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Abstract 
 
The tide toward the militarization of autonomous technologies has prompted 
critics to propose a pre-emptive ban on their development for fear that they may not 
adhere to international laws and, worse still, that no one will be responsible for their 
use.  These criticisms, however, are rooted in pessimistic prognoses that misconstrue 
the potential of emerging technologies and international law’s ability to regulate 
them.  Accordingly, this thesis advances three arguments to dismantle these dystopian 
perspectives. First, a pre-emptive ban ignores the centuries-long distribution of 
violent tasks between humans and non-human actants.  In the process, it seeks to 
revise current terminologies by shifting the focus on autonomy and lethality toward 
intelligence, violence, and systems. Second, the current international legal 
architecture is adequate to (a) ensure the responsible use of emerging autonomous 
weapons systems and (b) allocate human responsibility for their use. Critics often 
argue that it is impossible to preprogram all eventualities of warfare into a machine, 
but this perspective ignores advances in machine learning, that enable intelligent 
systems to teach themselves rules based on set parameters and algorithms. Third, 
critics misunderstand the networked nature of human violence, and consequently 
underestimate the elasticity of international law.  To this end, this thesis borrows from 
evolutionary biology, psychology, and semiotics to explain the composition and 
constitution of networks of human violence.  Ultimately, by viewing armed conflicts 
through the lenses of networks, this thesis argues that international law is capable of 
regulating human violence regardless of its conduit.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
 To study war is to study the expressions of human power through violence 
which, despite diverse materializations, remain products of human will.  While 
human violence has historically been declining,1 our species’ adeptness at innovating 
how violence is produced has dramatically increased.2  From the arrow to the 
algorithm, means and methods of human violence have evolved to enable humans to 
do more with less human input.3  The study of war is thus also a study of how humans 
produce, organize, and engineer violence through “bureaucratic death-dealing 
enterprise[s]” 4  that combine human actors and non-human actants.  This re-
materialization of violence—not to be confused with its de-humanization—entails 
significant legal consequences because it challenges the anthropomorphic conception 
of the legal subject and how legal systems attribute responsibility.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE xxi (Penguin Books, 2011) 
(“[V]iolence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most 
peaceable era in our species’ exsitence.”). 
2 BENJAMIN WITTES AND GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE 7 (Basic Books, 
2015) (“Technologies that put destructive power traditionally confined to states in the hands of small 
groups and individuals have proliferated remarkably far, as a general matter.  That proliferation is 
accelerating at an awe-inspiring clip across a number of technological platforms—in particular, 
networked computers and biotechnology and, in the not-so-distant future, robotics and nanotechnology 
as well…They are platform technologies—that is, technologies that facilitate generative creativity in 
their users to build and invent new things, new weapons, and new modes of attack.”). 
3 PINKER, supra note 1, at 673 (“Over the millennia weapons, just like every technology, got 
better and better”). 
4 ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING 
4 (Simon & Schuster, 2016). 
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These issues have come to the fore in the context of weapon systems capable 
of autonomously participating in—or actually carrying out—the infliction of lethal 
force in international armed conflicts.5  While these technologies already exist in 
some form, current apprehensions concern the development of what some have 
dubbed “Lethal Autonomous Robots” (“LARs”) or “Lethal Autonomous Weapon 
Systems” (“LAWS”)—weapon systems capable of selecting, targeting, and firing at a 
target without human intervention.  Numerous countries are studying the capabilities 
of these systems, and some, like the US, Russia, and China, have expressed an 
interest to utilize them at some point in the near future.   
The tide toward the militarization of autonomous technologies has prompted a 
handful of governments, 6  organizations, and advocates to propose a “ban” or 
“moratorium” on the development of such systems for fear that they may not adhere 
to international laws and, worse still, that no one will be responsible for their use.  
This potential accountability vacuum,7 or responsibility gap,8 effectively elevates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See e.g. Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned 
Robots in Warfare, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, 43 (May 2013), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/410220/EXPO-
DROI_ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf  (“How does increasing robotic autonomy affect the legal 
responsibility of States and individuals for potential harm which may result from their use?”). 
6 See e.g. Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, and 
Zambia.  See Dustin A. Lewis, Gabriella Blum, and Naz K. Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm 
Accountability 62, (Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, 2016), 
available at http://pilac.law.harvard.edu/waa/ 
7 Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, ¶ 77, Human Rights Council, 3rd Session, A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013). 
8 See e.g. Matthias, A., The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of 
learning automata, 6(3) ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 175–183 (2004); Heyns, supra 7, ¶ 
77. 
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autonomous weapons to “deodands”—a peculiar class of moving objects, like a rock,9 
or “beasts,” 10  like a horse, whose “movement,” despite being the “immediate 
occasion of a fatal accident,”11 entails no human liability.  Developed in the 11th 
century to make legal sense of deaths or injuries caused by “moveable thing[s] 
inanimate, or beast[s] animate,”12 deodand law is a reflection of jurisprudential 
struggles to attribute responsibility for human fatalities caused by non-human 
actants.13   
 While the critics’ concerns about the dangers of autonomous weapons are 
understandable, they are rooted on pessimistic prognoses that misconstrue the 
potential of emerging technologies14 and international law’s ability to regulate them.  
Accordingly, this thesis advances three arguments to dismantle these dystopian 
perspectives.  The thesis’ structure tracks these arguments in sequential order. 
 First, advocates for a pre-emptive ban assume that autonomous technologies 
are unique because they shift powers of lethal decision-making away from human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47(3) THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY, 237, 238 (“If a horse kicked a man in the chest or a stone fell 
on his head, the horse or the stone would be a deodand.”). 
10 Id., 238. 
11 Id. (“an animal or object was a deodand if its movement was the immediate occasion of a 
fatal accident.”). 
12 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME III 58 (Printed for A. 
Crooke [and 12 others], 1669) (“when any moveable thing inanimate, or beast animate, does move to, 
or cause the untimely death of any reasonable creature by mischance…without the will, offence, or 
fault of himself, or of any person, [that thing is a deodand.]”); Pervukhin, supra note 9, 238; see also 
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993)(“[I]f a man was killed by a moving cart, the cart and 
its horses were deodands…”). 
13 The law of deodands was abolished by The Deodands Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict, c.62).  
14 Deborah G. Johnson, Technology with No Human Responsibility?, 127(4) JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS ETHICS 707, 709 (2014) (“speculations about a responsibility gap misrepresent the situation 
and are based on false assumptions about technological development and about responsibility.”). 
! 4 
control.  This assumption, however, ignores the centuries-long distribution of violent 
tasks between humans and non-human actants.  This thesis employs the term “actant” 
as a “semiotic definition . . . that is something that acts or to which activity is granted 
by another . . . an actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the 
source of action.”15  Practical responsibilities for the production of violence (from 
planning to infliction) are inextricably shared between humans and other actants.  
From the automated assembly lines that manufacture weapon parts, through the 
computer systems that guide fire and forget missiles, to the warhead that inflicts lethal 
force, the praxis of violence is not confined to the human hand—it is a product of 
distributed practical responsibilities in networks of violence.  This distribution is at 
the heart of how humans design violence in international armed conflicts.  While 
human beings have always been functionally and legally responsible for organizing 
violence, technology has allowed our species to distribute numerous tasks to non-
human actants, including assembly lines, tanks, airplanes, weapons, drones, and, 
more recently, artificial intelligence. 
Terminology is also making it harder to engage in meaningful debates about 
the legal and moral implications of autonomous weapons.  In particular, the focus on 
“autonomy,” when combined with other terms like “lethality” and “robot,” distracts 
stakeholders from International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”)’s16 current priority to 
maximize human security through the moderation of the means and methods of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Bruno Latour, On actor network theory: a few clarifications, 47 SOZIALE WELT, 360, 373 
(1996).  
16 TERRI THORNE AND ERIC C. HUSBY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 8 (The Judge 
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, 2012), available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf (“The law of armed conflict 
is also referred to as the law of war (LOW) or international humanitarian law (IHL)”). 
! 5 
warfare.  This thesis proposes an alternative taxonomy, namely Violent Intelligent 
Systems (“VIS”), to facilitate discourse concerning weapons capable of autonomous 
operation.17  
 Second, current international laws are adequate to ensure the responsible use 
of the “means and methods” of warfare, including emerging autonomous weapons.  
The well-established principles of distinction, proportionality, precautionary 
measures, necessity, and doubt under IHL are focused on moderating the impact of 
violence regardless of its conduit.  Critics often argue that it is impossible to 
preprogram all eventualities of warfare into a machine, and accordingly, it is 
impossible, for instance, to teach a machine how to distinguish civilians from 
combatants, or to gauge the value of military targets.  But this perspective ignores 
advances in artificial intelligence, particularly machine learning, that enable 
intelligent systems to teach themselves rules based on set parameters and algorithms.  
If the Industrial Revolution automated manual tasks and the Information Age 
automated mental tasks, “the ‘Machine Learning’ Revolution is automat[ing] 
automation itself.”18  Since calls for a preventive ban are based on a thought 
experiment that focuses on technological incompetence, this thesis, in seeking to 
develop a more optimistic narrative, engages in a thought experiment about 
technology’s potential based on current developments.  As Johnson put it, “[t]he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See also Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at vii (“the [Autonomous Weapon 
Systems] framing has largely precluded meaningful analysis of whether it (whatever “it” entails) can 
be regulated, let alone whether and how it should be regulated….[and proposing] the concept of war 
algorithm [,which includes] any algorithm that is expressed in computer code, that is effectuated 
through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating in relation to armed conflict. Those 
algorithms seem to be a—and perhaps the—key ingredient of what most people and states discuss 
when they address AWS.”). 
18 PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 10 (Basic Books, 2015). 
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discourse on responsibility and artificial agents . . . is largely a discourse about the 
future.”19  This thesis argues that international responsibility for the use of VIS falls 
squarely on humans and human institutions, e.g., States, as dictated by principles of 
State responsibility and international criminal law.20  
 Third, critics misunderstand how human violence is organized in international 
armed conflicts, and consequently underestimate the elasticity of international law.  
Human violence does not operate in a vacuum.  It is a product of networks that 
combine humans and non-human actants to deliver force on an adversary.  In these 
networks, legal responsibilities do not travel with practical responsibilities,21 but 
firmly remain with the designers and manufacturers of violence: humans and human 
institutions.  As Gabriella Blum and Natalie Lockwood put it, “wars do not merely 
‘happen’; they are waged and prosecuted. Human beings control the incidence of 
armed conflicts and what transpires in their course.”22  To this end, this thesis 
borrows from evolutionary biology, psychology, and semiotics to explain the 
composition and constitution of networks of human violence.  It argues that violent 
technologies, including Violent Intelligent Systems, are phenotypic expressions of the 
human drive to wield political power through violence.  In this vein, VIS are active 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Johnson, supra 14, 710. 
20 Heyns, supra 7, at 15 (“The question of legal responsibility could be an overriding issue.”). 
21 See also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 212-214 (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edition, 2008) (distinguishing between role responsibility and cause responsibility). 
22 Gabriella Blum and Natalie Lockwood, Earthquakes and Wars: the Logic of International 
Reparations, in MAY, L. AND EDENBERG, E., (eds.), “JUS POST BELLUM” AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
190 (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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external media that assist the cognitive organization of violence much like a pen and 
calculator helped organize information processing in the Information Age.  Code, as 
the weapon of the 21st century, acts as a cognitive agent of human intentionality.  
Ultimately, by viewing armed conflicts through the lenses of networks, this thesis 
argues that international law is capable of regulating means and methods of human 
violence (i.e., violence designed by humans to be unleashed in many ways) and not 
just human means and methods of violence (i.e., ways in which violence is unleashed 
only by humans). 
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Chapter II 
Human Design 
 
Violent Intelligent Systems in the 21st Century 
Violent Intelligent Systems (“VIS”) increasingly capable of autonomous 
operation are no longer the product of the human imagination.  These technologies 
are no longer fanciful mockups of archetypal Renaissance men, such as Leonardo da 
Vinci’s “mechanical knight,”23  or fictional characters, such as Lord Dunsany’s 
“thinking beast of steel”24 or James Cameron’s “The Terminator.”  Weapon systems 
capable of autonomous action have now entered the realm of science fact with real 
legal, military and geopolitical implications.25   
Indeed, weapons with varying degrees of autonomy are already in use.  
Drones, as unmanned weapons, are widely considered precursors to autonomous 
weapons and have become staple military tools used in various capacities by over 85 
armed forces around the world.26  Highly sophisticated weapons are already playing 
autonomous defensive roles.27  For example, some U.S. Navy ships are equipped with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 M.E. Moran, The da Vinci robot, 20 JOURNAL OF ENDOUROLOGY 12, 986–990 (2006). 
24 LORD DUNSANY, THE LAST REVOLUTION 1 (Talos, reprint edition, 2015). 
25 Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal ‘Singularity’?, 1 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & POLICY 1, 45 (2013) (“In recent years, this technology has moved 
from the realm of science fiction to reality”). 
26 World of Drones: Military, International Security Website, available at http://securitydata. 
newamerica.net/world-drones.html [Last accessed September 26, 2016]. 
 
27 Autonomous weapons with offensive capabilities are yet to be deployed.  This is 
unsurprising because offensive autonomy arguably raises more complex issues since their use 
! 9 
the Phalanx anti-ship missile system “capable of autonomously performing its own 
search, detect, evaluation, track, engage and kill assessment functions.”28  South 
Korea’s SGR-A1 sentry guards the demilitarized zone separating North and South 
Korea, with capabilities to autonomously identify and destroy targets.29  Israel’s 
Harpy anti-radar missile system and the Guardium sentry robot are capable of 
autonomously destroying enemy radars and identifying suspicious elements on the 
border with Gaza.30  Russia has reportedly installed robot sentries at ballistic missile 
installations to “detect and destroy targets without a human giving the go-ahead.”31   
In both policy and practical terms, systems capable of autonomous operation 
are gradually becoming central to the military strategy of some of the world’s largest 
militaries, including the United States.  In the last two decades, US policy has 
gradually shifted from a focus on developing unmanned vehicles, such as drones, to 
increasing autonomous capabilities.  In 2001, the U.S. Congress issued a mandate 
stating that by 2010 one-third of all “U.S. deep-strike aircraft should be unmanned” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
increases the propensities of engagement due to increased mobility and greater exposure to the enemy 
and noncombatants. 
28 MK 15-Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, U.S. Navy Website, available at 
http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/Phalanx-CIWS.aspx [Last accessed September 26, 2016]. 
29 Alexander Velez-Green, The South Korean Sentry- A “Killer Robot” to Prevent War, 
LAWFARE BLOG, March 1, 2015, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/03/the-foreign-policy-
essay-the-south-korean-sentry-a-killer-robot-to-prevent-war/. 
30 Pablo Kalmanovitz, Judgment, liability, and the risk of riskless warfare, in NEHAL BHUTA, 
SUSANNE BECK, ROBIN GEISS, HIN-YAN LIU AND CLAUS KRESS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: 
LAW, ETHICS, AND POLICY 147 (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
31 Randy Rieland, Can Killer Robots Learn to Follow the Rules of War?, SMITHSONIAN 
MAGAZINE, May 29, 2014, available at  http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/can-killer-
robots-learn-follow-rules-war-180951581/?no-ist [Last accessed September 26, 2016]. 
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and that by 2015 “one-third of all ground vehicles should likewise be unmanned.”32  
While that goal was not met, in 2009 the Department of Defense (“DoD”) 
emphasized that “the level of autonomy [in unmanned systems] should continue to 
progress from [a] fairly high level of human control/intervention to a high level of 
autonomous tactical behavior that enables more timely and informed human 
oversight.”33  Two years later, in its 2011-2036 Roadmap, the DoD stated that it must 
“continue to pursue technologies and policies that introduce a higher degree of 
autonomy to reduce the manpower burden and reliance on full-time high-speed 
communications links while also reducing decision loop cycle time.”34   
In 2012, the DoD released Directive 3000.09 (“Directive”), entitled 
“Autonomy in weapon systems,” which aims to:  
a. Establish DoD policy and assign responsibilities for the development 
and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, 
including manned and unmanned platforms.    
 
b.  Establish guidelines designed to minimize the probability and 
consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems that could lead to unintended engagements.35 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Gary E. Marchant, Braden Allenby, Ronald Arkin, Edward T. Barrett, Jason Borenstein, 
Lyn M. Gaudet, Orde Kittrie, Patrick Lin, George R. Lucas, Richard O’Meara, Jared Silberman, 
International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, THE COLUMBIA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
LAW REVIEW, Vol. XII, 277 (2011). 
33 FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 27, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/UMSIntegratedRoadmap2009.pdf . 
34 FY 2011-2036 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
vi, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20Systems%20Integrated%20 
Roadmap%20FY2011-2036.pdf. 
35 Directive Number 3000.09, U.S. Department of Defense, November 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf [hereinafter “Directive Number 3000.09”] 
at ¶ 1. 
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The Directive provides that “[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems 
shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels 
of human judgment over the use of force.”36  It is unclear, however, what metric or 
standard is used to determine the appropriateness of “human judgment,” which is also 
an undefined term.  One interpretation is to define it against what is permissible under 
the Directive.  First, the Directive provides that semi-autonomous systems may be 
used to apply lethal or non-lethal force.  Second, human-supervised autonomous 
weapon systems may be used to select and engage targets, but not human targets, for 
local defense purposes.  These guidelines mean the DoD will not, as a matter of 
standard policy,37 use autonomous weapons systems to inflict lethal force. Third, 
autonomous weapons systems may be used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force, 
such as electronic attacks, against material targets.  While the use of lethal 
autonomous force against human targets is presumptively forbidden, the guidelines 
provide that use that “fall[s] outside” standard policy is allowed as long as it is 
approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the [Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff], “before formal development and again before fielding.”38  These 
approvals add a layer of human judgment to the development and deployment of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Id., at ¶ 4.(a) (emphasis added). 
37 U.S. Opening Statement at the CCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, April 13, 2015, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/04/15/u-s-opening-
statement-at-the-ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/ (“The US 
delegation to the 2015 CCW meeting made “clear that the Directive does not establish a U.S. position 
on the potential future development of lethal autonomous weapon systems – it neither encourages nor 
prohibits the development of such future systems.”). 
38 Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, at ¶ 4(d).  
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lethal autonomous weapon systems.  It suggests that high-level approvals will be 
necessary for mission-specific situations where lethal force is used, or against a 
specific set of combatants or enemies.39 
 The Directive must be understood in the context of the Defense Innovation 
Initiative, also known as the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategies,40 designed to inter 
alia “accelerate innovation ... [to] identify, develop, and field breakthrough 
technologies and systems that sustain and advance the capability of U.S. military 
power.”41  The First Offset Strategy, officially called the New Look Program and 
steered by President Einsenhower, sought to use nuclear weapons as a method of 
deterrence to offset Soviet power after the Second World War.  The Second Offset 
Strategy was the development of precision munitions and stealth capabilities to offset 
enemy air and ground forces, which the US could not, at the time, match.  As the 
world enters the “most volatile security environments … in decades,”42 the Third 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The directive’s attempt to “avoid organized irresponsibility” has been criticized because “it 
does not clearly address a fundamental aspect of fully autonomous systems—namely, that a system’s 
course of action is not necessarily completely predictable for the operator.”  Markus Wagner, The 
Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of 
Autonomous Weapon Systems, 47 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 1, 33 (2014). 
40 Bob Work, The Third Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Speech, U.S. Department of Defense (Jan. 28, 2015) available at 
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-
its-implications-for-partners-and-allies (“[T]hat is the department's innovation initiative, the Defense 
Innovation Initiative, and what we refer to right now as the third offset strategy, or perhaps more 
accurately to everyone here, offset strategies.”). 
41 Chuck Hagel, Defense Innovation Initiative Memorandum, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
2 (Nov. 15, 2014) available at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf. 
42 Bob Work, supra note 40. 
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Offset Strategies seek to “identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and 
advance America’s military dominance for the 21st century.”43   
These offset strategies recognize that the distribution of violence between 
humans and non-human actants (e.g., nuclear weapons, precision munitions) are 
critical to achieve a competitive advantage on the battlefield.  Indeed, President 
Eisenhower’s First Offset Strategy was designed to reduce manpower while 
maintaining deterrence. 44   The Second Offset Strategy sought to continue this 
trajectory by employing more precise and less destructive technologies.  A critical 
component of the Third Offset Strategies, however, is that it focuses on human-
technology collaboration.  As the US Deputy Secretary of Defense put it, “the big 
idea right now for deterrence is human-machine collaboration and combat teaming.”45  
The idea that autonomous weapons will simply be deployed and left to their own 
devices is not what is envisaged here.  As this thesis argues, human violence in 
international armed conflicts has always been expressed as a network where human 
and non-human actants collaborate in some form, rather than autonomous lethal 
systems that operate independently from human control.   
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43 Id. 
44 Id. (“So to counter Soviet superiority without bankrupting the West, Eisenhower directed a 
top-level strategic review which resulted in what was called the New Look. And that said the U.S. 
would reduce military manpower and would rely instead on its nuclear arsenal, where we had a big 
advantage at the time, for deterrence.”); see also generally Geoffrey Parker, Introduction: The Western 
Way of War, in GEOFFREY PARKER (ed.), THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF WARFARE 1 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) (“The western way of war, which also boasts great antiquity, rests upon five 
principal foundations.  First, the armed forces of the West have always placed heavy reliance on 
superior technology, usually to compensate for their inferior numbers.”). 
45 Cheryl Pellerin, Work: Human-Machine Teaming Represents Defense Technology Future, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS, November 8, 2015, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/628154/work-human-machine-teaming-represents-
defense-technology-future. 
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To achieve these strategies, the DoD is investing in numerous programs to 
better understand and develop autonomous capabilities. 46   For example, the 
Probabilistic Programming for Advancing Machine Learning seeks to “create an 
advanced computer programming capability that greatly facilitates the construction of 
new machine learning applications in a wide range of domains,” including 
“autonomous system navigation and control.”47  The Cognitive Computing Project 
focuses on developing “technologies that enable[] computing and autonomy systems 
to learn and apply knowledge gained through experience,”48 including “systems with 
increased self-reliance and the capacity to operate with reduced programmer and 
operator intervention.” 49   The Autonomous Robotic Manipulation program 
“developed advanced robotic technologies that enabled autonomous (unmanned) 
mobile platforms to manipulate objects without human control or intervention.”50  
The Pentagon is also “testing autonomous ships that can remain at sea for months 
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46 The DoD also opened an “outreach center” in Silicon Valley to “encourage some of the 
most innovative start-ups to turn their attention to national security.”  See Christian Davenport, Robots, 
swarming drones and ‘Iron Man’: Welcome to the new arms race, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 
20160 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/17/robots-
swarming-drones-and-iron-man-welcome-to-the-new-arms-race/. 
47 Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President’s Budget Submission, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
available at http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/DARPAFY17PresidentsBudgetRequest.pdf at 14-15. 
48 Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget Submission, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
available at http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/(2G1)%20Global%20Nav%20-%20About%20Us%20-
%20Budget%20-%20Budget%20Entries%20-%20FY2016%20(Approved).pdf [hereinafter DARPA 
2016 Budget] at 107. 
49 DARPA 2016 Budget, supra note 48, at 107. 
50 DARPA 2016 Budget, supra note 48, at 109 (“A key objective was intelligent control of 
manipulators to independently perform subtasks over a broad range of domains of interest to the 
warfighter, thereby reducing operator workload, time on target, training time, bandwidth, and hardware 
complexity.”). 
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without a crew.”51  In 2014, the Office of Naval Research awarded $7.5 million in 
grant money to university researchers to explore how to, inter alia, develop “novel 
computational means by which [autonomous] robots can reason and act ethically in 
the face of complex, practical challenges.”52  The US and UK armed forces are also 
investing in joint programs to “deepen” collaboration in the development of 
autonomous systems. 53   These investments have led some to prophesize that 
“[o]perational realities will likely drive the United States to discard its practice of 
keeping a human in the loop for lethal targeting decisions.”54  
Other militaries around the world are following suit.  For example, by 2025, 
“30 percent of all military technology in the Russian Armed Forces is expected to 
consist of robotic hardware.”55  China is similarly investing in military robotics and 
autonomy, having unveiled robots capable of “wield[ing] anti-tank weapons, grenade 
launchers and assault rifles.”56  The Dutch Armed Forces also noted that if they “are 
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51 Davenport, supra note 46. 
52 Moral Competence in Computational Architectures for Robots, Human Robot Interaction 
Laboratory,  (Apr. 8, 2016), available at http://hrilab.tufts.edu/muri13/ 
53 Philip Dunne, UK and US look to robotics help for ‘last mile’, U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
NEWS (Jul. 14, 2016), available at //www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-look-to-robotics-help-
for-last-mile 
54 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon 
Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231, 237 (2013). 
55 Franz-Stefan Gady, Meet Russia’s New Killer Robot, THE DIPLOMAT (Jul. 21, 2015), 
available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/meet-russias-new-killer-robot/. 
56 Patrick Tucker, The Pentagon is Nervous about Russian and Chinese Killer Robots, 
DEFENSE ONE (Dec. 14, 2015), available at http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/12/pentagon-
nervous-about-russian-and-chinese-killer-robots/124465/?oref=d-river 
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to remain technologically advanced, autonomous weapons will have a role to play, 
now and in the future.”57 
Autonomous weapons will likely first be used for specific missions that do not 
employ lethal force, and gradually progress into—or “incremental[ly] march”58 
toward—lethal capabilities as technologies become more sophisticated and better 
integrated with human networks.59  As more militaries pursue these programs, the 
research, development and eventual deployment of these technologies will intensify 
around the world.60  If we are to take unmanned aerial vehicles as an indicator, the 
number of countries that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system nearly 
doubled in the past decade alone.61   
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57 Autonomous weapon systems: the need for meaningful human control, Advisory Report, 
DUTCH ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Mar. 2, 2016) available at http://aiv-
advies.nl/8gr. 
58 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Why a Ban Won 't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTION RESEARCH 
PAPERS, 4-6 (Apr. 9, 2013) available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241. 
59 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, United States Air Force, 41 (May 18, 
2009) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf (For example, the Flight Plan 
for the US Air Force notes that “[a]dvances in computing speeds and capacity will change how 
technology affects the [Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act] loop. As a result, “humans will no longer be 
‘in the loop’ but rather ‘on the loop’ – monitoring the execution of certain decisions. Simultaneously, 
advances in [artificial intelligence] will enable systems to make combat decisions and act within legal 
and policy constraints without necessarily requiring human input.”). 
60 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 135 (“the fact that other states, including some U.S. adversaries, 
are pursuing research into such weapons systems means that the United States may have to do the 
same, for purely defensive purposes: human reaction time won’t be able to keep pace with machine 
reaction time.”). 
61 JEFFREY L. CATON, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: A BRIEF SURVEY OF 
DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 8, The Letort Papers (United States 
Army War College Press, 2015). 
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This trajectory is man-made—there is no “blind watchmaker.” 62   The 
development of system autonomy is the product of human-designed endeavors, both 
at the individual and institutional levels.63  The systems are not self-reproducing—
they are products of research programs that incorporate technologies developed by 
human policy makers, military personnel, developers, engineers, and others in public 
and private sectors.    
 
Hostility toward the Technological Distribution  
of Violence Tasks 
The tide toward the militarization of autonomy has raised alarm in 
government circles and civic society worldwide.64  Concerned stakeholders have 
argued that autonomous weapons should be banned because they will be incapable to 
meet the stringent standards of international humanitarian law,65 will make war more 
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62 JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE xiv (HarperCollins, 2015) (“There’s no 
blind watchmaker for the evolution of machines.  Whether we augment or automate is a design 
decision that will be made by individual human beings.”). 
63 Johnson, supra note 14, at 6  (“Given that producing a new technology involves many 
human actors making decisions and getting others to accept those decisions, in order to imagine a 
future time at which there will be artificial agents for which no humans are responsible, we have to 
imagine that the human actors involved would decide to create, release, and accept technologies that 
are incomprehensible and out of the control of humans.”). 
64 See e.g. Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 
2012)[hereinafter “Losing Humanity”]; Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, available at 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/; Republic of Sierra Leone, Opening Statement by Ambassador 
Yvette Stevens, CCW 2016 Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), at 
3 (Apr. 2016) available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0054AE2FAA24E566C1257F 
9B004A2CAB/$file/SIERRA+LEONE+GENERAL+STATEMENT+2016+MEETING+ON+LAWS.p
df. 
 
65 Losing Humanity, supra note 64, at 1; see also Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and legality of 
autonomous and remote weapons systems, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 886, 
630 (2012)  (“International humanitarian law (IHL) in its current manifestation is insufficient to 
regulate the growing use of autonomous and remote weapons systems . . .”); Melzer, supra note 5, at 1 
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likely,66 and will effectively allow humans to evade responsibility.67  From a moral 
standpoint, some have also argued that such weapons should be banned because 
decisions of life and death involve moral judgments that only humans can make.68  
Ultimately, these concerns focus on notions of responsibility that shape our 
understanding of permissible conduct: the ability to act responsibly and to be 
responsible for one’s acts.69  
The drive to ban the development of autonomous weapon systems have been 
largely set in motion by non-government organizations, such as Human Rights Watch 
(“HRW”) and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.  In Losing Humanity, HRW has 
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(“the EU should work towards the adoption of a binding international agreement, or a non-binding 
code of conduct, aiming to restrict the development, proliferation or use of certain unmanned weapon 
systems in line with the legal consensus achieved.”). 
66 Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(2015) [hereinafter “Mind the Gap”], at 1 (“potential threats include the prospect of an arms race and 
proliferation to armed forces with little regard for the law. “); Heyns, supra note 7, at 11 (“Due to the 
low or lowered human costs of armed conflict to States with LARs in their arsenals, the national public 
may over time become increasingly disengaged and leave the decision to use force as a largely 
financial or diplomatic question for the State, leading to the “normalization” of armed conflict.  LARs 
may thus lower the threshold for States for going to war or otherwise using lethal force, resulting in 
armed conflict no longer being a measure of last resort ”). 
67 Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 2 (“Existing mechanisms for legal accountability are ill 
suited and inadequate to address the unlawful harms fully autonomous weapons might cause.”). 
68 See Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, available at https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-
problem/  (“Allowing life or death decisions to be made by machines crosses a fundamental moral line. 
Autonomous robots would lack human judgment and the ability to understand context. These qualities 
are necessary to make complex ethical choices on a dynamic battlefield, to distinguish adequately 
between soldiers and civilians, and to evaluate the proportionality of an attack. As a result, fully 
autonomous weapons would not meet the requirements of the laws of war.”); see also Heyns, supra 
note 7, at 17 (proposing a moratorium and noting that “[m]achines lack morality and mortality, and 
should as a result not have life and death powers over humans.”). 
69 Vik Kanwar, Post-Human Humanitarian Law: The Law of War in the Age of Robotic 
Weapons, 2 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAl 616, 618 (2011) (asking if the role of human 
combatants recedes, will the respect for humanity be less in either sense? In a “post-human” context of 
war, where robots take over combat functions, will the connection between these two notions of 
humanity persist in our overall conception of IHL?). 
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called for a “preemptive prohibition” 70 of the development of autonomous weapons.  
HRW argues that “such revolutionary weapons would not be consistent with 
international humanitarian law and would increase the risk of death or injury to 
civilians during armed conflict.”71  According to HRW, autonomous weapons “would 
be unable to follow the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity and 
might contravene the Martens Clause.”72   
Others have advocated that lethal autonomous weapons should be subject to 
“meaningful human control,”73 a term used to “highlight that if the locus of human 
decision-making and of moral and legal responsibility becomes too far removed from 
the locus where harm is experienced; if the connection between the two becomes too 
remote or diffuse or distributed, human control ceases to be meaningful.”74  If a 
weapon lacking meaningful human control malfunctions and engages human beings, 
critics argue that “it is possible that no human would be held accountable for those 
engagements.”75  In a 2016 report focused on the right to assembly and duties of law 
enforcement, UN Special Rapporteurs Maina Kiai and Christof Heyns recommended 
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70 Losing Humanity, supra note 64, at 1. 
71 Id. 
72 Id., at 30. 
73 Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 36 (Apr. 
2013) at 1, available at http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Policy_Paper1.pdf 
74 Maya Brehm, Meaningful Human Control, Presentation, Informal Meeting of Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
(Apr. 14, 2015) at 4; Michael C. Horowitz and Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon 
Systems: A Primer, Working Paper, CENTER FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, 11 (Mar. 2015), available 
at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical_Autonomy_ Working_Paper_ 
031315.pdf. 
75 Horowitz and Scharre, supra note 74, at 4. 
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that “[a]utonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful human control 
should be prohibited.”76  Some have also argued for “an implicit requirement for 
human judgment” in IHL77 and for a “duty” not to delegate the authority to kill to 
machines.78 
These concerns are to some extent an outgrowth of the continued 
“humanization of international humanitarian law.” 79   By shifting the focus of 
regulating war from state security (i.e., “border etc.”) to “human security” (i.e., 
protection of persons and peoples), any weapon that could undermine human security 
deserves close examination and scrutiny.  While this is a legitimate concern, it 
mischaracterizes the relevance of autonomous weapons in international legal 
discourse.  Indeed, their use brings human security to the center stage because 
artificially intelligent systems will need to satisfy high levels of confidence before 
they are fielded.  It will require policy makers, military personnel, and developers to 
flesh out definitions (e.g., proportionality) and develop technologies capable of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 76 Maina Kiai and Christof Heyns, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, United Nations General 
Assembly, Human Rights Council, A/HR/31/66, at 15 (Feb. 4, 2016). 
77 Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and 
the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 94, no. 
886, 687 (2012), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-886-asaro.pdf. 
78 Asaro, supra note 78, at 687 (“In particular, there is a duty upon individuals and states in 
peacetime, as well as combatants, military organizations, and states in armed conflict situations, not to 
delegate to a machine or automated process the authority or capability to initiate the use of lethal force 
independently of human determinations of its moral and legal legitimacy in each and every case. I 
argue that it would be beneficial to establish this duty as an international norm, and express this with a 
treaty, before the emergence of a broad range of automated and autonomous weapons systems begin to 
appear that are likely to pose grave threats to the basic rights of individuals.”). 
79 Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regulation of 
Armed Conflicts, in AUSTIN SARAT, LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, AND MARTHA MERRILL UMPHREY, LAW 
AND WAR 48 (Stanford University Press, 2014). 
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increased precision and discrimination, thus benefiting the objective of maximizing 
human security.80   
But like its creator, technology can malfunction, raising questions about who 
is responsible when things go wrong.  In a separate effort focused on the 
accountability of autonomous weapons, HRW argued that it is “likely that humans 
associated with the use or production of [autonomous] weapons—notably operators 
and commanders, programmers and manufacturers—would escape liability for the 
suffering caused by fully autonomous weapons.” 81   Others have echoed these 
concerns. 82  Christof Heyns, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, 
or arbitrary executions, questioned whether “lethal autonomous robotics” could be 
programmed to comply with international humanitarian law and human rights law, 
and concluded that “their deployment may be unacceptable because no adequate 
system of legal accountability can be devised.”83  Heyns warned of a “potential 
accountability gap or vacuum” from the use of such weapon systems.84  Similarly, 
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80 Cadre Juridique D’un Eventuel Developpement Et Usage Operationnel D’un Futur 
Systeme D’armes Letal Autonome (Sala), Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (Apr. 2016) 
[hereinafter France Position Paper CCW] available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ 
(httpAssets)/52B09206029E8FD6C1257F8F0040349E/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_France+
LegalFramework.pdf (“En effet, l'utilisation de systèmes d'armes autonomes pourrait réduire les 
risques pour les civils en prenant des décisions de ciblage plus précises grâce à un calcul plus rapide 
des informations à leur disposition et des décisions de tir plus contrôlées du fait de l’absence de 
sentiments négatifs tels la peur, la panique et le désir de vengeance.”). 
 
81 Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 1 (emphasis added). 
82 Jack Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 617, 617 (2014) (noting the “enormous difficulty in assigning responsibilities 
to humans and states for the actions of these [autonomous] machines grows with their increasing 
autonomy.”) 
83 Heyns, supra note 7, at 1. 
84 Id., at ¶ 77. 
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Yale ethicist Wendell Wallach argues that “attribution and responsibility for the 
actions of autonomous machines is difficult if not impossible to make.”85   
Others have argued that the authority to legitimately inflict violence in war is 
exclusive to moral—human—agents.86  In this context, Maya Brehm argues that 
“organized violence . . . involves moral agents making moral judgments,” which are 
the result of a “deliberative process of human interaction” and not of “algorithmic 
calculations.”87  Heather Roff argues that by “hand[ing] over” lethal decision-making 
to machines, “we jeopardize a moral bedrock of just war theory” because there may 
be nobody responsible for those decisions. 88  To this end, Wallach and Allen argue 
that robot systems today only have operational morality, which refers to situations 
that have been fully pre-coded by the programmer and designer of the system.  The 
more challenging aspect is to develop robots that have functional morality, meaning 
systems capable of responding to scenarios that were not anticipated (and thus not 
pre-coded in the traditional sense) by the programmer and designer.  In this latter 
scenario, the robot will need to make ethical decisions alone.89  As this thesis will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 WENDELL WALLACH, A DANGEROUS MASTER 219 (Basic Books, 2015) (“Delegating life-
and-death decisions to machine is immoral because machines cannot be held responsible for their 
actions.”). 
86 See e.g. Heather M. Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, liability, and lethal autonomous 
robots, in FRITZ ALLHOFF, NICHOLAS G. EVANS, ADAM HENSCHKE (eds.), ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
ETHICS AND WAR 354 (Routledge, 2014) (“the ethical regulation of warfare is premised on the fact that 
the agents doing the fighting are moral agents, i.e., agents to whom responsibility for actions can be 
attributed.”). 
87 Brehm, supra note 74. 
88 Roff, supra note 86, at 251 (“Furthermore, I contend that when we hand over the decision 
to target and to fire to a machine, we jeopardize a moral bedrock of just war theory for we move from 
the central question of ‘who is responsible’ to ‘is there any potential of responsibility?’”). 
89 WENDELL WALLACH AND COLLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT 
FROM WRONG 9 (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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argue in Chapter III, machine learning provides a remedy to the pre-coding paradigm 
to enable intelligent systems to make ethical decisions without real-time human 
assistance.  Indeed, pessimistic prognoses about autonomous weapon systems in 
international armed conflicts are based on a misunderstanding of the potential of 
technology, including machine learning, as well as a failure to fully appreciate the 
elasticity of international law.90  To draw an analogy with air combat, “[i]t should be 
recalled that aeroplanes and drones were first used in armed conflict for surveillance 
purposes only, and offensive use was ruled out because of the anticipated adverse 
consequences.”91  Yet the use of aircraft is now typical in military operations and a 
well-regulated activity under international law. 
The fear that autonomous weapon systems will not perform adequately, that 
they will “act” with impunity, and that they are devoid of morality, may be grounded 
on human fear of what is unknown or misunderstood, or what is conjured at the 
intersection of science fictions and science facts.  As this thesis argues, the potential 
for these technologies to adhere to IHL, and for international law to attribute 
responsibility for their use, is being grossly underestimated by critics.   
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 90 Rodney Brooks, Artificial intelligence is a tool, not a threat, RETHINK ROBOTICS BLOG (Nov. 
10, 2014) available at http://www.rethinkrobotics.com/artificial-intelligence-tool-threat/ (“This all 
comes from some fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of the undeniable progress that is being 
made in AI, and from a misunderstanding of how far we really are from having volitional or intentional 
artificially intelligent beings, whether they be deeply benevolent or malevolent.”). 
91 Heyns, supra note 7, at 6. 
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The Technological Distribution  
of Violence Is Nothing New 
The cry for a ban also ignores the centuries-long distribution of violence tasks 
between humans and non-human actants.  Indeed, the use of automation and 
autonomy in warfare is “not a new concept.”92  The idea of removing the human body 
from the immediate infliction of violence has old roots.  Take, for example, the bow 
and arrow.  Invented over 10,000 years ago,93 the bow and arrow automated the 
propulsion and impact of violence over space and time.  Similarly, horses, as 
autonomous beings,94 have a long history of being used as “weapon[s]”,95 both 
literally and figuratively.96  Virtually all weapons have sought to automate some 
violent process—or a process for violent ends—while removing the human hand 
further away from the immediate infliction of violence.  Indeed, weapons illustrate 
the human desire to create unmanned vehicles of violence that position humans as 
“drivers” without necessarily being “in” the vehicle.97  For example, the Kettering 
Bug, developed after the First World War, was a pilotless biplane capable of carrying 
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92 CATON, supra note 61, at 5. 
93 Bow and Arrow, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at https://www.britannica.com/ 
technology/bow-and-arrow (“The origins of the bow and arrow are prehistoric; bone arrow points 
dating to 61,000 years ago have been found at Sibudu Cave in South Africa.”). 
 
94 Steve Wise, ‘Practical autonomy’ entitles some animals to rights, NATURE (Apr. 25, 2002) 
available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v416/n6883/full/416785a.html (arguing that 
animals have ‘practical autonomy’). 
95 MANUEL DELANDA, WAR IN THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 39 (Zone Books, 1991). 
96 CHRIS GRAVETT, TUDOR KNIGHT 29-30 (Osprey Publishing, 2006) (noting that horses used 
in close combat may have been taught to bite the opponent). 
97 This trend also likely has genetic roots since the removal of the human body away from the 
doing of violence concurrently removes the body away from exposure to counter-violence.   
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explosives.98  Similarly, in the Second World War, the Germans developed a cable-
operated vehicle dubbed Goliath capable of carrying explosive ordinances.99  As early 
as 1963, DARPA gave the Massachusetts Institute of Technology $2 million to 
explore “machine-aided cognition,” a move that jump-started research in AI.100  In 
1984, in a document called “Strategic Computing”, the Pentagon revealed its 
intention to create “autonomous weapons systems capable of fighting wars entirely on 
their own.”101 
In War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Manuel DeLanda traces the 
evolution of the “war machine” and argues that “[f]or centuries, military commanders 
have dreamed of eliminating the human element from the battlefield.”102  To illustrate 
his argument, DeLanda identified three phases in projectile-based production of 
violence: (i) the propulsion stage, covering everything up to the firing of a weapon 
(ii) the ballistic stage, covering its navigation, and (iii) the impact stage. 
The propulsion stage encompasses every task necessary to allow the projectile 
to be propelled out of the weapon.  In particular, three components make up the 
propulsion stage: fueling (i.e., loading a weapon); ignition (i.e., the triggering act); 
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98 Wagner, supra note 39, at 5-6. 
99 Id. 
100 Ty McCormick, Lethal Autonomy: A Short History, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 24, 2014) 
available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/24/lethal-autonomy-a-short-history/. 
101 DELANDA, supra note 95, at 128. 
102 DELANDA, supra note 95, at 128; Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous weapons systems: 
managing the inevitability of ‘taking the man out of the loop’, in BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, 
supra note 30, 209 (“Military leaders will constantly seek both the means (weapons) and the methods 
(tactics) of warfare to maximize their full-spectrum dominance over their adversaries.”). 
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and guidance (i.e., the imparting of the projectile).103  The 14th century hand canon, 
one of the first firearms, was unable to coordinate these three functions and depended 
heavily on human agents to coordinate them.  The smoothbore tube served as the 
“only guidance mechanism, so that the rest of the process depended on human 
marksmanship” 104 and the human gunner had to light the fuse to fire a weapon.  The 
fueling component was enhanced by the development of the metallic cartridge and 
breech-loading, which in contrast to its predecessor, known as “muzzle loading,” 
revolutionized the operation of the firearm.105  In 1424, the ignition process was 
simplified with a mechanical device—the matchlock—removing the human gunner’s 
involvement in that process.106  The manufacture of weapons also experienced a wave 
of automation with the replacement of individual gunsmiths with military engineers107 
“who began the military rationalization of labor in American armories and 
arsenals.”108  The standardization of labor in the production of military equipment 
effectively automated a process previously held by heavily specialized—manually 
intensive—labor.109  The Industrial Revolution precipitated this process.   
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In the ballistic stage, DeLanda sought to examine the evolution of “events 
influencing the trajectory of the missile in flight.”110  Here, the role of information 
technology becomes increasingly relevant.  DeLanda argues that early computers, in 
the form of mechanical calculators and people using those calculators, were deployed 
to create artillery range tables to assist gunners in the calculation of accurate missile 
trajectories.111  With the advent of the Differential Analyzer (a mechanical analogue 
computer), the people making these calculations were taken “out of the loop” as the 
process was automated.  As DeLanda explains:  
The next stage in this process would involve transferring the gunner’s 
calculating skills to the launching platform, to take him out of the 
decision-making loop.  The artillery range tables produced by 
automatic devices “were programmed into analog computers called 
gun directors which took over the job of calculating trajectories from 
the human antiaircraft gunner. Eventually the gun directors were 
connected to radar systems, channeling information about target 
location directly to control the guns . . . . The gunner had to predict 
how far ahead of a fast-moving plane he had to aim so that the 
trajectories of his missile and the plane would intersect at the right 
point.  This job of prediction was taken out by servomechanism 
(feedback-based) devices.”112 
 
The automation of the ballistic stage was further entrenched with the development of 
fire and forget weapons, aided by heat-seeking and computer controlled 
technology. 113  As DeLanda argues, “[a]rtificial [i]ntelligence would create the 
techniques necessary for building autonomous weapons systems endowed with 
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110 Id., at 39. 
111 Id., at 35. 
112 Id., at 46. 
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predatory capabilities of their own.” 114  
The third stage, which DeLanda calls the “impact stage,” overlaps with the 
prior stages and focuses on automating both the offensive and defensive aspects of 
the impact of projectile-based violence.  Here, DeLanda uses the radar to illustrate 
how walls and fortresses were rendered obsolete by missile technology, which in turn 
paved the way for a more expansive notion of a wall, this time in an electromagnetic 
form—the radar curtain—115 and developments in stealth technology shortly ensued.  
More recently, unmanned drones further removed human beings from the site of 
impact.  
The “iCombat world,”116 defined by a deeper collaboration between humans 
and technology, is thus the product of a centuries-long redistribution of violence tasks 
within networks of human violence.  As DeLanda put it:  
The robotic predator…may be seen as the culmination of the long  
“bridging” process started by electrical engineers and ballisticians in 
World War I, to channel scientific know-how into the creation of 
missiles and guns ever-less dependent on human skill for their 
performance…The efforts of military institutions to get humans out of 
the loop have been a major influence in the development of computer 
technology. The birth of autonomous weapons systems, of war games 
played by automata, of production systems that pace and discipline the 
worker, all are manifestations of this military drive...117   
 
The removal of human involvement from the propulsion, ballistic, and impact 
loops of violence has thus been an ongoing objective in networks of human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 Id.at 46. 
115 Id., at 51 (“The next stage in the development of the wall occurred when offense 
technology created a new delivery vehicle, the bomber plane, forcing the fortress to dematerialize into 
the electronic radar curtain.”). 
116 Pellerin, supra note 45. 
117 DELANDA, supra note 95, at 46, 177. 
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violence.  The end result is not a desire to entrust non-human actants with sole 
decision-making powers over life and death, but to incorporate technology 
capable of automation and autonomy within human networks to deliver force 
on the enemy.  
Of course, autonomy in robotic machines raises additional issues that 
are distinct from the automation of producing weapons118 and automating 
independent components of how they work.  Entrusting a weapons system 
relative independence over targeting and firing decisions raises vivid concerns 
about predictability, competence, and accountability.  Yet these weapons are 
merely a method of human violence by other means. 
 
Revised Taxonomy:  
Focus on Intelligence, Not Autonomy 
Many of the concerns about autonomous weapons systems stem from a 
perceived cessation of human control.  This perception is in part caused by 
terminological uncertainties.  Systems capable of autonomous decision-making in 
armed conflicts have been described in multiple forms, including lethal autonomous 
robots (“LARs”), 119  lethal autonomous weapon systems (“LAWS”), 120  Killer 
Robots,121 and autonomous military robots.122  These taxonomies create overtures for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 See id., at 177 (“In the early nineteenth century, the American military began to transform 
the mode of operation of its armories in order to produce firearms with perfectly interchangeable parts.  
To achieve this goal, they introduced methods for the routinization and standardization of labor.”) 
119 See Roff, supra note 86. 
120 See Heyns, supra note 7. 
121 See Losing Humanity, supra note 64. 
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mischaracterizations and hyperbolic constructions that do not reflect the true nature or 
the potential of artificial intelligence.  Indeed, the use of the term “autonomy” 
complicates our understanding of the technology and undermines the reality of human 
design and human use.  There are a number of reasons why the term “autonomy” 
should be replaced with “intelligence.”  Here, this thesis explains why the term 
Violent Intelligent Systems (“VIS”) is more fitting to describe violent emerging 
technologies capable of autonomous operation. 
Autonomy has been described in a variety of ways, and no uniform or 
“stable”123 definition exists in the technological, philosophical,124 or legal spheres.125  
Indeed, even in a discipline that conjures notions of precision (i.e., engineering), 
“autonomy means several different things.”126  In the military context, autonomous 
weapon systems have been described by the DoD as a “weapon system that, once 
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator.”127   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Merel Noorman and Deborah G. Johnson, Negotiating autonomy and responsibility in 
military robots, 16 ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 51, 51 (2014). 
123 Nehal Bhuta and Starvos-Evdokimos Pantazopoulos, Autonomy and uncertainty: 
increasingly autonomous weapons systems and the international legal regulation of risk, in BHUTA, 
BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, supra note 30, at 285 (Cambridge University Press, 2016) (“no stable 
consensus exists concerning the meaning of autonomy or of autonomy in weapons systems”). 
124 Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ (“the concept of autonomy is the focus 
of much controversy and debate”). 
125 Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at iii (“Largely, the discourse to date has 
revolved around a concept that so far lacks a definitional consensus… On one end of the spectrum, an 
AWS is an automated component of an existing weapon. On the other, it is a platform that is itself 
capable of sensing, learning, and launching resulting attacks.”). 
126 DAVID A. MINDELL, OUR ROBOTS, OURSELVES 11 (Viking, 2015). 
127 Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, at 13-14. 
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It may be easier to describe autonomy by reference to what it is not.  
Autonomy is different from remote controlled systems and automatic systems.128  
Whereas automatic systems are “fully preprogrammed and act repeatedly and 
independently of external influence or control” and can be ‘self-steering or self-
regulating’ but cannot ‘define’ or ‘dictate’ their own paths,”129 autonomous systems 
on the other hand are “self-directed toward a goal in that they do not require outside 
control,”130 and are “able to make a decision on a set of rules and/or limitations”131 
based on information that they deem important to the decision process.132  However, 
making such decisions about rules is accomplished by way of “programming 
platforms and approaches and a series of information inputs over repeated 
experiences of interactions.” 133  Thus, while a landmine is automatically 
indiscriminate, an autonomous weapon, powered by artificial intelligence, would be 
capable of discrimination based on its programming parameters.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Wagner, supra note 39, at 9 (“The different types of unmanned systems can be usefully 
grouped into three different categories, although these classifications are more realistically described 
as existing on a spectrum that moves from human-controlled systems towards full autonomy: remotely 
operated systems, automated systems, and systems that operate autonomously.”) 
129 Roff, supra note 86, at 353. 
130 Id., at 353. 
131 Id., at 353. 
132 See also Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, United States Department 
of Defense, Ref. No. 11-S-3613, 2011, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20 
Systems%20Integrated%20Roadmap%20FY2011-2036.pdf (“In its 2011 Roadmap, the DoD argues 
that automatic systems are fully preprogrammed and act repeatedly and independently of external 
influence or control. They are able to follow a predefined path while compensating for small deviations 
caused by external disturbances. In contrast, autonomous systems are self-directed toward a goal in 
that they do not require outside control, but rather are governed by laws and strategies that direct their 
behavior. Their behavior in response to certain events is not fully specified or pre- programmed. 
According to the DoD ‘[a]n autonomous system is able to make a decision based on a set of rules 
and/or limitations. It is able to determine what information is important in making a decision’”). 
 
133 Roff, supra note 86, at 353. 
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The notion that autonomy implies no human control is arguably founded on 
the misconception that autonomy implies full autonomy.  But full autonomy is a 
techno-mythic fantasy.  Autonomy is best understood to operate along a 
“continuum” 134  or a “spectrum” 135  of capabilities. 136   For example, the DoD’s 
definition of autonomous weapon systems includes human-supervised autonomous 
weapons systems “that are designed to allow human operators to override operation” 
of the weapon.137  Autonomy is a capability across different degrees and levels that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Tim McFarland and Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous 
Weapons Systems be Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361, 369 (2014) (“Machine autonomy 
is a capability that exists within a continuum rather than at discrete levels, ranging from complete 
human control over some operations to complete computer control. Military and civilian research 
organizations have proposed many different taxonomies of autonomous capability.”). 
135 Wagner, supra note 39, at 9 (“The different types of unmanned systems can be usefully 
grouped into three different categories, although these classifications are more realistically described 
as existing on a spectrum that moves from human-controlled systems towards full autonomy: remotely 
operated systems, automated systems, and systems that operate autonomously.”); Canadian Food for 
Thought Paper: Mapping Autonomy, Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 2006, available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C3EFCE5F7BA8613BC1257F8500439B9F/$f
ile/2016_LAWS+MX_CountryPaper+Canada+FFTP1.pdf (“Levels of autonomy vary according to a 
variety of factors. It is likely more useful to think in terms of a spectrum of autonomy, with the level of 
autonomy closely tied to a system’s technology and capabilities, operational environment, and chosen 
task, rather than merely the qualities of the system itself.”). 
136 HRW has developed a tripartite taxonomy that seeks to situate the human along the 
following spectrum: (i) “Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force 
only with a human command,” (ii) “Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and 
deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions,” and (iii) 
“Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force 
without any human input or interaction.” Losing Humanity, supra note 64, at 2.  While easy to follow, 
a weakness of HRW’s taxonomy is that it employs hidden assumptions about where the human is (and 
be) situated.  It also makes presumptions about what a “human” is and what terms like “human input” 
and “human command” encompass.  For example, couldn’t “human command” include commands by 
humans expressed through code? Similarly, the “Human out of the Loop” definition is based on the 
assumption that there was no “human input” in selecting a target, but wholly ignores that human-made 
code is responsible for modelling the selection of targets and the decision-making process of delivery 
force, if any.  See also Noel Sharkey, Staying in the loop: human supervisory control of weapons, in 
BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, supra note 30, at 27 (“human engages with and selects target 
and initiates any attack; program suggests alternative targets and human chooses which to attack; 
program selects target and human must approve before attack; program selects target and human has 
restricted time to veto; program selects target and initiates attack without human involvement”). 
137 Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, at 13-14. 
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adjust depending on context.138  It can refer to independent system capabilities, 
including perception, planning, learning, interacting, language understanding, and 
multi-agent coordination.139   But it also goes beyond computational autonomy.  
Indeed, “a robot cannot be said to be truly autonomous unless it has energy autonomy 
. . . there seems little point in building a smart robot that ‘dies’ when its battery runs 
out.”140  We are far from building a system that does not require humans for energy, 
healing, and reproduction.141  
The overall consensus on how to best describe autonomy is that it is “not as a 
discrete property of an object or system, but rather as a relationship between a system 
and its operator that may vary across the spectrum of different degrees of system 
autonomy.”142  As Johnson and Norman note: 
[M]aking robots autonomous in various ways means that human actors 
have different kinds of control. Human actors exert their influence as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, Task Force Report, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (Jul. 2012) available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/ 
autonomy.pdf at 23 (“The competing definitions for autonomy have led to confusion among 
developers and acquisition officers, as well as among operators and commanders. The attempt to 
define autonomy has resulted in a waste of both time and money spent debating and reconciling 
different terms and may be contributing to fears of unbounded autonomy. The definitions have been 
unsatisfactory because they typically try to express autonomy as a widget or discrete component, rather 
than a capability of the larger system enabled by the integration of human and machine abilities.”). 
139 Roff, supra note 86, at 353 (“In a 2012 task force report, the DSB identified “six key areas in which 
advances in autonomy would have significant benefit to the unmanned system: [perception, planning, 
learning, human-robot interaction, natural language understanding, multiagent coordination.]”). 
140 ALAN WINFIELD, ROBOTICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 49 (Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
141 Id., at 8.  This is not to mean that investments are not already being made in these specific 
capabilities.  Indeed, in the context of energy management, the defense contractor Raytheon has 
developed small robots named Hercules and Athena that run on solar power but are programmed to 
stay out of the light, a conflict that pushed the robots to develop “hunger” for energy and better life-
death management skills.  Davenport, supra note 46.  Harvard researchers have also built an ‘octobot’, 
a “self-contained” robot that is powered by chemical reactions and does not need batteries.  Jonathan 
Webb, Pneumatic octopus is first soft, solo robot, BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2016) available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-37169109. 
142 CATON, supra note 61, at 2. 
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they choose the mathematical and probabilistic models that will guide 
the behavior of the robotic system; as they formulate restrictions on 
the conditions for use and specify and verify the levels of reliability 
and predictability that robotic systems need to exhibit. Designers, 
developers, human operators as well as managers, regulators and 
policy makers, thus, set constraints on what robotic systems can and 
cannot do.143 
 
The emphasis on autonomy also misunderstands military operational realities.  
The absence of human liaison with a weapon system “contradicts the need for 
permanent and accurate situation awareness and the operational control by the 
commander.” 144   Commanders generally have no interest in deploying weapon 
systems that “they cannot control.”145  Even malevolent regimes and non-state groups 
that desire to use these weapon systems for nefarious purposes will need to program 
them to meet their goals. 
Far from a “Frankensteinian fantasy,”146 Violent Intelligent Systems are thus 
designed, programmed, and deployed by humans to achieve human objectives.   
There is no “[d]ehumanization” of lethal decision-making.147  While “[t]he crux of 
full autonomy is a capability to identify, target, and attack a person or object without 
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143 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 59-60. 
144 France Position Paper CCW, supra note 80. 
145 Horowitz and Scharre, supra note 74, at 8 (“A military’s tolerance for risk could vary 
considerably across cultures and strategic positions . . . . A desire for a battlefield advantage could 
push militaries to build weapons with high degrees of autonomy that diminish human control, 
particularly if they see such weapons as necessary to confront emerging threats or to keep pace with 
other militaries”). 
  146 Brad Allenby, What Human Rights Watch’s “Case Against Killer Robots” Gets Wrong   
About Military Realities, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
futuretense/2012/11/20/human rights watch_s_case_against killer robotsreport misunderstands 
_the.html. 
  147 Asaro, supra note 78, at 687-709; Heyns, supra note 7, at 17 (“Delegating this process 
dehumanizes armed conflict even further”). 
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human interface,”148 even “a fully autonomous system is never entirely human-
free”149 as “human beings will inevitably be involved, either in overseeing the 
operation of the weapon, or at least in producing and programming the weapon 
systems.”150  Indeed, it is highly unlikely for there to be fully autonomous weapon 
systems for the systems will always be subjected to the socialization of design and the 
parameters of code.  
The suggestion that autonomy implies humans are “out of the loop” should 
therefore be revised.  As this thesis argues, Violent Intelligent Systems, and the code 
that powers them, are expressions of human violence that cannot be disconnected 
from its human origin.  Autonomous systems execute tasks “on the designer’s 
behalf.”151  Autonomy is thus best conceived as “a human-designed means for 
transforming data sensed from the environment into purposeful plans and actions.”152  
These weapon systems “are not conducting automated warfare—people are still 
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148  Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: 
A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. FEATURES (2013), available at http://harvardnsj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf at 4 
149 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 235 (“Either the system designer or an operator 
would at least have to program it to function pursuant to specified parameters, and an operator would 
have to decide to employ it in a particular battlespace.”). 
150 Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, 
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT’L. L. STUD. 308, 309 (2014). 
151 Eduardo Alonso, Actions and agent, in KEITH FRANKISH AND WILLIAM M RAMSEY (eds.), 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 235 (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
(“By autonomy researchers mean the ability of the systems to make their own decisions and execute 
tasks on the designer’s behalf.”). 
152 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 12. 
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inventing, programming, and operating [them].”153  In other words, humans will 
“always . . . define how this autonomy will function.”154    
 A focus on autonomy has also led for calls to create a legal requirement for 
“meaningful human control” over their use. Two schools of thought emerge in this 
context.  The first does not propose an additional requirement but “rather a principle 
for the design and use of weapon systems in order to ensure that their use can comply 
with the laws of war.”155  As the Center for a New American Security points out, this 
“way of thinking about meaningful human control starts from the assumption that the 
rules that determine whether the use of a weapon is legal are the same whether a 
human delivers a lethal blow directly, a human launches a weapon from an unmanned 
system, or a human deploys an autonomous weapon system that selects and engages 
targets on its own.”  As part 3 of this thesis argues, international law already provides 
for this safeguard.  However, a more “maximalist” way of thinking about 
“meaningful human control” requires more than what current international law 
provides.  Here, “meaningful human control” is a separate and additional requirement 
that must be satisfied under the laws of war, though its contents are unclear. 
Further, “meaningful” is an open textured concept that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to define,156 and the term “human control” invites the question of control 
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153 Id., at 13. 
154 Sassóli, supra note 150, at 323-324 (“I do not think that the possession of autonomous 
decision making capacity breaks the causal chain allowing attribution and responsibility, because I 
assume that it is always humans who define how this autonomy will function.”). 
155 Horowitz and Scharre, supra note 74, at 7. 
156 CNAS surveyed the positions made by those advocating for “meaningful human control” 
and concluded that there are three “essential components” of the proposed requirement.  First, human 
operators must be able to make “informed, conscious decisions about the use of weapons.”  Second, 
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“at what level” 157 and in what form?  Efforts should be redirected to focus instead on 
whether an intelligent system is capable of meeting the requirements of IHL and other 
applicable rules (i.e., rules of engagement).  Whether the human is holding the trigger 
or marking the target is hardly relevant if the system, powered by artificial 
intelligence, cloud networking, and advanced robotics, is capable of adhering to legal 
parameters.  As one commentator put it, “[e]ven seemingly indisputable calls for a 
first principle of ‘meaningful human control’ mistake the issue, which is lessening the 
harms of armed conflict within the law by the means that are the most effective.”158  
Indeed, as this thesis argues, a VIS may act more intelligently than human soldiers 
and thus be able to better adhere to IHL.159  
Ultimately, decisions to develop and deploy autonomous weapon systems are 
firmly “concentrated in human hands.”160   Human judgment need not exclusively 
mean contemporaneous human supervision or control, but it also “includes the ability 
to decide when to let a machine operate autonomously—in other words, to forfeit 
[human] judgment, at least temporarily—and when to maintain [human] control over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
human operators have “sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness of the action they are taking, 
given what they know about the target, the weapon, and the context for action.”  Third, “[t]he weapon 
is designed and tested, and human operators are properly trained, to ensure effective control over the 
use of the weapon.”  Horowitz and Scharre, supra note 74, at 4. 
157 Horowitz and Scharre, supra note 74, at 15. 
158 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, and Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of Armed 
Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 401 (2014). 
159 Until artificial intelligence and robots are capable of reproducing, it is clear that human 
control will pervade the design, programming, and operation of VIS with autonomous capabilities.  
The code that runs through the semi-conductors and software of the systems are products of human 
will and expressions of human judgment – and thus control – in electronic form.   
160 PAUL DUMOUCHEL AND LUISA DAMIANO, VIVRE AVEC LES ROBOTS 201 (Seuil, 2016) (“la 
devolution de la capacite de choisir a des systems autonomes intensifie la concentration entre les mains 
de quelques agents humains seulement de la capacite politique et morale de decider”). 
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the machine.”161  In sum, the “decision to kill . . . is always taken by human beings 
[who] set out the ethical constraints to autonomous systems’ behavior . . . . Military 
robots are actually mechanical slaves that can only obey [human commands].”162  
Accordingly, the focus on autonomy should be replaced with a focus on 
“intelligence.”  The latter better captures both the technological realities and policy 
sensitivities surrounding the use of weapons capable of autonomous operation.  
Technologically, unless systems are able to autonomously reproduce and become 
self-sufficient, it is misleading to speak exclusively of “autonomy” in weapon 
systems.  A shift from autonomy to intelligence is better suited to describe systems 
that are capable of running thousands if not millions of calculations in complex and 
uncertain situations to achieve human objectives.163  The code that powers the 
weapons is a product of human design.  Even algorithms capable of machine learning 
are tied to the human-made code that dictates their parameters.  So when we look 
under the hood, code has no real autonomy.  The physical hardware that materializes 
code’s instructions (the gun subsystems, the sensors, etc.) are all designed by human 
beings and human institutions and do not “magically” animate themselves. 164  
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161 Dan Saxon, In the Context of the Design and Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems, What is 
Judgment?, Presentation, Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (Apr. 2016). 
162 DUMOUCHEL AND DAMIANO, supra note 160, at 203. 
163 Alonso, supra note 151, at 236 (“[I]ntelligence and learning are tightly tied in domains 
where autonomous agents must make decisions with partial or uncertain information: that is, in 
domains where agents learn without supervision and without the luxury of having a complete model of 
the world.”). 
164 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 59 (“Human actors exert their influence in at 
least three ways. First, much like in the Phalanx case, developers and designers delimit the problem 
that the robotic system is intended to solve and thus set constraints on its behavior . . . . A second way 
that human actors exert their influence on autonomous robots that are somehow more than automatic 
systems, is through norms and rules; even in future systems, norms and rules will still govern the 
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Intelligence better encompasses the capacity of code, hardware, and human designers 
and operators to interact in a network to organize and produce violence.  It also 
reflects the reality that artificial intelligence is the driving force of these systems.  
From a policy standpoint, the focus should not be whether “a system is too 
autonomous” but rather “is the system sufficiently intelligent to execute the task at 
hand in compliance with the law?”  Autonomy should not be the yardstick by which 
we measure weapon systems capable of autonomous operation.  Rather, the question 
should be whether intelligent systems can operate responsibly in accordance with 
legal requirements.  Autonomous beings (humans-included) can act irresponsibly, can 
fail to learn from their experiences, and can fail to accomplish stated goals.  
Intelligence, on the other hand, requires learning from and adapting to the operating 
environment.  Indeed, “an [AI] agent can hardly be called intelligent if it is not able to 
perform well when situated in an environment different from (yet in some ways 
similar to) the one it was originally designed for.”165   If we manage to build a 
completely autonomous system that fails to act intelligently and responsibly, would 
not we want to program it with some intelligence instead?  Should not these weapon 
systems be judged by their intelligence (or lack thereof), rather than their autonomy 
(or lack thereof)?   
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behavior of autonomous systems . . . . A third way that human actors exert their influence on 
autonomous robots has to do with predictability. Conceiving of autonomous robotic systems as 
somehow more flexible and nondeterministic than conventional automation calls for an increased 
emphasis on reliability and trust in technology, and the need to develop better methods for verification 
and validation (V&V).”). 
165 Alonso, supra note 151, at 236 (“[I]ntelligence and learning are tightly tied in domains 
where autonomous agents must make decisions with partial or uncertain information: that is, in 
domains where agents learn without supervision and without the luxury of having a complete model of 
the world.”). 
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Further, as a medium of artificial intelligence, code may allow for a more 
rigorous translation of IHL principles into military operation and thus better ensure 
that VIS operate responsibly, regardless of the system’s autonomous capabilities.  In 
other words, whereas intelligence can be regulated, autonomy implies uncertainty and 
irregulability.166  Moreover, terminologically, VIS suggest that these are creations of 
human design and engineering, 167  rather than the product of some bizarre 
Frankensteinian alchemy.168  
 The hostility toward autonomous weapons is also exacerbated by the 
association of autonomy with lethality.  Terms like “killer robots” or “lethal 
autonomous robots” conjure a sense of uncontrolled, Terminator-like,169 machines 
incapable of abiding by human commands—or worse, threatening the very existence 
of the human species.170  Lethality is a capacity—and potentially a consequence—of 
violence.  The term violence better encompasses the types of uses of weapons with 
autonomous capabilities, which may include lethal and non-lethal objectives.  
Violence also reflects the technological capability of developing a weapon that 
neutralizes, and not necessarily kills, a target.  Indeed, “the [U.S.] military is already 
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166 I am referring to non-human autonomous agents here. 
167 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 220 (“[A]ny supposedly intelligent system was designed by 
people”). 
168 In this context, the language of technology must be aligned with the language of the law. 
169 See BROOKS, supra note 4, at 135 (“The term does tend to have a chilling effect even upon 
those harboring a soft spot for R2-D2 and WALL-E.  I’m less concerned, however: not because I’m 
fond of killer robots, but because I’m inclined to think ethicists and rights advocates are far too 
generous in their assumptions about human beings.”). 
170 Ted Greenwald, Does Artificial Intelligence Pose a Threat, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 
10, 2015) available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-artificial-intelligence-pose-a-threat-
1431109025 (reporting on those that believe that AI poses an existential threat to mankind). 
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experimenting with a number of technologies that can incapacitate or control enemies 
without causing injury or death.”171  The DoD has been developing “active denial 
technology” which shoots a “beam of radio frequency millimeter waves toward a 
specific area,” effectively paralyzing the target “with no permanent ill effects” and 
thus giving the military more time to suppress ambushes and identify targets from 
civilians.172  Violence can thus be used for primarily non-lethal purposes, such as 
deterrence, or to protect vulnerable sites, such as schools, hospitals, and culturally 
significant sites.173 
In the context of autonomous weapons, the word “robot” embodies the idea of 
a separate technological unit, further personifies the technology, and thus intensifies 
the focus on autonomy.174  By contrast, the word “system,” meaning “a group of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 139. 
172 Id., at 139-140; Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program (May 11, 2016) available at http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact-
Sheets/Article-View-Factsheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology-fact-sheet/ (“Active Denial 
Technology produces a focused beam of directed energy to provide our troops a non-lethal option to 
stop, deter and turn back suspicious individuals with minimal risk of injury. Active Denial Technology 
is designed to protect the innocent, minimize fatalities and limit collateral damage across the range of 
military operations.”). 
173 Lucas Bento, Could Science Defeat Terrorism? Using Robots to Hunt Down ISIS, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 31, 2015) (“Killer robots would be particularly useful against groups like ISIS, where 
political costs are too high for major military powers to put boots on the ground, and political 
momentum too low to justify human military intervention to protect sites of cultural importance.”); 
Thiago Velozo and Lucas Bento, ISIS Is Destroying Priceless Artifacts.  Here’s How to Stop Them., 
THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 17, 2015) (noting how technology can help preserve cultural artifacts). 
174 The use of the term “robot”, while easy to understand and technically correct in certain 
contexts, carries significant connotations of personhood or fictional imagery of an animated ‘being’.  
See e.g. Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 2 (“The autonomous nature of killer robots would make them 
legally analogous to human soldiers in some ways, and thus it could trigger the doctrine of indirect 
responsibility, or command responsibility.”).  The word “comes from an Old Church Slavonic word, 
rabota, which means servitude of forced labor.” The word robot was introduced and popularized by 
Czech playwright Karel !apek, who used the word in his 1920 science-fiction play, R.U.R., 
or Rossum’s Universal Robots, which involved a factory that made artificial people to work for 
humans.  See Ira Flatow, Science Diction: The Origin of the Word ‘Robot’, NPR (Apr. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/04/22/135634400/science-diction-the-origin-of-the-word-robot. 
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related parts that move or work together,”175 is better suited to describe the interactive 
complexities of the technology.  Indeed, the term “weapon system” is already the 
term of choice among some stakeholders (though they also pair it with 
“autonomous”).176  
A Violent Intelligent System can operate sub-systems that include manned or 
unmanned platforms, munitions, or sub-munitions that can function autonomously or 
semi-autonomously.177   For example, in one mission the VIS may identify and target 
autonomously, but only fire after human real-time approval.  The same VIS in other 
missions may carry weapons that do the firing without human approval.  To this end, 
commentators note that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that all operations of an 
autonomous system will be subject to the same degree of human oversight, and a 
system may be operating at several different levels of autonomy simultaneously with 
respect to different tasks.”178    
 As artificial intelligence gains prominence in both traditional and cyber 
warfare, it will increasingly become integrated with traditional conceptions of space.  
To this end, the US military has been an early adopter of the internet of things (“IoT”) 
and is seeking to expand its applications on the battlefield.  This will further entrench !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Mariam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/system. 
 
176 See e.g. Directive Number 3000.9 supra note 35; Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122. 
177 Directive Number 3000.9, supra note 35, at 3 (“including manned or unmanned platforms, 
munitions, or sub-munitions that function as semi-autonomous weapon systems or as subcomponents 
of semi-autonomous weapon systems”); McFarland and McCormack, supra note 134, at 369 (“This 
consideration also applies to a ‘system of systems’ scenario wherein nominally separate systems with 
different levels of autonomy, such as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system 
and a weapons system, communicate directly.”). 
178 McFarland and McCormack, supra note 134, at 369.  
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the collaboration of human and non-human actants, as objects will become sources of 
information that can shape decision-making by both humans and weapon systems 
capable of autonomous operation.179   
 In the final analysis, the distribution of violence between humans and non-
human actants is a product of human political and sociotechnical design.180  While the 
mechanics that power modern weapons are beyond natural human abilities, they are 
nonetheless man-made creations.   Fighter jets, drones, battleships, cruise missiles, 
and other means of warfare, are not standalone objects, dangling in the void, but 
deliberately placed components in networks of human violence.181  
The “human design” of violence is not only to be understood as the actual 
design of the weapon systems themselves, but more perhaps importantly, the wider 
strategies that seek to engineer methods of violence that incorporate increased 
artificially intelligent capabilities while seeking to remove the human body away 
from the immediate infliction of violence.  Human design, in turn, entails human 
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179 Joe Mariani, Brian Williams, and Brett Loubert, Continuing the march: the past, present, 
and future of the IoT in the military, DELOITTE UNIVERSITY PRESS (Aug. 6, 2015) available at 
http://dupress.com/articles/internet-of-things-iot-in-military-defense-industry/. 
  180 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 61 (“The ascription of responsibility is therefore 
an integral part of the development and design of robots. Delegation of responsibility to human and 
non-human components is a sociotechnical design choice, not an inevitable outcome of technological 
development.”). 
181 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 59 (“Human actors exert their influence in at 
least three ways. First, much like in the Phalanx case, developers and designers delimit the problem 
that the robotic system is intended to solve and thus set constraints on its behavior… A second way 
that human actors exert their influence on autonomous robots that are somehow more than automatic 
systems, is through norms and rules; even in future sys- tems, norms and rules will still govern the 
behavior of autonomous systems . . . . A third way that human actors exert their influence on 
autonomous robots has to do with predictability. Conceiving of autonomous robotic systems as 
somehow more flexible and nondeterministic than conventional automation calls for an increased 
emphasis on reliability and trust in technology, and the need to develop better methods for verification 
and validation (V&V).”). 
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responsibilities that are encompassed by well-established principles of international 
law.  
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Chapter III 
Human Responsibility 
 
Moderating War through Legal and Practical Responsibilities 
 War is one of the most destructive human enterprises.182  The ability to 
moderate 183  war’s brutality and to attribute responsibility for its consequences 
informs the twin pillars of legal responsibility: acting responsibly,184 and being 
responsible for one’s acts.  Legal responsibility, then, can be divided as “responsible-
ability” and “responsible-liability,” with the former governed by jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello principles185 and the latter by principles of international criminal law 
(“ICL”) and state responsibility.  These mechanisms are important because “[w]ithout 
the promise of accountability, deterrence and prevention are reduced, resulting in 
lower protection of civilians and potential victims of war crimes.”186   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 MICHAEL P. JASINSKI, SOCIAL TRUST, ANARCHY, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 3 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) (describing war as “the most senseless and destructive of human 
enterprises”); see also CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 242 (Wordsworth Editions, 2000) (“The 
destruction of the enemy’s military force is the leading principle of war”). 
183 JONATHAN CROWE AND KYLIE WESTON-SCHEUBER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 2 (Edward Elgar, 2013) (arguing that IHL seeks to moderate the effects of 
warfare and noting that, as such, IHL “aims to ensure respect for the most basic human values, such as 
dignity, community, and freedom from suffering.”). 
184 At bottom, IHL was developed to address a consensus that humans were incapable of 
conducting themselves “humanely” in armed conflicts.  After all, law does not exist to remedy a 
vacuum. 
185 Principles of international human rights law may also apply. 
186 Heyns, supra note 7, at 14; Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 14 (“One of the primary 
reasons to hold individuals accountable is to deter harmful behavior. If individuals are punished for 
unlawful acts, they may be less likely to repeat them. Holding offenders responsible can also 
discourage future infractions by other actors, who fear being punished in the same way. According to 
Dinah Shelton, author of the treatise Remedies in International Human Rights Law, “[d]eterrence . . . is 
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In addition to legal responsibility, the notion of responsibility can also refer to 
practical responsibilities.  In functional terms, practical responsibilities are distributed 
among multiple actants in networks of human violence.  For example, the practical 
responsibility for a cruise missile to detonate upon impact lies with the engineering 
system embodied within the missile.  Legal responsibility for that impact, however, 
lies with human actors that engineered the attack.  Of course, practical and legal 
responsibilities inform each other.  Indeed, if a weapon is deemed practically 
incapable to discriminate between a civilian and a military target, humans are 
required under IHL not to use that weapon, and any such use would make human 
actors and human institutions responsible for it.   Thus, while practical responsibilities 
may be shared between human actors and non-human actants, legal responsibilities 
are not similarly distributed.187  As this thesis argues, only human beings and human 
institutions share legal responsibilities for the participation of non-human actants, 
such as VIS, in the delivery of violence in international armed conflicts. 
 The pursuit of mitigating188 war’s brutality has old roots.189  Sumerian law 
prescribed “specific rules” to govern wartime conduct, such as the granting of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
assumed to work because rational actors weigh the anticipated costs of transgressions against the 
anticipated benefits.” She adds that “[d]eterrence literature also shows a correlation between the 
certainty of consequences and the reduction of offences.” For deterrence to have the maximum effect, 
potential offenders must have advance notice of the prospect of accountability so that they can 
consider the consequences before they act. Public assurances that steps are being taken to diminish the 
likelihood of new offenses can also provide consolation to victims and society.”) 
187 Liu, supra note 65, at 629 (“Responsibility in law is a concept that has several disparate 
dimensions. Thus, although it may be possible for a machine to be responsible in a strictly causal sense 
for the production of specific results or outcomes, these are not necessarily accompanied by legal or 
moral responsibility in a role, liability, or capacity understanding of responsibility that usually attaches 
to human action.”).  
  188 Dieter Fleck, Methods and Means of Combat, in STEFAN OETER (ed.), THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 115 (Oxford University Press, 3d edition, 2013) (“The concern 
to protect the civilian population, as well as combatants, against excessive and exceptionally cruel 
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immunity to enemy negotiators.”190  The Babylonians, in their Code of Hammurabi, 
also provided for the protection of the oppressed and for the release of hostages upon 
payment of ransom.191  As early as 400 BC, Indian laws prohibited certain means of 
warfare, such as poisoned arrows and the killing of a surrendering enemy.192  The 
Greeks and the Romans respected the life of war victims and prisoners of war, 
respectively.193  In the Middle Ages, wars were also subject to strict principles, such 
as St. Augustine’s jus in bello principles, which provided, inter alia, that war must be 
fought in a manner to discriminate between proper objects of violence (i.e., 
combatants) and noncombatants, such as women, children and the elderly. 194  
Enlightenment philosophers sought to further entrench the humanization of violence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
violence might have been the beginning of all moral and philosophical attempts to mitigate the horrors 
of war.”). 
189 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94(2) THE AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTENRATIONAL LAW 239, 242 (2000) (“The law of war has always contained rules based on 
chivalry, humanity, and religious values that were designed to protect noncomatants, especially 
women, children, and old men, who were presumed incapable of bearing arms and committing acts of 
hostility.  It has also incorporated rules protecting combatants (in matters such as quarter, perfidy, and 
unnecessary suffering).”); CROWE AND WESTON-SCHEUBER, supra note 183, at 5 (these historical 
principles “illustrate that the formal documents at the heart of modern intenrational humanitarian law 
reflect a long customary tradition.”). 
190 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in OETER, supra note 
188, at 16. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id.; Augustine: Political and Social Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/aug-poso/; Fleck, supra note 188, at 123 (“As 
O’Connell notes, “[t]he humanitarian principles of Islamic legal culture and the moral theological 
postulates of medieval scholars already contemplated a principle of distinction between combatants 
and civilians and called for extensive protection of the civilian population.”). 
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in armed conflicts by advocating for the prohibition of targeting prisoners or war.195  
From this view followed the general principle that “acts of hostility may only be 
directed against the armed forces of the adversary, not against the civilian population 
which takes no part in the hostilities.”196  
 The United States played an important role in the codification of these 
principles.  During the Revolutionary War, George Washington agreed with the 
British that the conflict would be “carried on agreeable to the rules which humanity is 
formed” and “to prevent or punish every breach of the rules of war within the sphere 
of [their] respective commands.”197  During the American Civil War, President 
Abraham Lincoln approved a set of instructions to the Union Army, entitled 
“Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.”198  
These instructions, known as the Lieber Code, set out a set of rules to govern the 
armies’ conduct, including a prohibition against committing violence against 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 See e.g. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 6 (Dover Thrift Edition, 
2003) (“as soon as [soldiers] lay them down and surrender they become once more merely men, whose 
life no one has any right to take”). 
196 O’Connell, supra note 190, at 19-20. 
197 Law of War Manual, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Jun. 2015) [hereinafter “DoD Law 
of War Manual”], at ii. 
198 See FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FIELD (D. Van Nostrand, 1863) available at 
https://archive.org/details/governarmies00unitrich [hereinafter “Lieber Code”]. 
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civilians, robbery, and rape.199  It also provided for hostage rights and prohibited the 
punishment of prisoners of war.200   
The Lieber Code inspired other states to implement similar codes and “served 
as a template for international codifications of the law of war.”201  Indeed, the Code is 
the “origin of what has come to be known as ‘Hague Law’”202 which sets out the law 
of armed conflict from the “standpoint of the soldier, in the sense that it takes the 
form of a statement of the rights and duties of the military in a conflict.”203  The 
Geneva Conventions (also known as “Geneva Law”),204 on the other hand, focuses on 
the law of armed conflict “from the standpoint of the ‘victims’ of war”, including 
civilians, the wounded, the sick, and prisoners of war.”205  As O’Connell notes, 
Geneva Law “does not purport to define the rights and duties of the military but 
rather to lay down certain basic obligations designed to protect those victims, while 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 Lieber Code, supra note 198, at ¶ 44 (“All wanton violence committed against persons in 
the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, 
all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing 
of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may 
seem adequate for the gravity of the offence.”). 
200 Id., at ¶ 56.  
201 DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, at ii. 
202 O’Connell, supra note 190, at 22 (“IHL Is a vast body of substantive rules comprising 
what are traditionally called ‘the law of the Hague’ and ‘the law of Geneva’.  The former set of rules 
includes some Hague Conventions of 1899 or 1907 on international warfare.  These rules, in addition 
to providing for th various categories of lawful combatants, primarily regulate combat actions (means 
and methods of warfare) and the treatment of persons who no longer take part in armed hostilities 
(prisoners of war).  The so-called ‘law of Geneva’ comprises the various Gevena Conventions (at 
present the four Conventions of 1949 plus the two Additional Protocols of 1977), and is essentially 
designed to regulate the treatment of persons who do not, or no longer, take part in armed conflict 
(civilians, the wounded, the sick and shipwreacked, as well as prisoners of war)”). 
203 Id., at 22. 
204 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 81 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
205 O’Connell, supra note 190, at 22.  
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leaving to customary law and Hague Law questions which do not fall within its 
provisions.”206 
The normative evolution of the international legal order has shifted from an 
emphasis on state security to a “focus on human security.”207  As the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted in Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, “[a] State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a 
human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa 
omne jus constitutum (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a 
firm foothold in the international community as well.”208   
While the anthropocentric focus of the law of armed conflict is to be 
welcomed,209 it must not be misinterpreted as a normative justification for the 
seemingly corollary proposition that violence must only be inflicted by a human 
being.  So if we are to take a gun as an example, it would preposterous not to 
acknowledge that, in functional terms, the gun and bullet share practical 
responsibilities for the infliction of violence.  While moral and legal responsibility lay 
exclusively with the human subject, practical responsibilities can be distributed across !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
206 Id., at at 22. 
207 RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 4 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (“The normative 
foundations of the international legal order have shifted from an emphasis on state security— that is, 
security as defined by borders, statehood, territory, and so on—to a focus on human security: the 
security of persons and peoples. In an unstable and insecure world, the law of humanity—a framework 
that spans the law of war, international human rights law, and international criminal justice—reshapes 
the discourse of international relations.”); Blum, supra note 79, at 48 (“I argue that the “humanization 
of international humanitarian law” marks a shift from collectivism toward cosmopolitan individualism 
in the regulation of wartime conduct.”). 
208 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY, 1995), at ¶ 97. 
209 The law can also be used to advance non-human ends, such as protecting animals, the 
environment, and perhaps one day, artificial intelligence.  
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a network that combines humans and non-human actants to source, produce, organize, 
and ultimately deliver violence on a target.  Indeed, the “package” in which violence 
“comes in, machine or human, is not the deepest moral principle.”210  International 
Humanitarian Law is designed to “regulate the treatment of persons—civilian or 
military”211 in armed conflicts, and imposes no requirement that the final causal 
element in the chain of violence is a human being. 212  To give the law a “human 
face,”213 as Theodor Meron put it, does not necessarily require that a human face 
shadow all aspects of violence.  Other forms of human-made intelligence can also 
advance the humanization of war. 
The next two sections will argue that human use of VIS capable of 
autonomous functions is compatible with international obligations.  It will also argue 
that, far from the case of deodands where no human is responsible,214 human beings 
and human institutions remain responsible for the use of VIS.   Much like a 
manufacturer is responsible for the products she makes, humans, as manufacturers of 
violence, are responsible for its effects.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
210 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTION, Research 
Paper, 16 (2013). 
211 O’Connell, supra note 190, at 11. 
212 A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, Measures 
to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, [hereinafter ICRC Legal Review Guide], 3 (2006) (“IHL consists of the body of rules that 
apply during armed conflict with the aim ofprotecting persons…”). 
213 Meron, supra note 189, at 239. 
214 Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 2 (“A commander would nevertheless still escape liability 
in most cases.”). 
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Acting Responsibly in Armed Conflict 
International humanitarian law governs the means (weapons) and methods 
(tactics)215 of warfare.  Accordingly, two branches of IHL, namely “weapons law” 
and “targeting law”, govern the development, deployment, and use of VIS.216  
Weapons law governs the legality of the nature and intended use of the weapon.  
Targeting law governs the use of the weapon in international armed conflicts.  The 
application of these laws to VIS shows that far from non liquet, international law is 
clear and adequate to regulate the development and use of VIS.217 
  Before considering in more detail the rules governing permissible conduct in 
international armed conflicts, four broad observations should be made.  First, IHL and 
ICL obligations apply to human beings and human institutions, not the weapons 
themselves.218  While weapons law dictates the legality of a weapon, it does not 
impose an obligation on the weapon to satisfy those requirements.  While a weapon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35-36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; ICRC Legal Review Guide, supra note 212, at 932 (“The 
combatants’ right to choose their means and methods of warfare is limited by a number of basic IHL 
rules regarding the conduct of hostilities, many of which are found in Additional Protocol I of 1977 on 
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.  Other treaties prohibit or restrict the use of 
specific weapons such as biological and chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, blinding laser 
weapons and landmines, among others. In addition, many of the basic rules and specific prohibitions 
and restrictions on means and methods of warfare may be found in customary international law.”); 
Corn, supra note 102, at 209. 
216 Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman, supra note 158, at 400-401.  
217 See Question from Martin Caton MP, Hansard Citation: HC Deb, 6 March 2013, c1021W 
(noting the UK Government’s position that “the Government considers that the existing provisions of 
international humanitarian law are sufficient to regulate the use of these weapons and therefore we 
have no plans to call for an international ban. However, we remain firmly committed to their effective 
control.”). 
218  O’Connell, supra note 190, at 38 (“The obligations of a state under international 
humanitarian law are binding not only upon its government and its supreme military command but also 
upon every individual.”) 
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may be the object of weapons law, it is not its subject.  At all times legal obligations 
rest with human subjects.219  As the DoD’s Law of War Manual notes:   
The law of war rules on conducting attacks (such as the rules relating 
to discrimination and proportionality) impose obligations on persons. 
These rules do not impose obligations on the weapons themselves; of 
course, an inanimate object could not assume an “obligation” in any 
event. Thus, it is not the case that the law of war requires that a 
weapon determine whether its target is a military objective . . . . 
Rather, it is persons who must comply with the law of war. For 
example, persons may not use inherently indiscriminate weapons.220 
 
Second, the humanization of the law is curtailed by military necessity, 
resulting in an approach to warfare that is “limited”221 and whose “only legitimate 
purpose is to weaken the military capacity” of the enemy.222  This approach “requires 
every belligerent to strike a balance between the conflicting concerns of humanity and 
military necessity.”223  Further, Article 35(1) of the Additional Protocol I of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 Sassóli, supra note 150, at 323 (“Only human beings are subject to legal rules. In the case 
of autonomous weapons, IHL is addressed to those human beings who devise, produce and program 
them, as well as those who decide upon their use. I reject the idea that IHL is inadequate to regulate 
autonomous weapons because they would be situated somewhere between weapon systems and 
combat- ants, and further reject the suggestion that a new category with new rules should be created to 
regulate them. The difference between a weapon system and a human being is not quantitative but 
qualitative; the two are not situated on a sliding scale, but on different levels-subjects and objects. A 
combatant is a human being, only he or she is an addressee of legal obligations. However far we go 
into the future and no matter how artificial intelligence will work, there will always be a human being 
at the starting point. In my understanding, an autonomous weapon system will always operate within 
the limits of its software; software designed by humans. It is the human being who will decide whether 
a machine will be created and who will create it. Even if one day robots construct other robots, there 
will still be the need for a human being to develop the first robot and instruct it as to how to construct 
new robots. This human being is bound by the law; the machine is not bound by the law.”). 
220 DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, at ¶ 6.5.9.3. 
221 Fleck, supra note 188, at 122; ICRC Legal Review Guide, supra note 212, at 3 (“IHL sets 
limits on armed violence in wartime in order to prevent, or at least reduce, suffering.”). 
222 Military necessity, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Glossary, available at 
https://casebook.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm. 
223 Fleck, supra note 188, at 122 (To curtail the objective of humanization of warfare is 
justified only in so far as military necessity inevitably requires a certain military operation, not to 
mention the further condition that the damage inflicted must be proportionate to the military advantage 
sought.”). 
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Geneva Convention 1977 states that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties 
to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”224   
 Third, new weapons are subject to legal reviews.  Article 36 of the Additional 
Protocol I states that “in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new 
weapon, means or method of warfare, [a State] is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by [IHL] 
or by any other rule of international law applicable to the [] Party.”  In making this 
assessment, the State must evaluate “not only the weapon’s design and characteristics 
(the ‘means’ of warfare) but also how it is to be used (the ‘method’ of warfare), 
bearing in mind that the weapon’s effects will result from a combination of its design 
and the manner in which it is to be used.”225    
 Finally, we cannot underestimate international law’s flexibility and 
adaptability.  Indeed, “[t]hroughout history, IHL has shown a considerable capability 
to adapt its functional rules to meet challenges presented by newly developed weapon 
systems.  IHL contains general principles and generally applicable rules to a variety 
of weapon systems, rather than focusing on one individual technology.”226  As this 
thesis argues in Chapter IV, international law seeks to regulate means and methods of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 Additional Protocol I, art. 35(1). 
225 ICRC Legal Review Guide, supra note 212, at 17; Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 
271 (“While some commentators suggest that a disagreement exists as to whether Article 36 restates 
customary international law, the obligation to conduct legal reviews of new means of warfare before 
their use is generally considered, and correctly so, reflective of customary international law.  
Consensus is lacking as to whether an analogous requirement exists to perform legal reviews of new 
methods of warfare.”). 
226 Wagner, supra note 39, at 16 (“The existing rules of IHL are capable of responding to 
AWS, despite considerable differences in opinion that exist in interpreting these rules.”). 
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human violence (i.e., violence designed by humans but delivered via many conduits), 
rather than just regulating violence unleashed by human beings.    
 
Weapons Law  
 Under weapons law, the legality of a weapon system, like a VIS, depends on 
five basic rules.  First, it is necessary to determine whether there is a specific 
prohibition on that weapon system under international treaty law (for example, the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons227 prohibits blinding laser weapons228) 
and customary international law (which, for example, prohibits the use of poison in 
weapons).229  Second, the weapon system cannot, by its nature, be indiscriminate.230  
What this means is that the weapon cannot have been designed for use in an 
indiscriminate manner.  This is to be contrasted with actually using a discriminate 
weapon in an indiscriminate manner, which is governed by targeting law.231  Third, 
the weapon system cannot be “of a nature” to cause “unnecessary suffering or 
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227 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), Geneva, 
10 October 1980, and Amendment to Article 1, 21 December 2001. 
228 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 
1995 [hereinafter Blinding Laser Protocol]. 
229 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS AND LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK (eds.), CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
230 Additional Protocol I, art. 51(4)(c) (“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate 
attacks are: . . . those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”); see also Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226 (July 8), 78 [hereinafter Nuclear 
Weapons], at ¶ 78 (“States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never 
use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”). 
231 Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman, supra note 158, at 399. 
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superfluous injury”232 to combatants.233  As the ICJ put it in its Advisory Opinion on 
Nuclear Weapons, “‘unnecessary suffering’ stands for a harm greater than that 
unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.”234  Fourth, the weapon system 
can be illegal per se if its effects cannot be “limited” as required by international 
humanitarian law.235  An example here would be the use of a biological weapon 
whose biological agents cannot be controlled.236  Finally, the weapon must not offend 
“the dictates of public conscience”237—an obligation that is also known as the 
Martens Clause.  The ICJ has interpreted the clause as a “means of addressing the 
rapid evolution of technology” by preserving “the pre-existing customary law” of 
IHL.238  In practical terms, this means that customary international law applies to new 
means and methods of warfare.  Indeed, it is a “failsafe mechanism meant to address 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232 Additional Protocol I, art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”). 
233 Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman, supra note 158, at 400. 
234 Fleck, supra note 188, at 126. 
235 Additional Protocol I, art. 51(4)(c) (“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate 
attacks are: . . . those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”) (emphasis added). 
236 Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman, supra note 158, at 400 (“once released, it goes where it 
goes”). 
237 As the ICJ notes, “A modern version of th[e] [Martens] clause is to be found in Article 1, 
paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol 1 of 1977, which reads as follows: "In cases not covered by this 
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection 
and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” Nuclear Weapons, supra note 230, 
at ¶ 78. 
238 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 230, at ¶ 78, 84. 
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lacunae in the law” and “does not act as an overarching principle that must be 
considered in every case.”239 
 Against this backdrop, it is clear that weapons law does not categorically 
prohibit the use of VIS.240  First, there is no treaty prohibiting the use of weapons 
capable of autonomous engagement.  Of course, a VIS may incorporate sub-weapon 
systems that may be prohibited by weapons law.  For example, a VIS that uses a 
blinding laser weapon would contravene international customary law and the 1995 
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons.241  It is unlikely, however, that this prohibition 
would necessarily extend to the VIS technology employing it, unless the two are so 
connected that they are effectively one and the same weapon system.  The question is 
therefore whether the VIS is making use (i.e., as a platform)242 of the blinding laser, 
or whether the laser is so integrated with the VIS that the two are functionally one 
weapon.  
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239 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 275. 
240 Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman, supra note 158, at 401 (“None of these rules renders a 
weapon system illegal per se solely on account of it being autonomous. If a fully autonomous weapon 
system were supplied with sufficiently reliable parameters and it were able to act on them so as to be 
able to strike specific targets on the same legal terms of discrimination that would apply to a human 
soldier, that the weapon system was “autonomous” would not violate the “indiscriminate by nature” 
rule. Although some might view an autonomous weapon system as “uncontrollable,” its effects are not 
uncontrollable within the meaning of the legal provision.”); Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, 233 
(“The likelihood of an autonomous weapon system being unlawful per se is very low.”). 
241 Blinding Laser Protocol, supra note 228; see also HENCKAERTS AND DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 229, at 292 r.86 (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
242 Christof Heyns, Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified 
death, in BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, supra note 30, 6 (“AWS . . . are weapon platforms, 
and any weapon can in principle be fitted onto an AWS”). 
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 Second, VIS are not by nature indiscriminate.  Intelligence, by its very nature, 
includes the ability to distinguish and organize patterns in separate categories.243  
Advances in robotics and in artificial intelligence (particularly machine learning) will 
enable the development of VIS that are capable of distinguishing between civilians 
and combatants.244  Of course, a particular VIS may be developed with the nefarious 
purpose of being indiscriminate.  But in addition to providing little military advantage 
and being illegal per se, that weapon would be far from “intelligent.”  The prohibition 
in this scenario would attach to a particular type of weapon system geared for that 
specific purpose, not to intelligent (including autonomous) systems in general.  Much 
will therefore depend on how artificial intelligence, particularly code, is put to use.  
At bottom, code—as weaponized data—can be used for a variety, if not infinite, 
purposes.  But there is nothing that makes code automatically indiscriminate.245  
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243 FRITZ HENN, NORMAN SARTORIUS, HANFRIED HELMCHEN, AND HANS LAUTER, 
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHIATRY 8  (Springer, 2001) (“The mechanics of intelligence include elementary 
processes of information processing such as information input, visual and motor memory, and basic 
perceptual-cognitive processes such as discrimination, comparison and categorization”). 
244 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 247 (“Modern sensors can, inter alia, assess the 
shape and size of objects, determine their speed, identify the type of propulsion being used, determine 
the material of which they are made, listen to the object and its environs, and intercept associated 
communications or other electronic emissions. They can also collect additional data on other objects or 
individuals in the area and, depending on the platform with which they are affiliated, monitor a 
potential target for extended periods in order to gather information that will enhance the reliability of 
identification and facilitate target engagement when the risk of collateral damage is low. Even software 
for autonomous weapon systems that enables visual identification of individuals, thereby enhancing 
accuracy during autonomous ‘personality strikes’ against specified persons, is likely to be developed. 
These and related technological capabilities auger against characterization of autonomous weapon 
systems as unlawful per se solely based on their autonomous nature.”). 
245 Further, there may be instances where it is lawful to use an indiscriminate autonomous 
weapon that is used in areas populated exclusively by active military personnel.  Schmitt and 
Thurnher, supra note 54, at 246 (“Typical examples would include the employment of such systems 
for an attack on a tank formation in a remote area of the desert or from warships in areas of the high 
seas far from maritime navigation routes.”). 
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Third, VIS do not “automatically”246 violate the prohibition on unnecessary 
suffering and superfluous injury.  The prohibition is directed at regulating the effects 
of a weapon on a targeted individual, “not the manner of engagement.”247  Similar to 
the blinding laser example above, a VIS could be used as a platform for a weapon or 
sub-weapon system that violates this prohibition.248  But the opposite holds just as 
true.  Much will therefore depend on what type of violence the VIS will inflict. 
 Fourth, VIS, unlike conventional weapons, can be controlled and limited 
through code.  Code will enable human agents to program VIS to comply with 
targeting law and other international legal obligations.  Finally, VIS do not 
contravene the “dictates of public conscience” because there is nothing in their nature 
that makes them incapable of complying with IHL.  To the contrary, as this thesis will 
explore below, VIS may be better at complying with IHL than human soldiers.249  
Public conscience may thus require the use of VIS over human soldiers in certain 
environments.250 
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246 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 245. 
247  Id., at 245. 
248  Id., at 233 (“whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited 
as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs 
contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the “conduct of hostilities.”). 
249 Id., at 247 (“It must be emphasized that as a matter of law, more may not be asked of 
autonomous weapon systems than of human-operated systems. For example, some opponents of 
autonomous weapons contend a ban is necessary because autonomous weapon systems may be 
deceived, as in the case of ‘concealing weapons or by exploiting their sensual and behavioural 
limitations,’ and thereby have difficulty distinguishing civilians from combatants. Yet, asymmetrically 
disadvantaged enemies have been feigning civilian or other protected status to avoid being engaged by 
humano-perated weapon systems for centuries.”). 
250 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 137 (“Might there be a legal and ethical obligation to use ‘killer 
robots’ in lieu of ‘killer humans’?”). 
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Targeting Law 
Under targeting law, the use of lawful weapons must adhere to two 
fundamental rules: distinction and proportionality.  There are also related 
considerations, such as the requirement to take all feasible precautions in an attack 
and obligations on how to resolve doubts about the status of persons in international 
armed conflicts.   
 
Distinction.   
IHL requires parties to a conflict to “at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”251  This “intransgressible” 252 principle253 is further established in Articles 
51(2) and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I: 
Article 51(2).   The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. […] 
 
Article 52(2). Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. 
[…]254 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 Additional Protocol I, art. 48. 
252 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 230, at ¶ 79. 
253 Wagner, supra note 39, at 20 (noting that some have argued that this interpretation elevates 
the principle of distinction to jus cogens and arguing that there is also “little doubt” that the principle 
“has attained the status of customary international law . . . . The Court appears to have elevated the 
principle of distinction to the level of jus cogens when it considered it to “constitute [an] 
intransgressible principle . . . of international customary law.”). 
254 See also Wagner, supra note 39, at 18 (“Distinguishing between a person and an object 
that possesses a military character—as opposed to an object that is of a civilian character—is the first 
step in deciding whether a person or object can be lawfully targeted. IHL is based on the assumption 
that an individual who is not a combatant is a civilian. This assumption is incorporated in the 1868 
Declaration of St. Petersburg, the earliest international instrument in the field of international 
humanitarian law.”) 
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In other words, what the principle of distinction means in practice is that “the aiming 
point for the use of military force must be a military target,”255 and State must 
therefore “never make civilians the object of attack.”256   
Critics of autonomous weapon systems argue that computer systems will find 
it challenging, if not impossible, to satisfy this criteria because distinction involves 
qualitative decision-making and context-dependent analyses that only a human is able 
to make.257  For example, “[n]ot only would [the weapon] have to be able to 
distinguish civilians from military personnel, but it must also decide if a civilian is 
taking a direct part in hostilities.”258  Other difficulties may include “distinguishing 
the agonized face of a person in fear for her or his children from a threatening face” 
and “distinguishing children playing from threats.”259  One commentator notes the 
need “to be able to specify every element [of combat] in sufficient detail for a 
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255 ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS 93 (Routledge, 2009). 
256 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 230, at 78. 
257 Wagner, supra note 39, at 23 (“This type of analysis does not rely on quantitative data—as 
is the case with the distinction between a tank and a school bus—but rather requires qualitative 
analysis.”); see also The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Joint Doctrine 2/11, MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter UK Joint Doctrine], at ¶ 507 (“From this position, it would be 
only a small technical step to enable an unmanned aircraft to fire a weapon based solely on its own 
sensors, or shared information, and without recourse to higher, human authority. Provided it could be 
shown that the controlling system appropriately assessed the [international humanitarian law] 
principles (military necessity; humanity; distinction and proportionality) and that [rules of 
engagement] were satisfied, this would be entirely legal . . . . In practice, such operations would 
present a considerable technological challenge and the software testing and certification for such a 
system would be extremely expensive as well as time consuming. Meeting the requirement for 
proportionality and distinction would be particularly problematic, as both of these areas are likely to 
contain elements of ambiguity requiring sophisticated judgement. Such problems are particularly 
difficult for a machine to solve and would likely require some form of artificial intelligence to be 
successful. ”). 
258 Wagner, supra note 39,at 22. 
259 Wagner, supra note 39,at 23. 
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computer to be able to operate on it.”260  In other words, critics argue that these 
situations are not “easily programmable.”261   
While these are legitimate concerns, they underestimate the power of artificial 
intelligence (“AI”).  There are two approaches to AI.  The first is known as 
“knowledge engineering,”262 which requires the programmer to code (or preprogram) 
all the necessary knowledge into the system’s knowledge base.  This rationalist263 
approach is the traditional way of thinking of computer programming.  See Figure 1.  
But pre-programming knowledge and data into the system is too labor-intensive and 
failure-prone.264  Indeed, it would be a very difficult task to preprogram all the 
possible “eventualities”265 in complex war environments.   
 
 
Figure 1. Traditional Programming Approach266 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Noel E. Sharkey, The evitability of autonomous robot warfare, 94 INTERNATIOANL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 886, at 789 (2012). 
261 Wagner, supra note 39, at 22; Marchant et al., supra note 32, at 284 (“Furthermore, 
increasing complexity may lead to emergent behaviors, i.e., behaviors not programmed but arising out 
of sheer complexity.”). 
262 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 34 (“Knowledge engineering: knowledge can’t be learned 
automatically; it must be programmed into the computer by humans.”) 
263 Id., at 57 (“The rationalist likes to plan everything in advance before making the first 
move.”). 
264 Id., at 90. 
265 Id., at 280 (“There is no universal answer and no way to program a computer with all the 
eventualities.”). 
266 Pedro Domingos, The Secrets of Machine Learning Revealed, UNIVERSITY OF 
WASHINGTON PRESENTATION, at 5 (on file with author). 
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The second approach, known as machine learning, provides a more 
attractive—and surprisingly largely ignored—alternative in this context. 267  See 
Figure 2.  Machine learning is a form of artificial intelligence that is able to learn 
from experience.268  By learning from experience, a system is able to change its 
“behavior in a way that makes [it] perform better in the future.”269  Thus, in contrast 
to pre-programming a VIS with all potential possibilities, machine learning will 
enable it to teach itself lawful courses of action based on algorithmic parameters, 
modeling, and real-time data.270  Unlike the rationalist approach of knowledge 
engineering, machine learning is empirical in the sense that it “prefers to try things 
and see how they turn out.”271  In effect, it enables the programs to “program 
themselves.” 272  
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267 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 280. 
268 TOM M. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2 (McGraw-Hill, 1997) (“A computer program is 
said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P if its 
performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience E”). 
269 IAN H.WITTEN, AND EIBE FRANK, DATA MINING: PRACTICAL MACHINE LEARNING AND 
TECHNIQUES WITH JAVA IMPLEMENTATIONS 6 (Morgan Kaufmann, 2006) (defining data mining). 
270 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 74 (“learning is a race between the amount of data you have 
and the number of hypotheses you consider.  More data exponentially reduces the number of 
hypotheses that survive”). 
271 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 57. 
272 Id., at xi. 
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Figure 2. Machine Learning Approach273 
There are three broad approaches to machine learning: supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning.  Supervised learning refers to 
“working with a set of labeled training data.”274  As Sugiyama notes, “[t]he objective 
of supervised learning is to acquire the generalization ability, which refers to the 
capability that an appropriate answer can be guessed for unlearned [scenarios, . . .  
which means that] the user does not have to teach everything to the computer, but the 
computer can automatically cope with unknown situations by learning only a fraction 
of knowledge.”275  Examples of applications that use supervised learning include 
“hand-written letter recognition, speech recognition and image recognition.” 276  
Unsupervised learning is where the programmer “let[s] the algorithm find a hidden 
pattern in a load of data.” 277  Here the system will autonomously collect data, or 
organize apparently random data into clusters to make sense of the data and extract 
useful knowledge from it.278  Applications include “system diagnosis, security, event !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
273 Pedro Domingos, The Secrets of Machine Learning Revealed, University of Washington 
Presentation, at 5. 
274 JASON BELL, MACHINE LEARNING 3 (Wiley, 2015).  
275 MASAHI SUGIYAMA, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL MACHINE LEARNING 3 (Morgan 
Kaufman, 2016). 
276 SUGIYAMA, supra note 275, at 3. 
277 BELL, supra note 274, at 3.  
278 Id., at 3.  
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detection, and social network analysis.”279  Finally, reinforcement learning aims to 
achieve the generalization ability without the user providing data.  With this 
approach, a human “evaluates the [computer’s] behavior and gives feedback about it 
[and . . . ] based on [that] feedback, . . . the [computer] improve[s] [its] behavior to 
maximize the supervisor’s evaluation.” 280  This approach is “an important model of 
the behavior of humans and robots” and it has been applied “to various areas such as 
autonomous robot control” 281  and would thus be particularly suitable for the 
development of VIS.282   
Researchers are seeking to perfect these techniques in many ways.  There are 
currently five schools of thought focused on developing these technologies: 
symbolists, connectionists, evolutionaries, bayesians, and analogizers.  Symbolists 
believe that “all intelligence can be reduced to manipulating symbols.”283  For 
example, a grossly simplified rules-based approach to the principle of distinction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
279 Id., at 3.   
280 Id., at 3.   
281 Id., at 3.; see also Alonso, supra note 151, at 236 (“In such scenarios an agent exists in an 
environment described by a set of possible states. Each time an agent executes an action in a state it 
receives a numerical reward that indictates the immediate value of this state-action transition – how 
“good” it is.  This produces a sequence of states, actions, and rewards. The agent’s task is to learn a 
policy that maximizes the expected sum of rewards, typically with future rewards discounted 
exponentially by their delay. . . . This method has been successfully applied to several organizational 
problems in robotics, control, operations research, games, human-computer interaction, economics-
finance, complex simulation, and marketing.”). 
282 Guillaume Lample and Devendra Singh Chaplot, Playing FPS Games with Deep 
Reinforcement Learning, ARXIV (Sep. 2016) available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05521(finding that 
reinforcement learning and neural networks can outperform human agents in playing virtual killing 
games); id. at 1 (“Deep reinforcement learning has proved to be very successful in mastering human-
level control policies in a wide variety of tasks such as object recognition with visual attention, high-
dimensional robot control and solving physics-based control problems. In particular, Deep Qnetworks 
(DQN) are shown to be effective in playing Atari 2600 games and more recently, in defeating world-
class Go players.”) (internal citations omitted). 
283 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 89. 
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would be a general rule that states: “If a combatant, then threaten to engage; If not a 
combatant, then do not threaten to engage.”  This general rule would be dependent on 
specific sub-rules.  For starters, the general rule does not define combatant or 
civilians.284  A specific sub-rule that encodes this type of knowledge can be illustrated 
in the simplified decision tree285 as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Decision-Tree of Combatants Class 
A set of rules would need to be developed for what constitutes a “human,” “hostile 
behavior” (or taking part in hostilities), and what constitutes a “civilian.”  If !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
284 See Additional Protocol I, art. 50 (defining civilian for purposes of the Geneva 
Conventions). 
285 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 85 (“[T]he symbolist aglorithm of choice is decision tree 
induction . . . . [For example], Microsoft’s Kinect uses decision trees to figure out where various parts 
of your body are from the output of its depth camera; it can then use their motions to control the Xbox 
game.”). 
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knowledge is not readily available, the system would be able to fill in gaps in 
knowledge by using inverse deduction.286  While symbolism is easy to understand 
and explain, it has been criticized because “real concepts can seldom be concisely 
defined by a set of rules . . . . They require weighing and accumulating weak evidence 
until a clear picture emerges.”287 
To this end, connectionists seek to “reverse engineer the brain”288 so that the 
system can learn how to adjust its output with the desire one, a process known as 
backpropagation.  This approach involves creating and interconnecting artificial 
neurons to develop a neural network.  Also known as “deep learning,” this approach 
is already being used by many companies around the world.  A simple example is 
Google’s Cat Network, which trained itself to recognize cats by “looking” at 10 
million images in youtube videos.  Remarkably, Google engineers did not teach the 
network the concept of a “cat.”  The network taught itself.  As Andrew Ng put it, 
“[t]he idea is that instead of having teams of researchers trying to find out how to find 
edges, you instead throw a ton of data at the algorithm and you let the data speak and 
have the software automatically learn from the data.”289  In this context, research 
shows that “it is possible to train a face detector without having to label images as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
286 Id., at 52 (“Their master aglorithm is inverse deduction, which figures out what knowledge 
is missing in order to make a deduction go through, and then makes it general as possible.”). 
287 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 91. 
288 Id., at xvii. 
289 Liat Clark, Google’s Artificial Brain Learns to Find Cat Videos, WIRED (Jun. 26, 2012) 
available at https://www.wired.com/2012/06/google-x-neural-network/. 
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containing a face or not.”290  Objective classification techniques also allow a system 
to learn how to recognize and classify objects “without having been explicitly taught 
the notion of objects.”291  As neuroscience improves our understanding of the brain’s 
neural networks, connectionism will further improve these techniques and enable 
systems to teach themselves concepts (e.g., who is a civilian? What is a hospital?) in 
the absence of precise human definitions.  
Evolutionaries simulate evolution in artificial systems292 to create a “brain” 
that can fine-tune outputs.  This approach draws heavily from genetic programming 
which seeks to get “a computer to do what needs to be done, without telling it how to 
do it.”293  To achieve this, genetic programming “breeds” a population of programs 
using Darwinian natural selection and “biologically inspired operations,” including 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
290 Quoc V. Le, Marc’Aurelio Ranzato, Rajat Monga, Matthieu Devin, Kai Chen, Greg S. 
Corrado, Jeff Dean, Andrew Y. Ng, Building High-level Features Using Large Scale Unsupervised 
Learning, RESEARCH GOOGLE (2012), available at 
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//archive/unsupervised_icml2012.pd
f. 
291 Ray Kurzweil, MIT deep-learning system autonomously learns to identify objects, 
KURZWEIL ACCELERATING INTELLIGENCE (May 14, 2016) available at http://www.kurzweilai.net/mit-
deep-learning-system-autonomously-learns-to-identify-objects (finding that “the same [neural] 
network can perform both scene recognition and object localization in a single forward-pass, without 
ever having been explicitly taught the notion of objects”); Richard Socher, Brody Huval, Bharath Bhat, 
Christopher D. Manning, Andrew Y. Ng, Convolutional-Recursive Deep Learning for 3D Object 
Classification, NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS FOUNDATION (2012) available at 
http://nlp.stanford.edu/pubs/SocherHuvalBhatManningNg_NIPS2012.pdf; Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya 
Sutskever, Geoffrey E. Hinton, ImageNet Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks, 
NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS FOUNDATION (2012) available at 
https://papers.nips.cc/paper/4824-imagenet-classification-with-deep-convolutional-neural-
networks.pdf; Andreas Eitel, Jost Tobias, Springenberg, Luciano Spinello, Martin Riedmiller, and 
Wolfram Burgard, Multimodal Deep Learning for Robust RGB-D Object Recognition, ARXIV (Aug. 
18, 2015) available at http://www2.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/~spinello/eitelIROS15.pdf. 
292 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at xvii. 
293 John R. Koza, Genetic Programming, Genetic Programming Website, available at 
http://geneticprogramming.com/tutorial/ [Last accessed: October 5, 2016]. 
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reproduction, 294  crossover, 295  mutation, 296  and architecture-altering operations. 297  
After the process is complete, the “best program” in the population is “harvested and 
designated” as a solution to the problem at hand.298  Of course, while emulating 
humans may be desirable in some contexts, the architecture of the human brain may 
have many faults that we may want to avoid.299   
Bayesians believe “learning is a form of probabilistic inference” 300  as 
knowledge is uncertain.  At the heart of Bayesian thought is the notion that one’s 
degree of belief in a hypothesis changes as new evidence is received.  As Domingos 
explains, “as you see more data, some models become more likely and some less, 
until ideally one model stands out as the clear winner.”301  A simplistic example can 
illustrate how this could work.  Let us start with a basic hypothesis that a civilian 
typically wears civilian clothes.302  Next, let us assume that a VIS is sent to engage 
the enemy in a military base that is known to be populated exclusively by combatants.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
294 Id. (“Copy the selected individual program to the new population.”). 
295 Id. (“Create new offspring program(s) for the new population by recombining randomly 
chosen parts from two selected programs.”). 
296 Id. (“Create one new offspring program for the new population by randomly mutating a 
randomly chosen part of one selected program.”). 
297 Id. (“Choose an architecture-altering operation from the available repertoire of such 
operations and create one new offspring program for the new population by applying the chosen 
architecture-altering operation to one selected program.”). 
298 Id. 
299 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 141. 
300 Id., at xvii. 
301 Id., at 144. 
302 This basic premise would need to be modelled so that the system can distinguish between 
civilian clothing and military clothing.   
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How should a VIS act if it encounters a human being wearing civilian clothes? 
Should it engage? The VIS could take certain courses of action to invite reactions 
from the human, such as giving warnings, or displaying some level of hostility, and 
based on their reaction, update its hypothesis of the human’s status.  In mathematical 
notation, we could say that P(civilian | hon-hostile behavior303), the conditional 
probability of a human is a civilian based on behavior, is greater than P(civilian | 
civilian clothing), its conditional probability given that the human is wearing civilian 
clothing.304  Depending on the human’s behavior, the hypotheses would be updated to 
inform the VIS’ next course of action. 
Finally, analogizers see learning as “recognizing similarities between 
situations and inferring other similarities.”305  While the challenge here is figuring the 
“similarity” between two classes of data, the ability to analogize is not foreign to 
human behavior.  From the metaphors we use to how we think, the ability to compare 
and contrast information is a cornerstone of human intelligence.306  Powering VIS 
with analogical reasoning will help it better adjust to unanticipated data307 as well as 
learn from “behavior” that adheres to international obligations.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
303 For example, not engaging in hostile behavior by producing a weapon in a hostile manner 
or taking some other hostile action against the VIS or other civilians. 
304 This example assumes the prior probability that humans wearing civilian clothing are less 
likely to be combatants.  Of course, the use of this prior probability depends on the particular combat 
environment and mission objectives.  It may be that it would not be used in missions where 
intelligence suggests the enemy is deliberately hiding within the civilian population. 
305 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 53. 
306 Gentner, d., Bowdle, B., Wolff, P., and Boronat, C., Metaphor is like analogy, in GENTNER 
D., HOLOYOAK, K.J., AND KOKINOV, B..N. (eds.), THE ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199 (MIT Press, 2001) (“Metaphor is pervasive in language and thought”). 
307 For example, a VIS could use analogical reasoning to make sense of new environments or 
makeshift weaponry. 
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 The combination of these five paradigms could help develop highly intelligent 
systems capable of lawful conduct.  In The Master Algorithm,308 Pedro Domingos 
offers a three-step approach on how machine learning can be used to develop VIS.  
First, we must teach the VIS to recognize relevant data and concepts, such as “data 
sets of situations where civilians were and were not spared.”309  Second, we need to 
feed the VIS with a “code of conduct in the form of rules involving these 
concepts.”310  Third, we must “let the [VIS] learn how to apply the code by observing 
humans.”311  As Domingos notes, “[b]y generalizing from these examples, the robot 
can learn an end-to-end model of ethical decision making.”312  Once the VIS’ 
decisions match with a human’s “as often as one human agrees with another, the 
training is complete.”313  Further, VIS development will be subject to rigorous 
engineering processes such as verification (“did we build the system right?”), validity 
(“did we build the right system?”), security (“did we build a system sufficiently 
robust from manipulation?”), and control (“if anything goes wrong, is there an abort 
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308 In addition to providing an overview of the main approaches to machine learning, 
Domingos also argues that there may be a master algorithm that combines all schools of thought. 
DOMINGOS supra note 18, at xviii (“[w]hat we really want is a single aglorithm combining the key 
features of all of them: the ultimate master aglorithm . . . . The Master Aglorithm is to machine 
learning what the Standard Model is to particle physics or the Central Dogma to molecular biology: a 
unified theory that makes sense of everything we know to date”); see also Boer Deng, Machine ethics: 
The robots dilemma, NATURE (Jul. 1, 2015) (“The challenge — still unresolved — is to combine the 
[knowledge engineering and machine learning] approaches in a workable way.”). 
309 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 280. 
310 Id., at 280. 
311 Id., at 280. 
312 Id., at 280. 
313 Id., at 280. 
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mode?”).314  
Machine learning should not be misunderstood as a facile solution to sets of 
extremely complex problems.  But its advantages are too compelling to be ignored in 
this debate.  Human soldiers are subject to fear, anger, fatigue, prejudice, and sexual 
desire— human emotions and predispositions that can lead to underperformance and 
violations of international law.315  Machine learning could enable VIS to learn from 
humans the context-specific and qualitative assessments involved in combat 
situations, while allowing for more sophisticated and accurate evaluation of 
information.  For example, VIS could make use of image recognition technology and 
analogical reasoning in a way that is free from prejudice and bias.316  Assuming bias 
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314 Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey, Max Tegmark, Research Priorities for Robust and 
Beneficial Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE, Winter 2015, available at 
http://futureoflife.org/data/documents/research_priorities.pdf at 107-108.  Further, the use of VIS will 
be incremental.  At first, it could be that VIS accompany soldiers in specific terrains to “learn” from 
them.  Then, VIS can join missions to provide non-lethal support, such as advising human soldiers on 
compliance with IHL.  Finally, once confidence in the system is sufficiently high to adhere to IHL and 
other applicable rules, VIS can be deployed without real-time human supervision to engage human 
targets if necessary. 
315 See Ronald Arkin, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 29-32 
(Chapman and Hall, 2009) (“Some of the ethical advantages AWS will have over human soldiers may 
include: the ability to act more conservatively than their human counterparts due to the autonomous 
system’s lack of motivation for self- preservation; the programming to behave in a self-sacrificing 
manner, if necessary, due to the absence of fear of death; the ability to act without emotions, making 
autonomous systems insusceptible to anger or fear on the battlefield and therefore able to exercise 
clearer judgment than humans; and immunity from psychological “scenario fulfillment,” which occurs 
“where humans use new incoming information in ways that only fit their pre-existing belief patterns,” 
and can result in “distortion or neglect of contradictory information in stressful situations.”). 
316 See also The Chip That’s Bad at Math, 119 MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 4, 22 (2016) 
(reporting on DARPA’s research into computer chips that are deliberately programmed to perform 
mathematical calculations incorrectly which may help to make sense of fuzzy data such as video or 
other “messy real-world data.”); Devin Coldewey, Google researchers aim to prevent Ais from 
discriminating, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 7, 2016) available at https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/07/google-
aims-to-prevent-discriminatory-ai-with-equality-of-opportunity-method/?ncid=rss&utm_source= 
feedburner&utm_medium=feed.&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCrunch%29&utm
_content=FaceBook&sr_share=facebook. 
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and prejudice are not coded into the system,317 VIS could avoid psychological 
“scenario fulfillment,” which occurs “where humans use new incoming information 
in ways that only fit their pre-existing belief patterns,” and can result in “distortion or 
neglect of contradictory information in stressful situations.”318  As Rosa Brooks put it, 
“computers often seem to have better judgment” than humans.319  Brooks notes, for 
instance, how computers are better than humans at “distinguishing between genuine 
and faked expressions of pain” and “Google’s driverless cars fare better at avoiding 
accidents than cars controlled by humans.”320  
In addition, VIS will be able to tap into cloud robotics to make use of larger 
data sets, models, and real-time data to make better-informed decisions (such as 
distinguishing between types of weapons and cultural objects, for instance),321 which 
would arguably far surpass the intelligence of any human soldier.322  Machines can 
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317 See e.g. Aimee Rawlins, Math is racist: How data is driving inequality, CNN MONEY 
(Sep. 6, 2016), available at http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/06/technology/weapons-of-math-
destruction/index.html (“From targeted advertising and insurance to education and policing, O’Neil 
looks at how algorithms and big data are targeting the poor, reinforcing racism and amplifying 
inequality.”). 
318 Ronald Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, in Timothy J. Demy 
and George R. Lucas (eds.), MILITARY ETHICS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 76 (Routledge, 2014). 
319 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 137. 
320 Id., at 137. 
321 MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS 
FUTURE 21 (Basic Books, 2015) (“If one robot employs centralized machine intelligence to learn and 
adapt to its environment, then that newly acquired knowledge could become instantly available to any 
other machines accessing the system—making it easy to scale machine learning across large number of 
robots . . . . The impact of cloud robotics may be most dramatic in areas like visual recognition that 
require access to vast databases as well as powerful computational capability.”). 
322 Singularity: Ubiquity Interviews Ray Kurzweil, UBIQUITY (Jan. 2006) available at  
http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=1117663 (“it will be a very powerful combination to combine 
the subtle and supple powers of human pattern recognition with ways in which machines are already 
superior.”). 
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also share knowledge faster than human language.323  Of course, the success and 
utility of cloud capabilities will depend on the quality of the intelligence on the cloud.  
But as surveillance technologies and data analysis techniques become increasingly 
sophisticated,324 the ability to capitalize on both real-time and archived intelligence 
will empower VIS to make more informed decisions, particularly in the “fog of 
war.”325   
Advances in robotics could make VIS extremely agile326 and situationally 
aware.  For example, improvements in “belief space”327 are allowing robotics to 
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323 Id. (“Machines can think more quickly than we can. They are much better at logical 
thinking and much better at remembering things: a $1000 notebook computer can remember billions of 
things accurately whereas we’re hard-pressed to remember a handful of phone numbers. And most 
importantly, machines can share their knowledge their skills, and their insights at electronic speed, 
which is a million times faster than human language.”). 
324 See e.g. DARPA’s Fast Lightweight Autonomy Program.  Patrick Tucker, The Military 
Wants Smarter Insect Spy Drones, DEFENSE ONE (Dec. 23, 2014) available at 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/12/military-wants-smarter-insect-spy-drones/101970/ 
(“The Fast Lightweight Autonomy program, the agency said, “focuses on creating a new class of 
algorithms to enable small, unmanned aerial vehicles to quickly navigate a labyrinth of rooms, 
stairways and corridors or other obstacle-filled environments without a remote pilot.”); Michael V. 
Hayden, To Keep America Safe, Embrace Drone Warfare, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016) available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/drone-warfare-precise-effective-
imperfect.html?_r=0 (“TARGETED killing using drones has become part of the American way of war. 
To do it legally and effectively requires detailed and accurate intelligence . . . . And unmanned aerial 
vehicles carrying precision weapons and guided by powerful intelligence offer a proportional and 
discriminating response when response is necessary.”). 
325 Arkin, supra note 318, at 75 (“In the fog of war it is hard enough for a human  to be able to 
effectively discriminate whether or not a target is  legitimate. Fortunately, it may be anticipated . . . 
that in the future autonomous robots may be able to perform better than humans under these 
conditions”). 
326 See Boston Dynamics Website, available at https://www.youtube.com/user/ 
BostonDynamics [Last accessed October 4, 2016]. 
 
327 ALEC ROSS, THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 23-24 (Simon & Schuster, 2016) (Belief 
space means the “mathematical framework that allows us to model a given environment statistically 
and develop probabilistic outcomes . . . . [and allows for] the application of algorithms to make sense 
of new or messy contexts.”); see also ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON AND ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND 
MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 52 (W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2016) (noting imrpovements in SLAM (‘simultaneous localization and 
mapping’)); but see id., at 28-29 (noting Moravec’s paradox, which is “the discovery by artificial 
intelligence and robotics researchers that, contrary to traditional assumptions, high-level reasoning 
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execute tasks once thought the “exclusive domain of humans,” such as tasks requiring 
“situation awareness, spatial reasoning and dexterity, contextual understanding, and 
human judgment.”328  As Alex Ross notes in The Industries of the Future:  
Linked to the cloud, robots can access vast troves of data and shared 
experience to enhance the understanding of their own belief space.  
Before being hooked to the cloud, robots had access to very limited 
data—either their own experience or that of a narrow cluster of robots.  
They were stand-alone pieces of electronics with capabilities that were 
limited to the hardware and software inside the unit.  But by becoming 
networked devices, constantly connected to the cloud, robots can now 
incorporate the experiences of every other robot of their kind, 
“learning” at an accelerating rate.329 
Of course, there is the risk that network-connected VIS will be exposed to hacking330 
and tampering.331  But there are ways to ensure that military-grade communications 
remain secure.  Indeed, in addition to existing security measures, such as DARPA’s 
hack-proof High Assurance Cyber Military Systems,332 quantum communications 
may offer a way to develop hack-proof communications between humans and VIS.333 
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requires very little computation, but low-level sensorimotor skills require enormous computational 
resources.”). 
328 Id., at 23-24; Fergus Walsh, Robot operates inside eye in world first, BBC NEWS (Sep. 9, 
2016) available at http://www.bbc.com/news/health-37246995 (“Surgeons have used a robot to 
operate inside the eye and restore sight—in a world first . . . . Surgeons hope the procedure will pave 
the way for more complex eye surgery than is currently possible with the human hand.”). 
329 ROSS, supra note 237, at 23-24. 
330 RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR 333 (Penguin, 2006) (“An obvious top priority 
is to develop technology capable of maintaining integrity of communication and preventing either 
eavesdropping or manipulation of information by hostile forces.”). 
331 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 242 (“The one real risk is tampering by the enemy 
or non-State actors such as hackers.”). 
332 Kris Osborn, DARPA Unveils Hack-Proof Drone, DEFENSE TECH (Oct. 3, 2016) available 
at http://www.defensetech.org/2014/05/21/darpa-unveils-hack-proof-drone/. 
333 China Launches World’s First Quantum Satellite For Hack-Proof Program, REUTERS 
(Aug. 16, 2016) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space-satellite-idUSKCN10R07J 
(noting in the context of quantum satellites, that “[q]uantum communication boasts ultra-high security 
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What all these developments mean is that the notion of a VIS as an automaton 
that must have every eventuality pre-programmed is outdated and does not reflect the 
potential of current AI research.  Machine learning and improvements in robotics 
offer real possibilities to develop technologies that perform just as well as—if not 
better than—humans.334  Indeed, algorithms have been found in many contexts to 
outperform human “experts.”   Many studies have demonstrated that “human decision 
makers are inferior to a prediction formula even when they are given the score 
suggested by the formula.”335   
The synergistic capabilities of technologies capable of developing highly 
intelligent systems powered by large data sets about everything from types of 
weapons to different languages and environments, equipped with sophisticated 
sensors, such as facial recognition and heat sensing technology, and connected to the 
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as a quantum photon can neither be separated nor duplicated,” and that “[i]t is hence impossible to 
wiretap, intercept or crack the information transmitted through it.”). 
334 See Sassóli, supra note 150, at 319 (There is widespread agreement that the ability to use 
autonomous weapons in compliance with IHL should not be evaluated against a hypothetical ideal, but 
instead the comparison should be to human beings) 
335 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 224-225 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2011) (“Why are experts inferior to agrlorithms? One reason . . . is that experts try to be clever, think 
outside the box, and consider complex combinations of features in making their predictions.  
Complexity may work in the odd case, but more often than not it reduces validity.  Simple 
combinations of features are better.  Several studies have shown that human decision makers are 
inferior to a prediction formula even when they are given the score suggested by the formula! They 
feel that they can overrule the formula because they have additional information about the case, but 
they are wrong more often than not . . . . Another reason for the inferiority of expert judgment is that 
humans are incorrigibly inconsistent in making summary judgment of complex information.  When 
asked to evaluate the same information twice, they frequently give different answers.  The extent of the 
inconsistency is often a matter of real concern.  Experienced radiologists who evaluate chest X-rays as 
‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ contradict themselves 20% of the time when they see the same picture on 
separate occasions . . . . A review of 41 separate studies of the reliability of judgments made by 
auditors, pathologists, psychologists, organizational managers, and other professionals suggests that 
this level of inconsistentcy is typical . . . . Unreliable judgments cannot be valid predictors of 
anything.”). 
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cloud, are welcome developments to ensure greater precision336 and discrimination on 
the battlefield.337  Given their potential, a pre-emptive ban on VIS is premature at this 
stage.  
Finally, VIS, like drones, may be increasingly used in missions limited in 
scope.  Indeed, the humanization of IHL has been met by a gradual move toward the 
“individualization of war.” 338   As Brooks put it, “we have already begun to 
‘individualize’ warfare, primarily through targeted drone strikes.  In the future, this 
trend will continue: more and more, we will see highly individualized ‘attacks’ on 
specific individuals, in addition to—or in place of—impersonal assaults on ‘enemy 
forces’.”339  When compared to more devastating methods of warfare, such as using 
nuclear weapons or firebombing, “weapons capable of killing only specific 
individuals seem like a moral advance.”340  As the individualization of war continues, 
VIS may likely be used to participate in more precise missions rather than larger 
offensives, thus minimizing operational risks. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
336 Heyns, supra note 7, at 13 (“humans are not necessarily superior to machines in their 
ability to distinguish. In some contexts technology can offer increased precision. For example, a 
soldier who is confronted with a situation where it is not clear whether an unknown person is a 
combatant or a civilian may out of the instinct of survival shoot immediately, whereas a robot may 
utilize different tactics to go closer and, only when fired upon, return fire. Robots can thus act 
“conservatively” and “can shoot second.” Moreover, in some cases the powerful sensors and 
processing powers of LARs can potentially lift the “fog of war” for human soldiers and prevent the 
kinds of mistakes that often lead to atrocities during armed conflict, and thus save lives.”). 
337 See DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, at ¶ 6.5.9.2 (“In fact, in many cases, the use 
of autonomy could enhance the way law of war principles are implemented in military operations. For 
example, some munitions have homing functions that enable the user to strike military objectives with 
greater discrimination and less risk of incidental harm. As another example, some munitions have 
mechanisms to self-deactivate or to self-destruct, which helps reduce the risk they may pose generally 
to the civilian population or after the munitions have served their military purpose.”). 
338 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 133. 
339 Id., at 132. 
340 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 132. 
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Proportionality.   
Closely related to the principle of distinction is the rule “that the use of force 
and the means employed should always be proportionate to the military objective in 
order to protect civilians.”341  This rule of customary international law, as codified in 
Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I, prohibits “an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”342  However, without a definition 
of what counts as “excessive”, proportionality is best understood on a case-by-case 
basis.  The greater the military advantage of an engagement, the more the law will 
“tolerate the expected collateral damage.”343  While these may at first appear hard 
concepts to define344 and quantify,345 advances in machine learning may enable the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
341 KRISHNAN, supra note 255, at 92; see also Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 253 
(“An important element of the principle of distinction is the rule of proportionality”). 
342 See also DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, at ¶ 6.5.9.3 (“In addition, in the 
situation in which a person is using a weapon that selects and engages targets autonomously, that 
person must refrain from using that weapon where it is expected to result in incidental harm that is 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”). 
343 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 254. 
344 Schmitt, supra note 148, at 20 (“There is no question that autonomous weapon systems 
could be programmed to perform CDEM-like analyses to determine the likelihood of harm to civilians 
in the target area. Moreover, these weapon systems would usually be no less likely to generate a 
reliable result than CDEM since the latter is heavily reliant on scientific algorithms. The more difficult 
task for the autonomous weapon system would be assessing military advantage. Given the complexity 
and fluidity of the modern battlespace, it is unlikely in the near future that, despite impressive advances 
in artificial intelligence, “machines” will be programmable to perform robust assessments of a strike’s 
likely military advantage . . . . Yet, military advantage algorithms could in theory be programmed into 
autonomous weapon systems.”). 
345 Wagner, supra note 39, at 27 (“proportionality assessment is almost entirely a qualitative 
exercise.”); Heyns, supra note 7, at 14 (“proportionality assessments often involve qualitative rather 
than quantitative judgements.”); but see Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 255 (“Such 
calculations require consideration of both expected collateral damage and anticipated military 
advantage. An effective system already exists for determining the likelihood of collateral damage to 
objects or persons near a target. The “collateral damage estimate methodology” (CDEM) is a 
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computation of data and powerful algorithms capable of making sense of complex 
situations on the ground.346  
The ability to measure proportionality is not exclusive to the human brain.  A 
proportion is, after all, a mathematical concept.  Indeed, computer systems are already 
used to calculate collateral damage347 in a number of missions.  The U.S. Air Force, 
for instance, uses computer models to estimate the best approach to “ensure 
maximum effect on a target with minimum civilian casualties.”348  Thus, even 
context-specific concepts, such as “military advantage,” could “in theory be 
programmed” into a VIS.349 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
procedure whereby an attacking force considers such factors as the precision of a weapon, its blast 
effect, attack tactics, the probability of civilian presence in structures near the target, and the 
composition of structures to estimate the number of civilian casualties likely to be caused during an 
attack.”). 
346 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 256 (“‘military advantage’ algorithms could 
theoretically be programmed into autonomous weapon systems.”). 
347 MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
165 (Oxford University Press, 2014) (“[C]omputers can be used in support of the application of the 
law of armed conflict . . . e.g. to maintain target data, estimate the best targeting route or weapon, or 
calculate collateral damage”); Schmitt, supra note 148 , at 19 (“A system already exists for 
determining the likelihood of collateral damage to objects or persons near a target. The “collateral 
damage estimate methodology” (CDEM) is a procedure whereby an attacking force considers such 
factors as the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, attack tactics, the probability of civilian presence 
in structures near the target, and the composition of structures to estimate the number of civilian 
casualties likely to be caused during an attack . . . . The commander with authority to authorize the 
attack makes the proportionality determination as part of the attack’s approval process . . . . There is no 
question that autonomous weapon systems could be programmed to perform CDEM-like analyses to 
determine the likelihood of harm to civilians in the target area. Moreover, these weapon systems would 
usually be no less likely to generate a reliable result than CDEM since the latter is heavily reliant on 
scientific algorithms.”). 
348 Off Target. The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH at 19 (2003) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/12/11/target. 
349 Schmitt, supra note 148, at 20 (“For example, the systems could be pre-programmed with 
unacceptable collateral damage thresholds for particular target sets or situations. As an example, an 
autonomous weapon system could be pre-programmed with a base maximum collateral damage level 
of X for a tank; a human would have already made the determination that X generally comports with 
the proportionality rule. Such thresholds would have to be adjustable by human operators based on the 
military situation at a particular phase in the conflict, in a particular area of operations, and so forth. Of 
course, determining the appropriate threshold would be a very subjective endeavour. However, as 
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Why, then, are we betting against the potential of powerful artificial systems 
capable of processing information to maximize the mission’s objectives while 
minimizing, and hopefully eliminating,350 collateral damage?  A Violent Intelligent 
System could better “calculate blast and other weapon effects that cause collateral 
damage,” calculations that would be “far too complex for the warfighter to make in 
real time.”351  Further, drone surveillance (both aerial and lightweight in urban areas) 
will help the mapping of the battlefield and identification of targets and civilians.  
Just like a machine was able to learn how to play the game Go by playing the games 
several thousands of times against itself, and then beat human players at it, a VIS’ 
operating software could model thousands of eventualities based on given data to 
provide a suggested “attack plan” that maximizes military advantage and minimizes 
collateral damage.352 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
noted by the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I, and as acknowledged in Losing Humanity, 
proportionality determinations necessarily involve a “fairly broad margin of judgment” and “must 
above all be a question of common sense and good faith for military commanders.” Because military 
advantage is such a context specific value, compliance with the rule of proportionality would require 
that the base maximum collateral damage threshold be very conservative. Algorithms could be then be 
developed that would permit the autonomous weapon system to refine the base level threshold to 
account for specified variables it encountered on a mission. As an example, it would be reasonable to 
allow the system to increase the level of acceptable collateral damage if it identifies a concentration of 
enemy tanks, as distinct from a single tank. The concentration poses a greater threat and therefore the 
military advantage of destroying individual tanks making up the concentration is greater than that of 
destroying the same tanks when they are operating alone. Similarly, it would be reasonable for the 
system to adjust the level of acceptable collateral damage based on whether a targeted tank is headed 
towards or away from the battlefront.”). 
350 Sharkey, supra note 260, at 1 (“[i]t is proposed here that hi-tech nations should set the 
specific goal of developing weapons that enable zero civilian casualties and facilitate combatant 
surrender.”) 
351 KRISHNAN, supra note 255, at 92 (They could “could perform hundreds of these same 
calculations in real time, increasing the lethality of the engagement while simultaneously reducing the 
probability of collateral damage.”). 
352 A better way to prescribe this in code would be to ensure that VIS can maximize protection 
of civilians while still achieving military advantage. 
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 Further, a VIS need not shoot to kill.353  Indeed, VIS may be able to achieve 
mission objectives without using lethal force.354  Alternatives such as “immobilisation 
or disarmament”355 may become common practice.  For example, the DoD is already 
working on technology to immobilize the enemy.  Dubbed “active denial 
technology,” the technology shoots a “beam of radio frequency millimeter waves 
toward a specific area,” effectively paralyzing the target “with no permanent ill 
effects” and thus giving the military more time to suppress ambushes and identify 
targets from civilians.356  This would give the VIS time to obtain further data to 
ensure that the strike is proportional.  A VIS can also shoot-second if it is unable to 
determine whether potential targets are actually combatants. 
Finally, while operating autonomously, VIS should nonetheless be subject to a 
“kill or abort switch” if human commanders need to suspend the mission.357  An abort 
switch does not undermine the system’s autonomy or intelligence.  Since 
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353 Ronald Arkin, Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-Combatant, AISB 
QUARTERLY, No. 137, 3 (Jul. 2013) (“There is no need for a ‘shoot first, ask-questions later’ approach, 
but rather a ‘first-do-no-harm’ strategy can be utilized instead.”). 
354 Cesáreo Gutiérrez Espada and María José Cervell Hortal, Autonomous Weapons Systems, 
Drones, and International Law, 2 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO ESPAÑOL DE ESTUDIOS ESTRATÉGICOS, 4 
(2013) (“In the future, they will be able to employ a less lethal force, thereby avoiding unnecessary 
deaths.”); Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2(1) JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 
69 (proposing the introduction of “a least-harmful-means test, under which an alternative of capture or 
disabling of the enemy would be preferred to killing whenever feasible.”). 
355 Espada and Hortal, supra note 354 at 4.  
356 Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Non-Lethal 
Weapons Program (May 11, 2016) available at http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact-
Sheets/Article-View-Factsheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology-fact-sheet/. 
357 See Additional Protocol I, art. 57(2)(b) (“an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it 
becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the 
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”). 
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commanders can order subordinates and other actants (e.g., drones) to retreat or abort 
missions, there may be a case for VIS to be subject to real-time communications with 
commanders.  This would be the case anyways if the VIS is up-linking real-time 
video footage of the mission or if it is using the cloud to maximize its informational 
capabilities.  Thus, if commanders deem a certain target to no longer provide a 
“military advantage,” the “abort” switch should be used to “cancel the attack.”358 
 
Precautions and Doubt.  
 Tied to the principle of distinction is the requirement that the attacker take 
precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.359  This rule requires 
the attacker to “take all feasible steps to minimize the risk to civilian casualties, to 
cancel an operation when disproportionate consequences are expected or intelligence 
reveals that the targeted object is not military and to warn possibly affected civilians, 
if this does not contravene the purpose of the attack.”360   In the context of VIS, this 
may include ensuring that the VIS’ code is updated with the latest intelligence and 
upgraded with the most effective capabilities, that the hardware is upgraded and 
capable of making use of all its sensors,361  and that an abort or deactivation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
358 See Additional Protocol, art. 57(2)(b) (“an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it 
becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the 
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”). 
359 Additional Protocol I, art. 57(1) (“In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall 
be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”). 
360 Fleck, supra note 188, at 183. 
361 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 260 (“The requirement to do everything feasible 
to verify that the target is a military objective would, for example, require full use of onboard or 
external sensors capable of boosting the reliability of target identification.”). 
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functionality362 is available.363  These would all be “feasible” precautions.364  Human 
decisions from the design of the software and hardware through deployment thus 
carry an ongoing responsibility to ensure that a precautionary approach is taken to 
minimize civilian casualties.365 
 A precautionary approach also extends to doubts about the status of persons or 
objects366 on the battlefield.  Article 50(1) of the Additional Protocol I provides that 
“[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be 
a civilian.”367  As a VIS will likely not possess the same bias for self-preservation as a 
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362 DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, at ¶ 6.5.9.3 (“the obligation on the person using 
the weapon to take feasible precautions in order to reduce the risk of civilian casualties may be more 
significant when the person uses weapon systems with more sophisticated autonomous functions. For 
example, such feasible precautions a person is obligated to take may include monitoring the operation 
of the weapon system or programming or building mechanisms for the weapon to deactivate 
automatically after a certain period of time.”). 
363An abort functionality does not necessarily affect the “autonomy” of the system.  Would we 
say that a soldier is any less autonomous because it must comply with a commander’s order to abort a 
mission? 
364 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 60 (“The fulcrum of the verification requirement 
is the term feasible. Feasible has been interpreted as that which is practicable or practically possible, 
taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.”) (internal citations omitted). 
365 Fleck, supra note 188, at 183 (“The application of the principle of precaution may be 
guaranteed by so-called persons ‘in the loop’ who overview the attack and are fed with information on 
the targeted area and object and in the consequence can stop the automated attack, even if there is an 
interruption of communication with the automated UCAV. However, even without a person ‘in the 
loop’, other human decisions taken in advance, depending on their algorithms, sophistication, and 
reliability, may result in a positive legal evaluation. So far though, the requirements of customary law 
and Article 57 AP I can only be met by human decision-making; technology has not advanced far 
enough yet to address, for example, risks to civilians (autonomous systems).”). 
366 Additional Protocol I, art. 52(3) (“In case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is 
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so 
used.”). 
367 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 263 (“The presumption applies both to doubt 
regarding the status of a targeted individual and as to whether a person is to be considered a civilian in 
making proportionality calculations and taking feasible precautions in attack.”). 
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human soldier,368 the advantage of a shoot-second approach is clear in this context: 
not only will VIS be able to better manage doubt in the absence of fear and the fog of 
war, but it may also adjust doubt thresholds more accurately depending on real-time 
information.369  After all, doubt is the state of not knowing something with a degree 
of certainty.  Powered by cloud robotics and light-speed communications, it is not 
inconceivable that a VIS will be able to resolve doubt better than a human being.  A 
VIS’ sensors may also be able to capture information that a human soldier cannot 
naturally access by using heat-sensing technology, ultra-sound detection, and on-
board surveillance technology connected to the VIS.370 
 
Other Operational Benefits of VIS 
The use of VIS may bring many other advantages.  First, a VIS can be 
programmed not to follow unlawful orders.  Since weapons law prohibits certain 
types of weapons, it is arguable that a VIS’ software, as a component of the weapon, 
must include code that prohibits engagements that are contrary to IHL.  Second, VIS 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
368 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 264 (“Autonomous weapon systems arguably 
possess advantages over humans with respect to doubt. As with other unmanned systems, they are not 
constrained by the notion of self-preservation. Therefore, the systems could, in some conceivable 
circumstances, be programmed to either hold their fire until being fired upon or essentially sacrifice 
themselves to "reveal the presence of a combatant.”). 
369 Id., at 264 (“Even if values can be attributable to such variables, it will still be necessary to 
set the doubt threshold at which an autonomous weapon system will refrain from attack. In a sense, 
doing so will resemble programming autonomous weapon systems to refrain from attack because of 
the risk of violating the proportionality rule . . . . An autonomous weapon system may also have 
adjustable doubt thresholds that can be set before launch to account for the circumstances in which it 
will be employed (for example, for use in an area where enemy forces have been highly active as 
distinct from one where they have not.”). 
370 For example, the VIS can operate as a platform where lightweight surveillance drones are 
operationalized to gather real-time intelligence in situations where VIS requires further intelligence to 
proceed with a mission. 
! 85 
could record its operations using video, sound, and other data (e.g., metadata such as 
location data and number of engagements) to help monitor the system’s compliance 
with IHL.371  When working with teams of human soldiers, VIS could also monitor 
and report real-time observations about the mission’s compliance with international 
obligations.372  Militaries around the world may decide to voluntarily report this data 
to further increase transparency in the use of the system.373  Third, the deployment of 
VIS arguably replaces human beings on the ground.  This in turn reduces the human 
cost of war,374 which, assuming the VIS is compliant with IHL,375 furthers the 
humanization of international armed conflicts.  Fourth, lesser human involvement in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 See also Robin Murphy and David Woods, Beyond Asimov: The Three Laws of 
Responsible Robotics, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (Jul-Aug. 2009) available at http://ts-
si.org/files/IEEEIS_WebExtra-0709.pdf at 17 (“Robots should carry “black boxes” or recorders to 
show what they were doing when a disturbance occurred, not only for the sake of an accident 
investigation but also to trace the robots’ behavior in context to aid diagnosis and debugging.”); New 
Technologies and the modern battlefield: Humanitarian Perspectives: Autonomous weapons, 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, available at https://app.icrc.org/e-briefing/new-tech-
modern-battlefield/part-3-autonomous-weapons.html (“they may bring a new potential to improve 
compliance with humanitarian law on the battlefield.”). 
  372 Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid 
Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture, Part I: Motivation and Philosophy, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, 7 (2007) available at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-
publications/formalizationv35.pdf (“autonomous systems maybe capable ‘of independently and 
objectively monitoring ethical behaviour in the battlefield by all parties and reporting infractions that 
might be observed’.”); Marchant et al., supra note 32, at 280 (“when working in a team of combined 
human soldiers and autonomous systems as an organic asset, they have the potential capability of 
independently and objectively monitoring ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties and reporting 
infractions that might be observed. This presence alone might possibly lead to a reduction in human 
ethical infractions”). 
373 See Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, White House releases its count of civilian deaths in 
counterterrorism operations under Obama, WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 1, 2016) available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-releases-its-count-of-civilian-
deaths-in-counterterrorism-operations-under-obama/2016/07/01/3196aa1e-3fa2-11e6-80bc-
d06711fd2125_story.html (noting the U.S.’ publication of statistics related to U.S. drone attacks). 
374  See DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 279 (“One of the prime uses of robots is to do things 
that are too dangerous for humans, and fighting wars is about as dangerous as it get.  Robots already 
defuse bombs, and drones allow a platoon to see over the hill.”). 
375 The alternative is to assume that a VIS does not comply with IHL – just a like a human 
soldier may fail to comply with those rules. 
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the “doing of violence” could mean fewer sufferers of post-conflict psychological 
injury, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).  Fifth, we must recognize 
that humans are perfectable—not perfect beings.  There is little evidence to support 
the assumption that humans hold a perfect record in adhering to IHL.  To the 
contrary, there is a clear “gap between the [international] norms and the reality.”376  
Indeed, as former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan put it: 
Despite the adoption of the various conventions on international 
humanitarian and human rights law over the past 50 years, hardly a 
day goes by where we are not presented with evidence of the 
intimidation, brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in 
situations of armed conflict . . . . [T]he parties to conflicts have acted 
with deliberate indifference to those conventions.377 
 
Code may be better able to bridge the gap between norms and reality.  As former 
Pentagon official Rosa Brooks put it:  
Computers may be far better than human beings at complying with 
international humanitarian law.  After all, we humans are fragile and 
panicky creatures, easily flustered by the fog of war.  Our eyes face 
only one direction; our ears register only certain frequencies; our 
brains can process only so much information at a time.  Loud noises 
make us jump, and fear floods our bodies with powerful chemicals that 
can temporarily distort our perceptions and judgment . . . . Computers, 
in contrast, are excellent in crisis and combat situations [because] 
[t]hey don’t get mad, they don’t get scared, and they don’t act out of 
sentimentality.378   
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376 Meron, supra note 189, at 277; see also Wagner, supra note 39, at 46 (noting a 2006 report 
by the Surgeon General’s Office found that “appropriate ethical behavior among soldiers and marines 
deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom was questionable”). 
377 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/957, ¶ 2; see also BROOKS, supra note 4, at 136-137 (“If the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan produced a surfeit of dead and mangled civilians, it’s not because of killer robots, it’s 
because of fallible human decision making.”). 
378 BROOKS, supra note 4, at 136. 
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Noting that humans have “historically been quite bad at distinguishing between 
combatants and civilians, even in traditional conflicts between the militaries of 
opposing states,” 379  Brooks argues that we should not “romanticize our own 
species.”380  And even when humans correctly make that distinction, they “often 
make risk-averse calculations about necessity and proportionality.”381  Finally, the use 
of VIS may increase the “projection of state power despite declining military 
recruitment figures.”382  While the use of VIS may result in an arms race for this type 
of technology, the race should be understood as a shift in the means of violence rather 
than an increase in violence.383  
 In the final analysis, IHL is not exclusively concerned with the “package” of 
violence—or as one commentator put it, the “who” or the “what”384—but it focuses 
more broadly on the effects of violence.  IHL is focused on how that violence is 
“performed” only to the extent it seeks to regulate the effect or impact of a weapon.  
As Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman note:  
The principle of humanity is fundamental, but it refers, not to some 
idea that humans must operate weapons, but instead to the promotion 
of means or methods of warfare that best protect humanity within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
379 Id., at 136. 
380 Id., at 138. 
381 Id., at 136. 
  382 Liu, supra note 65, at 633. 
383 See also DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 281 (“If a war is fought by machines, with humans 
only in command positions, no one is killed or wounded.  Perhaps, then, what we should do, instead of 
outlawing robots, is – when we’re ready – outlaw human soldiers.”). 
384 Anderson, Reisner, Waxman, supra note 158, at 401 (“Whether the actor on the battlefield 
is a “who” or a “what” is not truly the issue, but rather how well that actor performs according to the 
law of armed conflict”). 
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lawful bounds of war, irrespective of whether the means to that end is 
human or machine or some combination of the two.385 
 
Tensions with International Human Rights Law 
Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—
known as the “cornerstone” of International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”)—provides 
that “every human being has the inherent right to life” and that “[n]o one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”386  Whereas IHRL “protects physical integrity and 
human dignity in all circumstances,”387 “the law of war allows, or least tolerates, the 
killing and wounding of innocent human beings not directly participating in an armed 
conflict, such as civilian victims of lawful collateral damage.”388   The tension 
between the objectives of IHRL and IHL has led some to argue that “[f]ully 
autonomous weapons have the potential to contravene the right to life.”389  For 
example, HRW argues that such weapons will not be able to make the necessary 
“qualitative assessments” required to comply with IHRL.  HRW predicts that “[d]ue 
to the infinite number of possible scenarios, robots could not be pre-programmed to 
handle every specific circumstance.”390   It is clear that a machine cannot be pre-
programmed in the traditional sense with all eventualities that may arise on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
385 Anderson, Reisner, Waxman, supra note 158, at 401. 
386 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], art. 6(1). 
387 Meron, supra note 189, at 240. 
388 Id., at 240. 
389 Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 16. 
390 Id., at 9. 
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battlefield.  But the point ignores the potential of machine learning, as noted above.  
Machine learning, like a human brain, does not need to be fed all eventualities; rather, 
humans can teach the machine how to learn and how to make lawful decisions. 
 Further, from a legal standpoint, IHL, as lex specialis, is the governing law in 
international armed conflicts.  As the ICJ noted in Nuclear Weapons: 
[W]hether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon 
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary 
to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the 
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the 
[International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights] itself.391   
 
In practical terms, it may be that VIS will be able to utilize non-lethal force to achieve 
military objectives, and thus still satisfy the spirit IHRL by not using lethal force.  
 
Can VIS Protect the Environment and Cultural Property?  
International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on the natural environment392 
and cultural property.393  VIS may be able to make better determinations about 
incidental effects on the natural environment than a warfighter because the latter may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
391 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 230, at 25.  
392 Additional Protocol I, art. 35 (3) (“It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment.”); Article 55 (“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment 
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of 
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.”). 
393 Additional Protocol, art. 55 (“it is prohibited: (a) to commit any acts of hostility directed 
against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or 
spiritual heritage of peoples;”); see also UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art. 4(1) (“The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the 
territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate 
surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to 
destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, 
directed against such property.”). 
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be primarily focused on—and overwhelmed by—military objectives.  A network of 
VIS could more quickly process scientific data in order model decisions that 
minimize long-term and severe damage to the environment.  Of course, concepts such 
as “long-term” or “severe” are hard to define.  But environmental science, aided by 
AI, provides a number of tools designed to predict and quantify damage to the 
environment.394  Environmental impact assessments are already used in a number of 
industries to assess the impact of man-made activities on the natural environment.  If 
faced with an existential threat, would it not be better for a State to use VIS to offset 
the threat, rather than dropping an atomic bomb that is incapable of distinction and is 
extremely harmful to the environment?  These questions highlight the potential that 
VIS code can be “green” as well as “good.”395   
VIS could also be used in missions to protect cultural property.396  VIS may 
be able to better identify sites protected by international conventions and take action 
to minimize their damage.  Further, since political costs may be too high to send 
ground forces to protect cultural heritage, sending in VIS may be a more viable 
alternative.397 
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394 Francois Spitz and Sovan Lek, Environmental impact prediction using neural network 
modelling. An example in wildlife damage available, 36(1) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECOLOGY 317 (April 
1999); Roudgarmi, P., Monavari, M., Feghhi, J. et al., Environmental impact prediction using remote 
sensing images, 9(3) JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY-SCIENCE A, 381-390 (2008). 
395 By “good”, I mean code that is capable of powering a weapon system in a way that 
complies with International Humanitarian Law. 
396 Thiago Velozo and Lucas Bento, ISIS Is Destroying Priceless Artifacts. Here’s How to 
Stop Them, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 17, 2015) available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/isis-is-
destroying-priceless-artifacts-heres-how-to-stop-them/. 
397 In order to further humanize IHL and align it with IHRL, more research should be focused 
on technology capable of immobilizing and disarming without lethal consequences.  
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Human Responsibility in Armed Conflicts 
International responsibility under public international law can be broadly 
divided into two camps: State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility.  State 
Responsibility is a branch of international law governing state responsibility for a 
State’s breaches of its international obligations.  Individual Responsibility governs 
the allocation of personal responsibility under international criminal law.  While 
IHL’s capacity to govern VIS has been examined by many,398 the question of 
responsibility and accountability for the use VIS is typically ignored or takes a 
secondary position in the debate.399  Some argue that no human responsibility 
ensues.400  Others propose that responsibility should be shared between robots401 and 
the human actors involved.402  Those perspectives, however, ignore the current legal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
398 See supra Chapter III (“Acting Responsibly in Armed Conflicts”). 
399 McFarland and McCormack, supra note 134, at 385 (“Too little analysis has been 
undertaken on questions of State responsibility for the deployment of autonomous weapons systems 
that result in serious violations of the law of armed conflict”); but see e.g. McFarland and McCormack, 
supra note 134, at 370 (“[I]n what circumstances, if any, does a system’s inbuilt capacity for 
autonomous operation start to affect the allocation of criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
the law of armed conflict?”). 
400  See Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 2 (“These weapons have the potential to commit 
criminal acts—unlawful acts that would constitute a crime if done with intent—for which no one could 
be held responsible”); Darren M. Stewart, New Technology and the Lai of Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L L. 
STUD. 271, 290 (2011) (“Absent the aberrant behavior of either the data or command programmers . . .  
it would be almost impossible to attribute the autonomous system’s behavior directly to a particular 
human.”); Sparrow, R., Killer robots, 41(1) JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, 62–77 (2007) (arguing 
that it will not be possible to hold humans responsible for the behavior of autonomous robots); id., at 
62 (“possible loci of responsibility for robot war crimes are canvassed: the persons who designed or 
programmed the system, the commanding officer who ordered its use, the machine itself. I argue that 
in fact none of these are ultimately satisfactory.”). 
401 Indeed, some have argued that robots in the future be held responsible in some form.  
Hellstrom, T., On the moral responsibility of military robots, 5 ETHICS AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 99 (2013) (arguing that we should be prepared for a future when people blame robots 
for their actions). 
402 Crnkovic, G. D., & Persson, D., Sharing moral responsibility with robots: A pragmatic 
approach, in P. K. Holst & P. Funk (Eds.), FRONTIERS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
APPLICATIONS (IOS Press Books, 2008). 
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architecture of international responsibility.  Indeed, humans and human institutions 
remain solely responsible for VIS-inflicted violence.403   
 
State Responsibility 
State Responsibility is governed by the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(“ARISWA”).404  Article 1 of ARISWA provides that international responsibility 
arises in respect of internationally wrongful acts.  Article 2 of ARISWA defines “an 
internationally wrongful act as occurring when conduct attributable to a state under 
international law constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.”405  
Attribution, in turn, is the “process by which international law establishes whether the 
conduct of a natural person or other such intermediary can be considered an ‘act of 
state’, and thus be capable of giving rise to state responsibility.” 406   State 
responsibility rules acknowledge that the State is an abstract entity and can only act 
through its organs and agents, which includes government personnel and persons 
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403 Nagenborg, M., Capurro, R., Weber, J., & Pingel, C., Ethical regulations on robotics in 
Europe, AI & SOCIETY (2008), 22, 349–366; Marino, D., & Tamburrini, G., Learning robots and 
human responsibility, 6 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS, 46–51 (2006); Chopra, S., 
& White, L. W., A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS, (The University of 
Michigan Press, 2011). 
404 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly on Its Fifty-Third Session, 56 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 10, at 1, 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. 
405 James Crawford, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 93 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
406 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 113. 
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acting under the direction or control of a State.407  The acts of armed forces, as an 
organ of the State, are therefore attributable to a State.408  Thus, if a State’s armed 
forces use VIS in breach of IHL, that State is responsible for the breach.409  
Acts ultra vires are also “attributable to a state where committed by one of its 
organs,”410 such as the armed forces.411  Indeed, “the mere fact a soldier losing his 
way does not deprive him of the status of a state organ.”412  Thus, a soldier that 
tampers with a VIS and misuses it does not absolve the State from responsibility.413  
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407 Melzer, supra note 5, at 38 (“This includes not only government personnel, such as 
members of the armed and police forces or intelligence agencies (de jure State agents), but also 
persons acting on the instructions or under the direction or control of a State, such as certain private 
military or security contractors (de facto State agents).”). 
408 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 119 (“The most obvious executive manifestations are 
actions of the armed forces, which in the context of armed conflict are in all cases attributable to and 
engage the international responsibility of the state in question.”). 
409 See ARSIWA, supra note 404, art. 12 (“There is a breach of an international obligation by 
a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, 
regardless of its origin or character.”); Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Law, 
ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 8, Geneva Academy, November 2014 (noting Sweden’s position that “even if 
LAWS are referred to as “autonomous”, states are legally responsible for their use. If violations occur 
that are attributable to a particular State, that state is responsible according to the rules of State 
responsibility and international humanitarian law.’”). 
410 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 120; ARSIWA, supra note 404, art. 7 (“The conduct of an 
organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that 
capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.”). 
411 If internal laws grant robots and VIS some type of legal status, so that it becomes some 
form of “entity”, the State would remain responsible for the acts of that entity.  See ARSIWA, supra 
note 404, art. 5 (“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 
but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance.”).  
412 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 120. 
413 Melzer, supra note 5, at 38 (“In international armed conflict, the responsibility of States 
even extends to ‘all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces,’ including acts 
committed outside their official capacity as members of the armed forces. In principle, therefore, all 
military operations carried out on behalf of a State are directly attributable to that State, regardless of 
where they take place or where their effects materialize.”). 
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Depending on the misuse, individuals would also be responsible for that conduct.  
Further, “a state cannot plead the provisions of its internal law in order to justify an 
internationally unlawful act.”414   
International legal responsibility may also arise where a State aids or assists 
another State to commit an internationally wrongful act, such as supplying the code or 
hardware to the assisted State.  While the assisting State need not know of the 
unlawfulness of the assisted conduct, it must be aware of the “factual circumstances” 
that make it unlawful.415  For example, when a State is known to use VIS in 
contravention to IHL, other States knowingly assisting such operations through the 
provision of code, training, or hardware will be internationally responsible for their 
assistance.416 
Can VIS’ autonomy breach the chain of responsibility?  In the Nicaragua 
case, in considering Guatemala’s argument that the contras were mercenaries paid by 
the US, the ICJ noted that the contras would “have no real autonomy in relation to 
[US]” and as such “any offences which they have committed would be imputable to 
[the US].”417  This passage of obiter dicta may at first imply that autonomy can 
undermine the chain of responsibility.  However, closer analysis shows how the ICJ 
was referring to a group’s relationship to a State, not a weapon’s status in relation to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
414 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 121. 
415 Melzer, supra note 5, at 38. 
416 Id. (“For instance, when a State is known to carry out armed drone attacks which are 
widely regarded to contravene its obligations under human rights law and humanitarian law, other 
States knowingly assisting such operations through the provision of personnel, logistic support or 
targeting intelligence will become internationally responsible for doing so.”). 
417 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), ICJ Reports (1986) 14, 64 (emphasis added). 
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the State.  Further, a weapon cannot “commit an offence” under international law—
only States and individuals i.e., humans and human institutions, are capable of 
violating international law. 
 One of the most significant challenges to State Responsibility in the context of 
VIS is the defense of force majeure.  Article 23(1) of ARISWA states: 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to 
force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an 
unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially 
impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 
 
The concern is that “[w]ith increasing autonomy” weapon systems will “spin[] out of 
control” and “malfunction.”418  A State could therefore in theory plead force majeure 
in order to “evade” international responsibility for “unforeseen” VIS breaches if IHL, 
such as indiscriminate attacks on civilians.  However, ARISWA, Article 32(2)(a), 
provides that force majeure is not available where “the situation of force majeure is 
due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State 
invoking it.”  As the Commentary to the ARISWA notes, “material impossibility 
cannot be invoked if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of 
an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any 
other party to the treaty.”419  Thus, if a State failed to take the necessary precautions 
to ensure that the VIS complied with IHL (lack of training commanders and officers, 
lack of testing, poor development), then that State would not be able to plead force 
majeure if the VIS malfunctioned or did not operate as planned.  Indeed, States 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
418 Melzer, supra note 5, at 38. 
419 ARSIWA, supra note 404, art. 23, § 9. 
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cannot invoke force majeure by relying on events resulting from the state’s 
negligence.420  In any event, the effects of man-made code or robotic systems are not 
“irresistible forces” and potential malfunctioning are not “unforeseen events.”   
 Further, Article 23(2)(b) of ARISWA provides that a State cannot plead force 
majeure if “the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.”  In this 
context, Crawford explains that “[i]f a state accepts responsibility for a particular risk, 
it renounces its right to rely on force majeure to evade that responsibility.  It may do 
so expressly, by agreement, or by clear implication.”421  When a State assumes the 
risk of deploying a VIS that runs ineffective or faulty software or hardware, that State 
is responsible for the unexpected operation of that VIS because “there is predictable 
unpredictability” in the use of VIS.422  Thus, a State that employs these technologies 
in warfare and seek to benefit from them takes on the risks associated with their 
use.423  A thornier question is whether external hacking of the VIS constitutes force 
majeure.424  But hacking is a well-known countermeasure in cyberspace, and thus a 
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420 See CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 298 (“One thing it certainly does not cover is mere 
negligence.”). 
421 CRAWFORD, supra note 405, at 301. 
422 Robin Geiss, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Risk Management and State Responsibility, 
Presentation, Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (Apr. 2016) available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/00C95F16D6FC38E4C1257F9D0039B84D/$fi
le/Geiss-CCW-Website.pdf. 
423 Geiss, supra note 422, at 2 (“It follows that a State that benefits from the various 
(strategic) gains associated with this new technology should therefore be held responsible whenever 
the (unpredictable) risks inherent in this technology are realized.”). 
424 Melzer, supra note 5, at 39 (“The question to be clarified is whether force majeure can 
only arise if robotic malfunction is caused by external factors (e.g., malicious cyber-interference) or 
also in case of a genuinely unforeseen shortcomings in the system’s operating software.”). 
! 97 
risk that a State assumes in entering the cyberspace domain.  Thus, even in the most 
extreme circumstances, a State remains responsible for the use of VIS.425 
 
Individual Responsibility 
  Individual responsibility is governed by international criminal law (“ICL”).  
ICL revolves around the notion of personal culpability,426 which can be direct or 
complicit.427  Personal culpability, in turn, is informed by individual autonomy.  As 
Cassese notes:  
The principle of individual autonomy whereby the individual is 
normally endowed with free will and the independent capacity to 
choose his conduct is firmly rooted in modern criminal law, including 
ICL.428 
 
Human autonomy, however, is not to be confused with the notion of VIS’ autonomy.  
The latter is merely a product of human choice.429  The autonomous operation of a 
weapon system does nothing to undermine a human being’s autonomy to develop, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
425 Melzer, supra note 5, at 37 (“At the most basic level, legal accountability requires the 
recognition that States remain legally responsible for the consequences of their use of robotic weapons 
irrespective of the operational autonomy achieved by such systems. Legal accountability also involves 
a governmental duty of investigation, and of reparation for potential violations.”). 
426 CASSESE, supra note 204, at 33 (“In ICL, the general principle applies that no one may be 
held accountable for an act he has not performed or in the commission of which he has not in some 
way participated, or for an omission that cannot be attributed to him.”). 
427 DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 197, ¶ 18.32 (“Individuals may be held liable for 
violations of the law of war whether they have committed them directly or are complicit in the 
commission of such crimes.”). 
428 CASSESE, supra note 204, at 33. 
429 Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 280 (“Finally, humans will always be accountable 
for the employment of autonomous weapon systems. Although they will gradually delegate more tasks 
to autonomous systems, the responsibility for the appropriate use of the systems will nevertheless 
remain with the human operators and commanders. Orders to deploy the system and judgments about 
how to program it will come from a human. Any recklessness or criminal misuse will result in 
accountability through the same war crimes mechanisms that already exist under the law of armed 
conflict.”). 
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select and deploy weapons to carry out human objectives.  What better evidence of 
human free will than to remove a human being from harm’s way and let a machine do 
the work on its behalf? 
  Individual criminal responsibility can be divided in two camps: direct 
responsibility and indirect responsibility.430  Individuals that develop and deploy VIS 
with the intention to commit international crimes will be directly responsible for those 
crimes.  For example, under the doctrine of direct responsibility, military 
commanders who order their subordinates to perpetrate atrocities in violation of the 
law are liable for the ensuing crimes.431  Thus, if a commander ordered subordinates 
to deploy VIS programmed to commit war crimes, then that commander, as well as 
the subordinates, would be liable for those crimes.  Accordingly, “[s]uperiors shall 
only issue orders which are in conformity with international law.  Superiors who issue 
an order contrary to international law expose not only themselves but also their 
subordinates obeying these orders to the risk of being prosecuted.”432   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
430 Wagner, supra note 39, at 35 (“Given that AWS are military tools, a natural starting point 
for responsibility could be the military officers who set parameters for a given engagement. It is 
important to distinguish between direct responsibility, which arises from acts or omissions supporting 
the commission of IHL, and command responsibility, which involves the failure of military or civilian 
superiors to conduct the required oversight of their subordinates.”). 
431 See e.g. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (recognizing this mode of criminal liability); O’Connell, supra note 190, at 39 (“In the 
case of Yamashita, the US Supreme Court held that General Yamashita was guilty of a war crime for 
failing to control the troops under his command and to prevent the atrocities which they committed in 
areas occupied by the Japanese army. This principle has now been incorporated into the leading texts 
on international criminal law such as the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Articles 25 and 
28) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Article 7).”). 
432 O’Connell, supra note 190, at 40 (“An officer, of whatever rank, who orders the 
commission of an unlawful act is guilty of a war crime, as is the soldier who carries out that order. The 
‘grave breaches’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions and AP I stipulate that ordering the 
commission of an act amounting to a grave breach is itself a grave breach.” ); Additional Protocol I, 
art. 86; Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/features/darfur/ 
fiveyearson/report9.html (“All individuals, including government officials, military commanders, 
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  Commanders may also be liable under the doctrine of indirect responsibility, 
which states that a commander is liable when the commander knew or should have 
known 433  that her subordinates committed crimes and the commander failed 
prevent,434 report, or punish such subordinates.435  Critics argue that this doctrine 
cannot be squarely applied to the use of VIS.  Their arguments tend to be based on a 
false comparison that equates a VIS to a “subordinate” or “combatant.”436  This 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
soldiers, militia members, and civilians, are subject to prosecution for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and applicable domestic crimes under international law.”). 
433 Command responsibilty and failure to act, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian 
law INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1, available at https://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/2014/command-responsibility-icrc-eng.pdf. 
434 The “abort” switch mentioned above may provide a mechanism to ensure that commanders 
can prevent any unlawful violence inflicted by a VIS.  However, it is acknowledged that some VIS 
may act at speeds that may complicate real-time human monitoring.  This only becomes a problem, 
however, if the technology is incompetent from the beginning.  It is unclear how or why a military will 
deploy a weapon they do not understand or do not have confidence in.  For both legal and strategic 
reasons, such weapons are unlikely to be deployed at all.  
435 Additional Protocol I, art. 87 (1) (“Parties to the conflict shall require military 
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons 
under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities 
breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.”). 
436 See e.g. Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 20 (“Using a commander-subordinate analogy, the 
commander would not be directly responsible for the robot’s specific actions since he or she did not 
order them.”); id., at 21 (“First, command responsibility only arises when a subordinate commits a 
chargeable criminal offense.  Second, even if a criminal act committed by a robot were considered 
sufficient for the command responsibility doctrine in the case of fully autonomous weapons”); Heyns, 
supra note 7, at 15 (“Since a commander can be held accountable for an autonomous human 
subordinate, holding a commander accountable for an autonomous robot subordinate may appear 
analogous.”); Roff supra note 86, at 357 (“Military commander liable for actions of subordinates, 
where commander should have known what would happen.  Modern case law requires the effective 
control of subordinates by superiors . . . . Looking at the case of LARs, the effective control criterion 
would actually exculpate leaders from legal responsibility because the commanders’ inability to 
control the machines. Autonomous machines are “impossible” to control by “a human in real-time due 
to its processing speed and the multitude of operational variables involved.”); Neha Jain, Autonomous 
weapons systems: new frameworks for individual responsibility, in BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND 
KRESS, supra note 30, at 303 (“The actions of an AWS, being partly of the character of a weapon and 
partly the character of the combatant”); Liu, supra note 65, at 636 (“the capacity for autonomous 
decision-making pushes these technologically advanced systems to the boundary of the notion of 
‘combatant’”). 
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misleading characterization of the weapon system as some type of robotic soldier437 
or subordinated combatant438  ultimately tips the scales of criticism against the 
efficacy of international law.  To be clear, VIS are weapon systems—not 
“subordinates” or “combatants.”  A weapon is not a subordinate and a weapon cannot 
commit an international crime as that term is understood under international law.  
Indeed, in the words of the Nuremberg judges, “crimes . . . are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities.”439 
  Further, critics argue that commanders may not be held responsible because 
they would not understand how the VIS’ complex programming operates and thus 
could not have “known” something they did not comprehend.440  But the commander 
need not be an expert in computer science or know the intricacies of how the system 
is built, only what it is “able and unable to do.”441  To this end, DARPA is working !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  437 Ugo Pagallo, Robots of just war: a legal perspective, 24 PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY, 
307– 323 (2011). 
438  See e.g. KRISHNAN, supra note 255, at 103 (“AW could potentially interrupt the clear 
chain of  military command that is required by international law.  Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
requires any combatant ‘to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’”) (emphasis 
added); Liu, supra note 65, at 636 (“the capacity for autonomous decision-making pushes these 
technologically advanced systems to the boundary of the notion of ‘combatant’.”). 
439 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 223 (1947) (“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”). 
440 Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 3 (“a commander would not always have sufficient reason 
or technological knowledge to anticipate the robot would commit a specific unlawful act.”); Heyns, 
supra note 7, at 15 (“Yet traditional command responsibility is only implicated when the commander 
“knew or should have known that the individual planned to commit a crime yet he or she failed to take 
action to prevent it or did not punish the perpetrator after the fact.” It will be important to establish, 
inter alia, whether military commanders will be in a position to understand the complex programming 
of LARs sufficiently well to warrant criminal liability.”). 
441 Sassòli, supra note 150, at 324 (added emphasis); Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 
267 (“This requires an understanding not only of the physical capabilities and limitations of the system 
(the maximum range, the effectiveness of the weaponry, the blast radius of its weapons, etc.), but also 
the subjective values embedded in it”); Schmitt and Thurnher, supra note 54, at 277 (“The mere fact 
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on ways to make “the decisions made by autonomous systems to use lethal weapons 
‘explainable’” so that humans can have more details about “how the machine used 
deep learning to come up with answer[s] [to problems].”442 
  The more challenging question is whether individuals can be held responsible 
for unlawful violence inflicted by VIS that are “unintended” or “unknowable,” either 
because of malfunctioning or external hacking.  These individuals may argue that 
such violence was unintended and unforeseeable, and that they took all precautions to 
ensure that only lawful violence was used.  Critics argue that such individuals may 
argue that they lacked the necessary mens rea to commit international crimes443 and 
thus evade liability.  But this concern is overestimated for five reasons. 
  First, there is little doubt that collective responsibility i.e., State responsibility 
would arise in these circumstances.444  Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I 
provides that a State “shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming 
part of its armed forces.”  Further, Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I 
Additional Protocol I explicitly impose an international legal obligation on parties to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
that a human might not be in control of a particular engagement does not mean that no human is 
responsible for the actions of the autonomous weapon system. A human must decide how to program 
the system and when to launch it. Self-evidently, that individual would be accountable for 
programming it to engage in actions that amounted to war crimes. Moreover, the commander or 
civilian supervisor of the person would be accountable for those war crimes if he or she knew or 
should have known that the autonomous weapon system had been so programmed and did nothing to 
stop its use, or later became aware that the system had been employed in a manner constituting a war 
crime and did nothing to hold the individuals concerned accountable.”). 
442 Cameron Leuthy, In battle, you need to trust your robots, BLOOMBERG GOVERNMENT (Jun. 
16, 2016) available at http://about.bgov.com/blog/battle-need-trust-robots/. 
443 See e.g. Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 21(“Command responsibility is only triggered if a 
commander has actual or constructive knowledge of the crime, that is, the commander must know or 
have a reason to know of the crime.”). 
444 See Additional Protocol I, art. 91 (“A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of 
the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall 
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”). 
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an armed conflict to require commanders to take all necessary measures445 to prevent 
crimes being committed and to initiate disciplinary or penal sanctions against them 
when crimes have been perpetrated.446  
  Second, military leaders and commanders’ responsibilities constrain447 the 
potential unpredictabilities, if any, of using Violent Intelligent Systems.  Indeed, 
before engaging an objective, military leaders must comply with a number of 
international obligations, including selecting means and methods of warfare to 
minimize collateral injury to civilians,448 refraining from launching excessive force 
which may be expected to cause incidental injury civilians,449 and suspending attacks 
if new information suggests that the target is not a military objective.450  These 
responsibilities add layers of checks and balances over possible uncertainties related 
to the use of VIS.  Further, in addition to “sign[ing] off” on decisions, commanders 
and military leaders are responsible for “formulating the rules of engagement, which 
includes specifying how and which weapons may be used.”451  Thus commanders 
may be reluctant to allow subordinates to use a VIS that “they know is unpredictable 
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445 Additional Protocol I, art. 86 (2) (“The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary 
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to 
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a 
breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the 
breach.”). 
446 Additional Protocol I, arts. 86, 87.  
447 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 59. 
448 Additional Protocol I, art. 57 (2)(a)(ii). 
449 Additional Protocol I, art. 57 (2)(a)(iii). 
450 Additional Protocol I, art. 57 (2)(b); Fleck, supra note 188, at 199. 
451 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 59. 
! 103 
for fear that they would be held responsible for violating the laws of armed conflict as 
a result of the robot’s rogue or unethical behavior.”452 
  To this end, military policy may emphasize direct individual responsibility 
and accountability for the operation of VIS.453  For example, US military policy 
imposes direct obligations on persons responsible for making decisions related to the 
use of autonomous weapon systems.454  Indeed, Directive 3000.09 provides that 
“[p]ersons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in 
accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable rules of engagement.” 455   This creates a direct thread of human 
responsibility and judgment through the employment of VIS capable of autonomous 
operation.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
452 Id. 
453 See e.g. UK Joint Doctrine, supra note 257, at ¶ 510 (as long as a system is lawful, “[l]egal 
responsibility for any military activity remains with the last person to issue the command authorising a 
specific activity.”); but see Liu, supra note 65, at 650 (“Relocating the locus of punishment to natural 
persons with the closest nexus to these machines, however, runs the risk of scapegoating those persons: 
the possession of autonomous decisionmaking capacity may break the causal chain that would justify 
the attribution of responsibility to those persons. Thus, autonomous and remote weapons systems may 
have a higher capacity to adhere to IHL, but will inevitably have much lower levels of responsibility 
for any breaches. This leads to impunity for conduct in armed conflict.”). 
454 Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, at ¶ 4.(b) (“[p]ersons who authorize the use of, 
direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with 
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety 
rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”); Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, Enclosure 4, 
sec. 10 (imposing these same requirements on the “Commanders of the U.S. Combatant Commands.”). 
455 Directive Number 3000.09, supra note 35, at ¶ 4.(b) (“[p]ersons who authorize the use of, 
direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with 
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety 
rules, and applicable rules of engagement.”); id., at Enclosure 4, sec. 10 (imposing these same 
requirements on the “Commanders of the U.S. Combatant Commands.”). 
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  Third, the possibility that human operators may lack the necessary mens rea 
for war crimes in this context should not act as a basis for prohibiting these types of 
weapons.456  Any weapon can malfunction.  Why should we assume that the human 
operator acted benevolently and lawfully?  Why are we assuming that the VIS 
malfunctioned, and not the other way around?  While the discourse must recognize 
potential pitfalls of the technology, it should not fuel narratives that allow humans to 
hide behind the complexity of their technologies.   
  Further, humans can lie about their intentions, but code seldom lies.  Human 
intention can be evidenced in many of the components and settings of a VIS, 
including in code that operates it and the type of weapons it employs.  If one uses VIS 
to commit crimes against humanity, the VIS must, for example, be programmed to 
commit murder against civilians.  Of course, sophisticated coding techniques, such as 
encryption and data self-destruction technology, may conceal evidence of 
premeditation or knowledge for mens rea purposes.  In cases where the VIS may have 
genuinely malfunctioned, code may nonetheless illustrate human failures in setting 
appropriate parameters for the mission at hand, by for example setting lower 
thresholds of doubt in environments heavily populated with civilians.  Here, experts 
would need to opine on whether specific code and models were set to target 
legitimate targets in lawful ways.  In any event, VIS code, as a symbolic language of 
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456 See e.g. Mind the Gap, supra note 66, at 2 (“Human commanders or operators could not be 
assigned direct responsibility for the wrongful actions of a fully autonomous weapon, except in rare 
circumstances when those people could be shown to have possessed the specific intention and 
capability to commit criminal acts through the misuse of fully autonomous weapons. In most cases, it 
would also be unreasonable to impose criminal punishment on the programmer or manufacturer, who 
might not specifically intend, or even foresee, the robot’s commission of wrongful acts.”). 
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violence, can evince human intent to inflict violence.  Ultimately, whether that code 
(or the VIS hardware) malfunctioned is a question of fact. 
  Fourth, technological developments will facilitate the enforcement of 
responsibility.  This thesis has already considered how built-in monitoring systems 
will help assess VIS compliance with IHL.  This could be taken a step further to 
include a traceable path of command within the system, so that “every distinct 
decision can be traced back to the responsible individual, who may then be held 
accountable.”457  Enemy surveillance of VIS operations will also add a layer of 
accountability.  Indeed, the enemy may publish footage of VIS violations captured 
from its surveillance apparatus.   
  Finally, the question of (and doubts concerning) human responsibility will 
become less of an issue once there is a better understanding of how VIS, and AI 
generally, will operate.  To this end, additional interdisciplinary efforts must be 
pursued to facilitate cross-disciplinary research into VIS to reach a consensus about 
the potential of their underlying technologies as well as issues related to terminology, 
legality, and best practices.  The real issues are practical: how can we ensure that VIS 
are legally and technically competent? How can we adequately test them? Can we 
develop international best practices for their development, testing, and fielding in 
order to minimize risks? How can armed forces share technologies (e.g., open-source 
code) without undermining competitive advantage?458  How can we properly train !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
457 Wagner, supra note 39, at 38. 
 458 See Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark, supra note 314, at 107 (“If it is permissible or legal to 
use lethal autonomous weapons, how should these weapons be integrated into the existing command-
and-control structure so that responsibility and liability be distributed, what technical realities and 
forecasts should inform these questions, and how should “meaningful human control” over weapons be 
defined?”). 
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human actors involved in the development and deployment of VIS?459  How can the 
international community monitor the use of VIS?460  Ultimately, the legal evaluation 
of the employment of any weapon, including who is to be responsible for its 
employment, will depend on its specific use.461   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
459 Noorman and Johnson, supra note 122, at 60 (“when the black box is opened up and we 
see how autonomy is understood and ‘made’ by those involved in the design and development of 
robots, the responsibility questions change significantly. The important question is not whether human 
actors can be held responsible (they can), but how tasks are distributed among human and non-human 
components of the system, whether the machine parts have been adequately tested, whether the human 
actors involved have been adequately trained for their tasks, what risks are involved, and how those 
risks are being managed and minimized.”). 
460 Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at ix (noting the role of scrutiny governance, 
which “concerns the extent to which a person or entity is and should be subject to, or should exercise, 
forms of internal or external scrutiny, monitoring, or regulation (or a combination thereof ) concerning 
the design, development, or use of a war algorithm. Scrutiny governance does not hinge on—but might 
implicate—potential and subsequent liability or responsibility (or both). Forms of scrutiny governance 
include independent monitoring, norm (such as legal) development, adopting nonbinding resolutions 
and codes of conduct, normative design of technical architectures, and community self-regulation”). 
461 See Fleck, supra note 188, at 182 (“As stated by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston in his 
report on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions in 2010, ‘a missile fired from a drone is no 
different from any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or 
gunship that fires missiles’. He stressed that the legal evaluation of the employment of any weapon 
depends on its specific use. Outside an armed conflict, the use of lethal force must comply with human 
rights limitations.  The fact that UAVs/UCAVs have no on-board pilot does not change the 
applicability of the principles of armed conflict to UAVs/UCAVs.”). 
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Chapter IV 
Networks of Human Violence 
 
Re-Imagining Human Violence in International Armed Conflicts 
The hostility towards the use of VIS in international armed conflicts is 
fundamentally grounded on a perception that autonomous technology will allow 
violence to be unleashed uncontrollably and unlawfully. Taken to its limit, the critics’ 
interpretation suggests that international law is only capable of regulating human 
means and methods of violence.  In other words, the use of other intelligent actants in 
the infliction of violence could fall outside of international law’s reach, despite being 
designed, developed, directed and deployed by humans to achieve human objectives.  
In addition to misinterpreting the law, this perception misconceptualizes the structure 
of human violence in international armed conflicts. 
Human violence is not exclusively performed by humans.  Rather, it is 
performed by a network of human and non-human actants462 where responsibilities 
are distributed—not delegated 463 —to achieve political goals.  This networked 
approach to violence has become increasingly relevant at a time where technology is 
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462 Walter Isaacson called the collaboration between machines and humans the “Lovelace 
approach,” named after Ada Lovelace, the English mathematician and crucial work on one of the first 
computers, the Analytical Engine.  Isaacson notes that the Lovelace approach involves machines never 
“truly think[ing]” and that “humans will always provide creativity and intentionality.”  Walter 
Isaacson, The Intersection of the Humanities and the Sciences, Lecture, National Endowment for the 
Humanities (2014) available at https://www.neh.gov/about/awards/jefferson-lecture/walter-isaacson-
lecture. 
463 See Sharkey, supra note 260, at 23 (“There is an ongoing technological transformation in 
warfare with ever more control of weapons being delegated to computer systems.”). 
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becoming deeply embedded in most facets of human activity.  The U.S. military has 
recognized as much, and the Pentagon is preparing for what it is now calling 
“network-on-network warfare” against traditional rivals, including China and 
Russia.464  These networks are founded on “human-machine collaboration”465 that 
seeks to “put learning machines, AI, and autonomous systems into the network to 
allow your network to prevail over an enemy’s network.”466  To this end, DARPA is 
conducting research to enhance collaboration between human beings and machine.467  
For example, swarming technology will enable the use of multiple VIS as “force 
multipliers” without requiring constant human supervision.  As more militaries 
continue to invest in robotics and artificial intelligence, the performance of human 
violence will be increasingly distributed within networks of human and non-human 
actants. 
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464 Davenport, supra note 46 (“The Pentagon is preparing for what Deputy Defense Secretary 
Robert Work called “network-on-network warfare” against more traditional rivals, such as China and 
Russia, after more than a decade of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). 
465 Davenport, supra note 46; see also Heyns, supra note 7, at 9 (“Their most likely use 
during armed conflict is in some form of collaboration with humans, although they would still be 
autonomous in their own functions.”). 
466 Bryant Jordan, Pentagon Wants Artificial Intelligence to Defeat Enemy Networks, 
DEFENSE TECH (May 5, 2016) available at http://www.defensetech.org/2016/05/05/pentagon-wants-
artificial-intelligence-to-defeat-enemy-networks/. 
467 For example, the DoD is researching how “to develop autonomous swarming algorithms 
for Unmanned Vehicle (UxVs) to augment ground troops performing missions in a complex 
environment, without creating a significant cognitive burden, . . . [and using] minimum operator 
training and supervision so that the operator can continue to perform his/her normal duties while using 
UxVs as force multipliers.”  DARPA 2016 Budget, supra note 48, at 134.  The Mobile Infantry 
Program seeks to develop “a system-based, mixed team of mounted/ dismounted warfighters and semi-
autonomous variants of current or planned small off-road platforms (equivalent to high-mobility 
platforms currently used by special forces operators single rider, two-rider, or four-rider variants).”  
DARPA 2016 Budget, supra note 48, at 127 (“The MI mixed teams will be able to execute an 
expanded mission set from those currently employed. The MI system concept will allow for a 
combined set of mounted and dismounted operations and for a larger area of operations over more 
aggressive timelines than standard infantry units.”). 
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But the distribution of practical responsibilities between man and machine 
does not result in the distribution of legal responsibilities.  The assumption that legal 
responsibilities travel with practical responsibilities runs counter to the networked 
structure of human violence.468  Networks of human violence are first and foremost 
man-made networks.469  While some theories have sought to portray humans as “no 
more than pieces of a larger military-industrial machine,”470 others more precisely 
recognize that human beings are at the heart of violent networks.  The technologies 
humans employ in these networks are not “self-acting” but are rather operating in 
collaboration with people.  Indeed, as Mindell notes, “automated and autonomous 
vehicles constantly return[] to their human makers for information, energy, and 
guidance.”471  Ultimately, VIS are “embodi[ments] of human efforts”472 and products 
of human intentionality.  The characterization of machines, robots, or intelligent 
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468 The law is replete with devices that illustrate the notion that legal responsibilities need not 
travel with practical responsibilities.  For example, state responsibility recognizes that, while human 
agents may hold practical responsibilities for certain acts, states remain responsible for those acts.  
Command responsibility similarly provides for hierarchical accountability.  The doctrine of respondeat 
superior acknowledges that companies, while distributing practical responsibilities through human 
agents, only attribute certain legal responsibilities to specific human principals.  Products liability law 
generally provides that makers of products are responsible for injuries causes by the products.  The 
common law maxim qui facit per alium facit per se provides that “he who acts through another acts 
himself operates to make the acts of an agent.”  See e.g. Colonial Sec., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(“the common law maxim Qui facit per 
alium facit per se, he who acts through another acts himself operates to make the acts of an agent 
within the scope of his authority, in legal effect, the acts of his principal.”). 
469 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 10 (“How a system is designed, by whom, and for what 
purpose shapes its abilities and its relationships with the people who use it.”). 
470 DELANDA, supra note 95, at 3. 
471 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 4; but see Liu, supra note 65, at 650.  Citing M Coeckelbergh 
at 273  (“None of the parts, nodes, or bees control the action (in this sense they are not agents), but the 
system, network, or swarm as a whole acts.”). 
472 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 220. 
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systems as “inhuman” is thus also incorrect because they are “embedded, [as humans 
are], in social and technical networks” created by humans.473 
The notion of machines replacing humans on the battlefield is a “myth” 
because “[f]or any apparently autonomous system, we can always find the wrapper of 
human control that makes it useful and returns meaningful data.”474  Technology does 
not replace humans in the sense that it substitutes them; rather it re-places in the sense 
that it resituates or repositions the human within the network.475  In its report entitled 
The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, the DoD notes: 
Treating autonomy as a widget or “black box” supports an “us versus 
the computer” attitude among commanders rather than the more 
appropriate understanding that there are no fully autonomous systems 
just as there are no fully autonomous soldiers, sailors, airmen or 
Marines.  Perhaps the most important message for commanders is that 
all systems are supervised by humans to some degree, and the best 
capabilities result from the coordination and collaboration of humans 
and machines.476    
 
The key to remedying the perspective that humans are “out of the loop” is to focus on 
the system.  As Mindell notes, “[t]here is a human being in the system.  The human 
being is what makes the system.”477  Indeed, humans “are still present inside” the VIS 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
473 Id., at 8. 
474 Id., at 9. 
475 Id., at 13 (Where are the people? Which people are they? What are they doing? When are 
they doing it?). 
476 The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, Task Force Report, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (Jul. 2012) available at 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf at 24 (emphasis added). 
477 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 220 (emphasis added). 
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“through design and coding.”478  In effect, code enables “human action” and human 
intention “removed in time.”479 
The idea that “human decisions, presence, and expertise . . . still”480 lives 
through another medium does not require any futuristic thought experiments.  We can 
find examples right here on Earth.  In The Extended Phenotype, evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins makes the case that nature is full examples of an animal’s genes 
influencing the development of functional extensions of that animal’s body.  As 
Dawkins put it, “[a]n animal’s behaviour tends to maximize the survival of the genes 
‘for’ that behaviour, whether or not those genes happen to be in the body of the 
particular animal performing it.”481  For example, a spider’s web and a beaver dam 
are phenotypic extensions of the spider’s and the beaver’s genes, respectively.  “In 
principle,” Dawkins argues, “there is no reason why the phenotypic levers of gene 
power should not reach out for miles. A beaver dam is built close to the lodge, but the 
effect of the dam may be to flood an area thousands of square metres in extent.”482   
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478 Id., at 10. 
479 Id., at 221 (“This is the essence of the term ‘programming’ – telling a computer what to do 
at some point in the future, when the program is run.  Of course the machine will respond to its 
environment, and may encounter novel situations, and may even develop unexpected behaviors.  But 
the constraints on those behaviors are still very tight, and very much pre-scripted by the designers and 
programmers.”); but see Heyns, supra note 242, in BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, supra note 
30, 4 (“The increased autonomy in weapons release now points to an era where humans will be able to 
be not only physically absent from the battlefield but also psychologically absent, in the sense that 
computers will determine when and against whom force is released.”). 
480 Id., at 224 (“[H]uman decisions, presence, and expertise are still there but shifting with 
new technologies, although not always in the ways we expect.  It is not the robots themselves, but the 
novel mixtures of human and automated machines that are changing the nature of the work and the 
people who do it.”) (emphasis added). 
481 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE 233 (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
482 Id., at 200. 
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Similarly, technology is the phenotypic expression of human beings.483  VIS, 
then, are phenotypic expressions of human violence.  That the technology is removed 
in space and time from the human does not undermine its human objectives just as the 
predatory effect of a spider is not undermined simply because the spider web exists 
outside the spider’s body.484  VIS and humans are linked to “vast networks of data, 
colleagues, and imagery even as they become enmeshed in the details of human 
events that unfolds halfway across the globe.”485  Code is thus an extension of the 
human military organism. 486   To this end, the intelligence present in Violent 
Intelligent Systems is a functional extension of human predatory will.487  The desire 
to build VIS could also be interpreted as motivated by self-preservation.  Indeed, by 
sending VIS to do some of the fighting on their behalf, human lives are spared.488  
Another way to look at networks of human violence is through the lenses of 
active externalism.  With the advent of technology, human beings have heavily relied 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
483 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 284; MINDELL, supra note 126, at 13 (technology allows 
“[p]eople’s minds [to] tavel to other places, other countries, other planets.”). 
484 DAWKINS, supra note 481, at 200 (“In a very real sense her web is a temporary functional 
extension of her body, a huge extension of the effective catchment area of her predatory organs.”). 
485 MINDELL, supra note 126, at 220. 
486 To argue that autonomous systems are completely autonomous and do not have any 
“programmed mission” undermines the bedrock of military action.  Soldiers are not given carte 
blanche to do as they please on the battlefield, or to pursue their own private or divergent interests, but 
military missions are always governed by specific commands, orders and instructions.  Similarly, VIS 
will be given specific instructions on the battlefield.  Code, as an extension of human intent, will 
govern the VIS’ actions. 
487 DOMINGOS, supra note 18, at 284 (“intelligence and will may not inhabit the same body, 
provided there is a line of control between them”).   
488 I owe this analogy to Thiago Bento’s observation that the development of artificial 
intelligence is an extension of human intelligence and may be a way for human genes’ to promote self-
preservation.  Indeed, if we are able to upload our consciousness on a machine, Man potentially 
becomes immortal.  This may the ultimate expression of self-preservation in a known species. 
! 113 
on environmental supports to perform tasks which otherwise would have been 
impossible or inefficient for humans to do.  Humans use the “general paraphernalia of 
language, books, diagrams, and culture” to allow their brains to perform some 
operations, “while others are delegated to manipulations of external media.”489  For 
example, humans use pens and paper (or calculators) to perform mental calculations.  
In this sense, technology acts as a cognitive aid to human beings.  VIS are thus 
external media used by humans to carry out violent intentions in international armed 
conflicts.  As gatherers of data and information processors, VIS are cognitive aids 
that enable human intentions to be implemented remotely with greater efficiency, 
precision, and effectiveness.  Together with humans, VIS form a “coupled system” 
where all components play “an active causal role”, and as such “are in the loop, [and ] 
not dangling at the other end of a long causal chain.”490  Eventually, the use of VIS, 
as a cognitive tool of violence, will influence how humans wage and organize wars.  
Like pens and calculating machines impacted information technology, VIS will 
facilitate the human processing of power.  In particular, code, as a cognitive agent of 
human intentionality, will allow humans to externalize violence in ways that are 
removed in space and time and thus reconfigure established notions of defense, 
deterrence, and diplomacy.    
While phenotypic expressions and active externalism helps explain how VIS 
are expressions of and aids to human violence, they do not explain how networks of 
human violence distribute responsibilities between human and non-human actants. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
489 Andy Clark and David Chalmers, The Extended Mind, 58(1) ANALYSIS, 8 (1998). 
490 Clark and Chalmers, supra note 489 at 9. 
! 114 
Actor Network Theory (“ANT”) can help explain how a violence network operates 
without undermining fundamental rules of legal responsibility.  ANT is a descriptive 
tool that helps tell “stories about how relations assemble or don’t.”491  It is a form of 
material-semiotics that seeks to advance a relational materiality where “all entities 
achieve significance in relation to others.”492  At the heart of the ANT framework is 
the notion that human and non-human “actants” operate to make up networks.  
In The Pasteurization of France, Bruno Latour, a leading proponent of ANT, 
uses the process of scientific discoveries to illustrate how the actor-networks operates.  
While scientists, such as Louis Pasteur, are “actors” known for driving discoveries in 
laboratories, we cannot speak of “science” without also speaking of other “actants”, 
such as microbes, laws, microscopes, research groups, and research institutions.  
Actors and actants give meaning to each other through their relationships in the 
network.  Importantly, human actors act as spokespersons in the assemblage of that 
network.  Spokespersons mobilize actants in the network to achieve certain goals.  
Thus, “Pasteur speaks for microbes, the Curies can be said to speak for plutonium, 
Cantor for transfinite numbers, Einstein for photons.”493  ANT helps explain how 
“collective actions” are performed in networks where actors (humans) and actants 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
491 John Law, Actor-network theory and material semiotics, in BRYAN S. TURNER, THE NEW 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL THEORY141-142 (Blackwell Publishing, 3rd ed., 2008). 
492 Cassandra S. Crawford, Actor Network Theory, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY, 
available at http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/socialtheory/n1.xml. 
493 Sal Restivo, Bruno Latour: The Once and Future Philosopher, in GEORGE RITZER AND 
JEFFREY STEPINSKY (eds.), THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO MAJOR SOCIAL THEORISTS 538-539 
(Blackwell, 2011). 
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(non-humans) share practical (but not legal) responsibilities, 494  and without 
anthropomorphizing actants.495 
ANT frameworks can be used where there is semiotic relationality (a network 
whose components define and shape one another), heterogeneity (diversity of actors, 
human and otherwise), process (components need to play their respective parts), and 
space and scale (networks extend themselves and translate distant actors).496  In the 
context of human violence, the military is a network of violence that includes a 
multitude of actants, including (in no particular order) political leaders, policy 
makers, military lawyers, commanders, soldiers, contractors, researchers, victims, 
fuel, weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, computers, and code.  The VIS is an 
actant whose meaning depends on its relations to other components in the network.  
Human beings, including political leaders, programmers, commanders, and soldiers, 
are actors that shape and define those relations.  In effect, human beings are the 
“spokespersons” of the means and methods of human violence (e.g., VIS) just as 
Pasteur was the “spokesperson” for the microbes he studied and the pasteurization 
process he pioneered. 
Given their anthropocentric bent, systems of law continuously strive to 
identify human beings and human institutions as “spokespersons” of human relations 
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494 These actor-networks are often “punctualized”, meaning that the components of complex 
systems are hidden from the view of the user or audience of the system. Thus, while human beings 
may be “hidden from the view” of the operation of VIS, they remain the most important “components” 
in the “complex” system of human violence.  See Restivo, supra note 493, at 541-542. 
495 Restivo, supra note 493, at 539 (the actant (microbes, photon, the laboratory) are the non-
anthropomorphic sibling of “actor” and plays an important part in the network). 
496 Law, supra note 491, at 146. 
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with non-human actants.497  Chapter III demonstrated how human institutions and 
individuals remain responsible for the use of VIS.  Attempts to argue that VIS can 
“speak” for themselves contradicts the fundamental structures of law and violence: 
humans, as the true subjects of the law, ultimately remain responsible for the violence 
they inflict.  Accordingly, regulating the use of force in international armed conflicts 
is necessarily an exercise in parsing through networks of human violence to 
determine the human locus in emerging violent technologies.498  By focusing on the 
idea that human violence is performed by humans and non-human actants, this 
reconceptualization can assist “courts, tribunals and other agents” to continue 
expanding rights and responsibilities “to encompass wider circles of conduct, and 
additional actors within conflicts.”499  
Attitudes toward VIS in international armed conflicts will change as social 
expectations and cultural priorities shift to welcome the increasing digitization of 
human activity.  As with all forms of human violence, the meaning of VIS will be 
shaped not only by how they are built but also by how they are semiotically and 
culturally construed. 500   Culture will cultivate the meanings underlying the 
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497 The non-human is not foreign to law.  Indeed, we accept evidence from scientific analysis 
(DNA analysis) for example as part of a trial.  Latour characterized this as “the testimony of 
nonhumans”.  BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 23 (Harvard University Press, 1993) 
(“These nonhumans, lacking souls but endowed with meaning, are even more reliable than ordinary 
mortals, to whom will is attributed but who lack the capacity to indicate phenomena in a reliable 
way.”). 
498 TEITEL, supra note 207, at 4 (“In interpreting and elaborating the law of humanity, courts, 
tribunals, and other agents have had to address tensions between, and gaps within, the different 
traditional doctrinal sources of humanity law.”). 
499 Id., at 4 (emphasis added). 
500 As Geertz put it: “[b]elieving, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
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technology, including what they are (combatants, human-like machines, weapons?) 
and what they are for (to promote peace, protect hospitals, commit genocide?).501  As 
Wittgenstein put it, “[t]he arrow points only in the application that a living being 
makes of it.”502  Meanings are subject to a matrix of semiotic constructions that adapt 
to changing circumstances.503  If used to stop or prevent war crimes, the technologies 
underlying VIS are viewed favorably and very differently from, say, if a terrorist 
group uses them to commit a terrorist attack.  
Different cultures may internalize technological shifts differently.  For 
example, while “the threat of humanity creating things [it] cannot control pervades 
Western literature” 504  this “fear does not pervade Eastern culture to the same 
extent.”505  As Alex Ross notes in The Industries of the Future: 
The cultural dynamic in Japan is representative of the culture through 
much of East Asia, enabling the Asian robotics industry to speed 
ahead, unencumbered by cultural baggage. Investment in robots 
reflects a cultural comfort with robots, and, in China, departments of 
automation are well represented and well respected in the academy.  
There are more than 100 automation departments in Chinese !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”  
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, SELECTED ESSAYS 5 (Basic Books, 1973). 
501 See Brehm, supra note 74, at 4 (“Meaning-making is a social practice by which human 
beings interact with each other to make common sense of the world.  Meaning includes moral 
understandings of right and wrong, cognitive understandings of true and false, perceptual 
understandings of like and unlike.”). 
502 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/#H5. 
503 MARKOFF, supra note 62, at xviii (noting “the social construction of technology—the 
understanding that we shape our tools rather than being shaped by them.”). 
504 ROSS, supra note 327, at 23.  
505 Id. (“Prometheus was condemned to an eternity of punishment for giving fire to humans.  
When Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his ingenious waxed wings and he fell to his death.  In Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, Dr. Frankenstein’s grotesque creation wreaks havoc and ultimately leads to its 
creator’s death and numerous B-movie remakes.”).  
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universities, compared with approximately 76 in the United States 
despite the larger total number of universities in the United States. In 
South Korea, teaching robots are seen in a positive light; in Europe, 
they are viewed negatively. As with eldercare, in Europe robots are 
seen as machines, whereas in Asia they are viewed as potential 
companions.506 
 
As technology becomes increasingly embedded in our daily lives, workplaces, and 
relationships, 507  cultural expectations are likely to further anthropomorphize 
intelligent systems.508  VIS could in the future be described as “soldiers,” “fighters,” 
or “combatants.” 
This perceptive shift, however, should not affect the social expectation that 
humans remain responsible for the use of VIS. 509   We should not let the 
anthropomorphization of technology undermine the application of law and the 
allocation of responsibility—particularly for technologies that are capable of 
inflicting violence.  That may of course change if VIS and robots generally start 
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506 Id., at 23. 
507 Heyns, supra note 242, in BHUTA, BECK, GEISS, LIU AND KRESS, supra note 30, 3 
(“Computers affect almost all aspects of our lives and have become an integral part not only of our 
world but also of our very identity as human beings.”). 
508 As Martin Ford notes in the context of the workplace, “machines themselves are turning 
into workers.”  FORD, supra note 321, at xii. 
509 Of course, it is difficult to predict the social and cultural expectations of the future.  See 
Johnson, supra note 14, at 8 (“Recognizing that responsibility is embedded in relationships adds 
further support to the idea that the nature of a particular technology does not necessitate a particular 
responsibility arrangement. Accountability relationships are not dictated by nature or anything else. 
The nature of a technology is relevant to the responsibility arrangements, but responsibility 
arrangements are socially constituted through the norms and expectations of particular activities and 
contexts. . . . Hence, when it comes to responsibility-accountability for artificial agents of the future, 
the possibilities are open. People of the future might accept no human responsibility; they might come 
to expect robots to explain their behavior specifying why they did what they did; they might hold robot 
manufacturers accountable or they might hold multiple parties accountability according to their 
particular contributions to robot behavior.”). 
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acquiring legal personhood,510 or as Arendt put it, “right to have rights.”511  But since 
VIS will always act within networks of human violence (unless they figure out a way 
to procreate and be energy independent!), humans, as creators and users of these 
systems, should always remain responsible for consequences of their use.512  
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510 Upendra Baxi, The Posthuman and Human Rights, in UPENDRA BAXI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
POSTHUMAN WORLD 198-199 (Oxford University Press, 2009) (“Personification of the non-human has 
a very long juridical history, although it is with more recent invention of citizenship and corporate 
personality that the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ person (natural persons are born and 
the artificial persons are made) becomes problematic. The distinction misleads because in both cases it 
is the law that assigns personhood. And citizenship is an artificial personhood just the same as the 
corporation; not all born humans ‘enjoy’ the ‘blessing’ of citizenship-being. Stateless, diasporic, and 
nomadic humans may not belong to the category of persons/ populaces and may be reduced to status of 
things and objects, denied in Arendt’s immortal phrase ‘the right to have rights.’”); see also United 
States v. Certain Real Prop. & Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove Drive, Babylon, N.Y., 747 F. 
Supp. 173, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (“the ascription of personality to 
offending objects persisted into the modern law of civil forfeiture.”). 
511 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951). 
512 Whether in the future that responsibility becomes shared is a possibility, though the point 
is that humans should never be conceived as being removed from the responsibility chain. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to challenge the perspective that lethal weapons capable 
of autonomous operation ought to be pre-emptively banned on the grounds that they 
will be incapable to satisfy IHL and will allow human beings to evade liability for 
their use.  It has argued that such dystopian prognoses about VIS are based on a 
pessimistic and outdated view of artificial intelligence, and moreover, on a 
misinterpretation of international law’s ability to regulate means and methods of 
human violence.  In the process, this thesis has also critiqued terminologies of “lethal 
autonomy” and sought to refocus the debate toward violence, intelligence, and 
weapon systems.  In the final analysis, an alternative narrative emerges—one that 
recognizes technology’s potential to better bridge the gap between “norms and 
reality.”  Indeed, advances in machine learning and robotics will allow, at minimum, 
for rigorous adherence to IHL, and at best, that VIS outperform human compliance 
with IHL on the battlefield. 
As AI becomes more influential in all corners of human life,513 decision-
making will increasingly be made or shaped by powerful algorithms both on and off 
the battlefield.514  But human beings cannot cede their responsibility for violence by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
513 See MARKOFF, supra note 62, at xi (“Robots are pervading our daily lives.  Cheap sensors, 
powerful computers, and artificial intelligence software will ensure they will, increasingly, be 
autonomous.  They will assist us and they will replace us.”); see also id., at xv-xvi (“With the arrival of 
‘ubiquitous computing,’ . . . smart machines are making decisions for us.”). 
514 Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at i (“[A]uthority is increasingly expressed 
algorithmically. War is no exception. . . . Warring parties have long expressed authority and power 
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merely delegating functions to algorithms.  Human violence has always been 
expressed in networks of human and non-human actants that collaborate to implement 
violent political515 objectives.516  While actants can share practical responsibilities in 
these networks, there is no correlated distribution of legal responsibilities from 
humans to other actants.  Indeed, human institutions and human beings remain 
responsible for the use of VIS under public international law.  Accordingly, VIS 
should not be pre-emptively banned.  
This conclusion should not be taken as a justification for the increased 
militarization of States or other actors.  To the contrary, it serves as a warning to 
States and human agents that decisions to develop and deploy VIS carry 
responsibilities that cannot be discarded by virtue of the technology’s complexity.  In 
many ways, this heightens the bar to responsible development, deters poor 
deployment, and increases the expectations that VIS must categorically comply with 
IHL.  Additional accountability methods will also need to be developed beyond the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
through algorithms. For decades, algorithms have helped weapons systems—first at sea and later on 
land—to identify and intercept inbound missiles. Today, military systems are increasingly capable of 
navigating novel environments and surveilling faraway populations, as well as identifying targets, 
estimating harm, and launching direct attacks—all with fewer humans at the switch.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
515 War, as a mere continuation of human-made policy “by other means”, is an “act of 
violence” that works as a “political instrument” to achieve political goals.  CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 
182, at 5, 22. 
516 Some have sought to characterize this collaborative network as a post-human distribution 
of human subjectivity and agency, re-situating “the human as an intelligent machine in constant 
interaction with other intelligent machines.” In this post-human context, distributed cognition between 
human and non-human intelligence replaces the notion of autonomous will. This partnership between 
humans and non-human actants “is not so much a usurpation of human right and [human] 
responsibility as it is a further development in the construction of distributed cognition environments”.  
As technology becomes more deeply embedded in the human condition, the notion of what is ‘human’ 
be stretched to allow other actants to participate in the mediation of human conduct.  Indeed, in 
potentially allowing for greater adherence to IHL, VIS may evolve to become “constitutive partners” 
in the development of how human rights are shaped, promoted and protected.  Baxi, supra note 510, at 
205, 223. 
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legal architecture.517  For example, Lewis, Blum and Modirzadeh identify a number 
of “soft mechanisms” to strengthen accountability for the use of weapons like VIS.  
These mechanisms include independent monitoring, non-binding declarations and 
resolutions, normative design and technical architectures, and community self-
regulation.518   
Ultimately, stakeholders should recognize that bellicosity does not spring 
from the human hand but is seeded by the human mind.  Code, as a functional 
extension of human intentionality, extends human action in space and time in ways 
that challenge established notions of the structure of the international order.  The use 
of drones and cyberwarfare are already undermining traditional state-centric concepts, 
such as sovereignty, territoriality, and the monopoly of force.  It is only a matter of 
time before VIS upend the organization of warfare. 
To this end, the weaponization of artificial intelligence519 may shift power 
from entities that monopolize force (traditionally States) to those that monopolize or 
control information technology.  Code will become to the 21st century what the 
nuclear weapon was to the 20th.  But since coding is available to anyone and 
technologies are becoming more accessible and cheaper to acquire, the greatest 
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517 Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at xii (“In short, individual responsibility for 
international crimes under international law remains one of the vital accountability avenues in 
existence today, as do measures of remedy for state responsibility. Yet in practice responsibility along 
either avenue is unfortunately relatively rare. And thus neither path, on its own or in combination, 
seems to be sufficient to effectively address the myriad regulatory concerns pertaining to war 
algorithms—at least not until we better understand what is at issue. These concerns might lead those 
seeking to strengthen accountability of war algorithms to pursue not only traditional, formal avenues 
but also less formal, softer mechanisms.”). 
518 Lewis, Blum, and Modirzadeh, supra note 6, at 91. 
519 ROSS, supra note 327, at 121 (“The weaponization of code”). 
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defense challenge of the 21st century will be to maximize human security in an age 
where vulnerability and defense are distributed—or democratized—among public and 
private actors.520  As Wittes and Blum note, “[i]n our new world, you can pose a 
threat to the security of every state or person on the planet—and each can also 
threaten you.”521  In this new world, human impunity is not an option.  Much like a 
manufacturer is responsible for the products she makes—regardless of whether the 
assembly line is automated—humans, as manufacturers of violence, are responsible 
for its effects. 
While the future of violence will reducibly be waged through code, its 
malleability and openness allows it to also work as a medium through which law 
regulates conduct.  Indeed, code may allow for a more rigorous translation of IHL 
principles into military operation.  Self-learning code, coupled with powerful 
robotics, will allow for greater precision, discrimination, and proportionality in 
attacks.  It may also encourage the use of non-lethal force.  And unlike human 
intelligence, code is testable, scalable, upgradeable, and connectable.  As Laplace put 
it in another context, which is nonetheless pertinent here: 
An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given 
instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the 
universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the 
motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, 
provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data 
to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the 
past would be present to its eyes.522   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
520 WITTES AND BLUM, supra note 2, at 2 (“[D]estructive power once reserved to states is now 
the potential province of individuals.”); MARKOFF, supra note 62, at xvii (“More than merely replacing 
humans, information technology is democratizing certain experiences.”). 
521 WITTES AND BLUM, supra note 2, at 6. 
522 PIERRE SIMON LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 282, translated by 
Frederick Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory, (Dover Publications, 1951). 
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   In addition to creating new avenues to produce violence, artificial intelligence 
may also help humans find optimal solutions to international conflicts that wholly 
avoid the use of force.  The dialectical struggle between the weaponization of 
artificial intelligence and the human quest for global peace may refurbish our 
perspective of AI as a tool built not to destroy Mankind, but to save it from itself.523  
But before we find the algorithm for peace, our species still has considerable work to 
do in humanizing the inconvenience of war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
523 MARKOFF, supra note 62, at xix (noting Nortbert Wiener’s warning about the potential of 
automation: “We can be humble and live a good life with the aid of machines, or we can be arrogant 
and die.”). 
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